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1.1 Child labor in the developing World 
Child labor is a persistent social and economic problem. Although children have always 
carried out a variety of tasks, child labor began to be a worrying phenomenon since 
the large-scale employment of children in factories during the Industrial Revolu-
tion. During this period, children worked long hours under unhealthy, dangerous, and 
sometimes even fatal circumstances. It was also during these times that awareness for 
children’s rights and the importance of (compulsory) education progressively grew. The 
first laws on child labor were implemented with the British Factory Acts; the earliest 
originated in 1802 and designed to regulate working conditions for young workers in 
the factories. In the following years and throughout the nineteenth century, maximum 
work hours were reduced and children obtained more rights and chances to pursue an 
education. 
 Nowadays, child labor mostly occurs in developing countries. During the course of 
the twentieth century, two UN agencies – still important actors today – have fought for 
the elimination of child labor: the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the 
International labor organization (Ilo). Their efforts have resulted in several interna-
tional conventions, aimed at stopping child labor and getting children into school. one 
of the most important Ilo–initiatives is the International Programme on the Elimination 
of Child labour (Ilo–IPEC). This initiative, which started in 1992, intends to eliminate 
child labor by national capacity building and global awareness-raising. however, despite 
these measures and the efforts of donors, NGo’s and governments, it has been esti-
mated that still 215 million children are engaged in child labor worldwide (Ilo–IPEC, 
2010b). Why is the child labor problem so persistent? obviously, anti-child labor legisla-
tion and treaties have failed to a large extent. The most important Ilo treaties on child 
labor are signed by most countries, but if governments do not have the ambition and 
means to implement and enforce their child labor laws, ratifying a convention remains 
an empty formality.
 Poverty is the most frequently mentioned cause of child labor. Indeed, primarily poor 
children living in poor countries are engaged in child labor. however, this cannot explain 
all the differences in the child labor incidence. Recently, for instance, the Ilo reported 
a decline in child labor in the period 2004–2008 (Ilo–IPEC, 2010b). This decline partly 
took place during the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis that hit the developed as 
well as the developing world. If poverty would be the most important cause of child la-
bor, we would have expected to see an increase in, at least, the supply of child laborers.
 Nonetheless, if the financial crisis has led to less international trade, the demand 
for child labor would be lower, and a decline is to be expected. Besides, the term ‘child 
labor’ covers much more than children in sweatshops knitting our carpets or sewing 
our footballs: children also work at family farms, family businesses and do household 
chores. Although the Ilo includes unpaid family workers in their statistics, housework 
is excluded. Therefore, it could very well be that the decline in child labor goes hand in 
hand with an increase in the number of children performing unpaid household chores.
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 For a good understanding of the child labor problem it is therefore necessary to get 
a clear picture of every kind of work children are engaged in. While there are numerous 
publications on child labor, there is no study that covers all the kinds of work done by 
young children in developing countries. This thesis intends to do that. By studying the in-
volvement of children in commercial work, housework, family business work, and unpaid 
work outside the household, I hope to make a valuable contribution to our knowledge 
about the driving factors behind child labor.
1.2 theoretiCal baCkgroUnd
Child labor has been studied intensively by historians, economists and social scientists, 
but they all tell a different part of the story. historians often focus on the circumstances 
of child laborers in factories during the British industrial revolution (Nardinelli, 1980; 
kirby, 2003; hutchins & harrison; 1903). The most cited historical child labor article, for 
example, is about the earlier mentioned “Factory Acts” (Nardinelli, 1980). In this paper, 
Nardinelli shows that the decline of child labor did not begin with the installment of 
the Factory Acts, but that rising real income and technological change caused the child 
labor rates to decrease. Child labor laws only accelerated this development.
 Economists have shown that the complex child labor problem can be simplified with 
the help of demand and supply curves in mathematical models; which have helped in 
making an argument for interventions, such as minimum adult wage policies. In his 
well-known paper, levy (1985) applies a model of the household economy to research 
the relationship between child labor, fertility decisions and mechanization / moderni-
zation to child labor in rural Egypt. he argues that substitutes for child labor, such as 
mechanization and efficient agricultural techniques (e.g. irrigation) go hand in hand with 
dropping birth rates. Since agriculture has not yet been modernized in various parts of 
the developing world, levy’s work is still of great value. Another much cited economic 
article is ‘The Economics of Child labor’ by Basu and van (1998). Their theoretical model 
is based on two pillars: (1) the empirical evidence that children of wealthy parents are 
less often engaged in child labor. When parents earn sufficient income, they pull their 
children out the labor market and send them to school. This is called the luxury-axiom. 
(2) From a company’s point of view, adult and child labor are substitutes: the substitu-
tion axiom. Basu and van’s paper has changed economic thinking by showing that there 
may be two equilibria (instead of one) in the labor market in developing countries: one 
with low wages and child labor and one with high wages and no child labor. In economic 
terms, both are equally efficient. More recently, Scoville (2002) has revised and supple-
mented Basu and van’s model, arguing that not all work done by children is replaceable 
by adults. According to him, children often are employed to do monotonous, low-produc-
tive and agricultural tasks for which hiring adults is too expensive. Scoville concludes 
that the Basu and van model might be a good model to explain commercial child labor 
in sweatshops, but it does not do justice to the reality of many working children in other 
situations. 
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 Most of the economic child labor literature today is based on human capital theory 
as developed by T.W. Schultz, Gary Becker, and other authors (Edmonds, 2008; Becker, 
1964; Schultz, 1960). This theory regards education as an investment in human capital 
and child labor can be seen as opportunity costs of schooling. Edmonds (2008) stresses 
the importance of agency in the decision making process, which is often neglected. 
however, it does matter if the choice for child labor or schooling is made by the children, 
their parents, or both.
 one of the merits of anthropological research into child labor is that it gives insight 
into the daily activities of boys and girls in developing countries. For example, in a paper 
based on data from Murdoch’s ‘Ethnographic Atlas’, Bradley (1993) describes for chil-
dren living in 97 societies what they do in daily life. In most societies, working children 
are responsible for low-skilled, tedious tasks. Similar to Scoville, Bradley emphasizes 
that children generally are involved in tasks which are generally not performed by 
adults, such as cattle herding. Another merit of the work of anthropologists can be found 
in the way they are able to give specific details into successes or failures of policies 
aimed at reducing child labor. For example, in a study on poor children in kerala (India), 
Nieuwenhuys (1993) shows that compulsory education had an unintentional side-effect: 
in order to pay for school clothes and other materials, children had to earn money after 
school hours. All in all, anthropological work has given us the insight that we need to 
look at the age and gender dimension of child labor (Nieuwenhuys, 1996) and have a 
close look at the diverse cultural circumstances in different parts of the developing 
world (lieten, 2003).
 Important sociological work on child labor involve case studies for specific regions 
(Bass, 2004) and countries (Buchmann, 2000; lu & Treiman, 2011). Besides situation-
specific knowledge, these studies also emphasize how stratification leads to persistent 
low levels of education and high child labor involvement of specific groups in society, a 
situation often referred to by economists as the poverty trap (Emerson & Souza, 2003). 
Since the sociological concept of ‘social capital’ partly overlaps with ‘social exclusion’, 
sociology also plays an important role in the ‘new poverty’- discourse. The key concepts 
here are ‘social exclusion’ and ‘relative poverty’; they might help to explain why some 
‘absolute’ poor children are involved in child labor while others are not. For example, 
a lack of social capital in vulnerable poor circles may lead to a marginalized, excluded 
group in society, which is unable to benefit from schemes or policies aimed at helping 
them. Moreover, social exclusion can also be a result from discriminating policies, such 
as in some parts of Turkey, where the majority of child laborers in rural areas are kurd-
ish children with low access to school and social services (Özbek, 2007).
1.3 this thesis 
An important disadvantage of most child labor research is that it focuses on determi-
nants at one level only. This can either be the family level (e.g. Buchmann, 2000; Patri-
nos & Psacharopoulos, 1997) or the national level (e.g. kis-katos & Schulze, 2006; Fan, 
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2004; Roggero et al., 2007). Parental decisions regarding child labor, however, depend 
not only on characteristics of parents and their households, but just as much on the 
presence of job opportunities for children at the local labor market and on the charac-
teristics of the available educational facilities. Therefore, for gaining an encompass-
ing understanding of the roots of child labor, the relevant factors at the different levels 
(household, community and national) should be studied simultaneously. The insight 
that child labor should be researched by including factors of both the level of the child/
household and the context they live in, has already been acknowledged in the literature 
for some time (Manacorda & Rosati, 2007; Bashieri & Falkingham, 2006; kis-katos & 
Schulze, 2006), but until now, no large scale comparative research on child labor has 
been conducted.
 Another shortcoming of the child labor literature is that most research concen-
trates on commercial labor: until recently, there has not been much attention for unpaid 
children’s work. Nevertheless, unpaid work can also be unhealthy and hamper a child’s 
education. The few studies with a focus on unpaid work mostly are case studies (e.g. 
Goulart & Bedi, 2008; Zabaleta, 2011; Assaad, levison & Zibani, 2010); hence cross-
country comparative research would be a step forward our knowledge about child labor. 
 This thesis contributes to the existing debate by (1) solving the micro-macro divide, 
(2) including both paid and unpaid child labor and (3) combining theoretical ideas of 
earlier-mentioned disciplines into one multidisciplinary framework aimed at under-
standing the determinants of child labor both at the household level and at the level 
of the context in which the household lives. In this framework, all possible factors are 
grouped into three kinds of conditions: resources, structure and culture. Resources are 
the means by which households can provide their members with food, shelter, education 
and health, as well as the services, regulations and information available in the context 
that may help households fulfill these needs. Structure refers to structural characteris-
tics of households (e.g. nuclear or extended family, number of children, absence of par-
ents) and of the context in which they live (e.g. labor market, legal framework). Culture 
encompasses local and national views of society on childhood, socialization and the role 
of women.
 Furthermore, the availability of advanced statistical software for multilevel analyses 
allows me to test which factors at which level determine children’s engagement in child 
labor. In addition, this approach makes it possible to research whether effects differ un-
der different circumstances. To test the validity of the model and to get a more detailed 
insight into the world of child labor, I will empirically test the model on four forms of 
child labor, namely (1) commercial work, (2) housework, (3) family business work, and 
(4) unpaid work outside the household.
1.4 aiMs
The aims of this study are fivefold. Firstly, I will give a description of the size of the 
child labor problem. Secondly, I will introduce a newly developed theoretical framework 
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that explains child labor at both the household and the context level. This framework 
is tested with multilevel analysis to determine which factors at the individual and the 
context level play a role. In order to get an encompassing understanding of child labor 
in the developing world, this model will be applied to all forms of child labor. Thirdly, I 
will determine how these factors differ between boys and girls. Fourthly, I will research 
whether effects of the household level factors differ under the different circumstances 
in urban and rural areas. Fifthly and lastly, I will describe how the household and context 
level factors differ between Asia and Africa.
1.5 researCh QUestions
The first research question corresponds with the first aim to describe the size of the 
child labor problem in the developing world. This first question therefore reads:
1 how high is the incidence of the different forms of child labor in developing 
countries? how many hours do working children on average spend on com-
mercial work, housework, family business work and unpaid work outside their 
household?
The second aim of this thesis is to develop a new theoretical framework. To achieve this 
aim, we first need to know how household characteristics affect the involvement in child 
labor in developing countries. Furthermore: parents, who are the main decision mak-
ers on their children’s labor engagement, also take the characteristics of the context 
into account. When there is no demand for child labor, or when it is forbidden by law, 
children cannot be engaged in child labor. Parents will also be influenced by persistent 
cultural value patterns, e.g. about the role of women in the economy. Consequently, my 
second research question is divided into two parts:
2 A: What is the effect of the characteristics of the household in which a child lives 
on the engagement in child labor?  
B: What is the effect of context characteristics on the engagement in child labor? 
Parents may have different ideas about the future for their daughters and sons. Boys, 
for example, may be expected to inherit the family farm or business and girls to become 
housewives. To prepare them for these future roles, children may often perform gender-
specific tasks when they are young. Boys must help with heavier tasks or learn skills 
that may help them in their future professions, while girls are expected to help with the 
household chores and the care for siblings. These gender differences can also be found 
in commercial work. For example, since in some societies the place of women and girls 
is in the home, they will only do commercial work when it is home-based. When girls 
work outside the household, girls and boys participate in different tasks and sectors; for 
instance, boys are more involved in fisheries and growing cereal crops while girls work 
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more in the textile industry and poultry farming (Edmonds, 2008). To address these dif-
ferences between boys and girls, the third research question reads:
3 To what extent do effects of household and context characteristics on the en-
gagement in child labor differ between boys and girls?
Characteristics of the household not only have a direct effect on child labor; the strength 
of these effects may be weaker or stronger in different contexts. The fourth aim of this 
thesis therefore is to increase our understanding of the way in which effects of house-
hold characteristics on child labor depend on the context in which children live. Since 
there are many differences in the level of development, (social) infrastructure, and 
culture between rural and urban areas, I will focus on differences in the background 
characteristics between those two. The fourth research question of this thesis therefore 
is:
4 To what extent do effects of household and context characteristics on the en-
gagement in child labor differ between rural and urban areas?
I do not implicitly assume that the driving factors behind child labor are the same for 
different parts of the developing world. Given that previous research indicates that there 
are many differences in the causes, incidence and types of child labor between Asia and 
Africa (e.g. Bhalotra, 2003), I will perform separate analyses for these two regions of the 
developing world in the second part of the book. The fifth and last research question in 
this thesis therefore reads as follows:
5 To what extent do effects of household and context characteristics on the en-
gagement in child labor differ between Asia and Africa?
1.6 Model
The theoretical model in this thesis unifies theories from economics, sociology and 
history/anthropology into one theoretical framework. In this model the many factors 
that are mentioned in the broad child labor literature as determinants of child labor are 
grouped into three conditions according to the supposed underlying causal mechanisms. 
These conditions are called resources, structure and culture and are assumed to be 
located at both the household and the context level.
resources are the means by which households can provide their members with food, 
shelter, education and development. Context level resources include the level of devel-
opment and educational level of the community; they allow parents to earn enough to 
be able to send their children to school or increase the awareness that schooling is a 
prerequisite to acquire human capital.
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structure refers to family structure, such as living in an extended family, the number of 
siblings and to structural characteristics of the context, like the (educational) infrastruc-
ture and characteristics of the labor market.
Culture encompasses views on childhood, socialization and the role of women in society. 
Traditional values on the level of the household are, for instance, reflected by the age 
difference between spouses. At the context level, dominant value patterns in patriarchal 
circles are perceived to be cultural traits which may possibly influence children’s labor 
engagement. 
Finally, the model assumes that the effects of these mechanisms may have different ef-
fects depending on the circumstances; for example, according to the situational domi-
nance hypothesis, resources make less of a difference under more severe situations. We 
would expect a weaker positive effect of resources, because there are fewer possibilities 
in these areas.
 This book can be regarded as the end product of the research process to develop 
a sound and clear model for explaining child labor. The final model will be extensively 
described in Chapter 3. The paper, on which Chapter 6 is based, is historically written 
earlier in time and I use a less developed version of the model here. The background 
factors can be placed under the same underlying mechanisms of the final model though. 
1.7 definitions
Child labor is a complex phenomenon to research. This basically has two reasons. First, 
a large share of child labor is literally invisible because many children do not work in 
factories or in the street, but in the realm of the household, doing housework or (unpaid) 
family business work. Second, there are multiple and (partly) overlapping definitions of 
child labor in use. In order to study the complex child labor problem, a good working 
definition of child labor needs to be constructed. For this purpose, I use two conventions 
of the International labour organisation (Ilo) as a starting point. Both these conven-
tions are ratified by approximately 160 countries and both refer to children in employ-
ment. The first one speaks not about child labor per se but about the minimum entry 
age of employment:
1 Convention no. 138: Minimum Age for Admission to Employment: “prohibits all 
economic activity by children beneath the age of 12 and permits light work only 
for 12 and 13 year-olds in developing countries” and “it calls for universal com-
pulsory education through the age of 14 in developing countries”. 
With ratifying Ilo’s convention no. 138, a country promises to make the effort to “pursue 
a national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labor and to progres-
sively raise the minimum age for admission to employment or work to a level consistent 
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with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons”. By signing the con-
vention, the member states promise that the minimum age is not less than the comple-
tion age of compulsory education in their country and not less than 15 years. Developing 
countries, however, are allowed to lower the age to 14 years.
The second convention is about the worse forms of child labor and reads:
2 Convention no. 182: Concerning The Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the worst Forms of Child labour: “prohibits and targets for urgent 
elimination of the worst forms of child labour for all children below the age 
of 18”.
In the spirit of these conventions, the Ilo itself defines child labor as “work that de-
prives children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful to 
physical and mental development.” (Ilo, 2012).
Child labor refers to work that:
 – “is mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children; and
 – interferes with their schooling by:
 – depriving them of the opportunity to attend school;
 – obliging them to leave school prematurely; or
 – requiring them to attempt to combine school attendance with excessively long 
and heavy work.“ (Ilo, 2012)
Most developing countries have made efforts to combat child labor, both in national laws 
and international agreements. There are some differences, however. From the countries 
studied in this thesis, Somalia and India are the only countries that have not ratified Ilo’s 
Convention no. 182 on the worst forms of child labor. Somalia, India, liberia and Bangla-
desh have not ratified Convention no. 138 on the minimum age of employment either. 
 Employing the Ilo–definition, child labor is much broader than paid employment 
of children alone. In this study, child labor is all work done by children under the age of 
14 that hampers their health or education. Employing this new working definition does 
more justice to the reality of millions of children in developing countries.
 In this thesis, child labor is divided into four categories: (1) commercial work, (2) 
housework, (3) family business work and (4) unpaid work outside the household. In 
separate chapters, I will study the causal mechanisms behind these kinds of work. In 
order to get a good understanding of the concepts used in this thesis, the different kinds 
of labor are defined below:
 – Commercial work: is paid (either in cash or kind) work for someone who is not a 
member of the household in which the child lives. 
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 – housework: refers to work running a household and consists of chores such as 
shopping, collecting firewood, cleaning, fetching water, or caring for children. 
 – family business work: is work done for members of the household, but house-
work is excluded. It includes ‘any other family work’, for example on the farm or 
in a business or selling goods in the street.
 – Unpaid work outside the household: This category encompasses all unpaid 
work for someone who is not a member of the household in which the child 
lives.
By making this categorization, I hope to get a clearer understanding of the world of child 
labor. It must be noted, however, that the group of bonded child laborers and other worst 
forms of child labor (such as child prostitution or child soldiers) are excluded, because 
the information needed on these vulnerable groups is generally not included in house-
hold surveys, which form the empirical basis of this thesis.
As mentioned earlier, it is generally the parents who make the child labor decision. 
In this process, parents take the characteristics of the child, the household and the 
context into account. In the literature, various terms are used to describe these different 
spheres (or levels). The literature speaks, for example, about the supply and demand 
side of child labor when discussing characteristics of the child’s family and local labor 
market. The context level is also often referred to as the community level. In this thesis, 
I will use a more inclusive terminology to describe the different spheres, because com-
munity characteristics and the demand for child labor and are only a dimension of the 
context in which the child lives.
household factors: refers to characteristics of the child and the household. Character-
istics of the child are for example its age, gender and birth order. Characteristics of the 
household are the socio-economic characteristics of the parents, its size, the number of 
sons and daughters, or whether it is an extended family. 
Context factors: refers to characteristics of the context. These factors relate to the 
demand side, community factors, culture, etc. In this study the context factors are 
measured at the subnational level, hereafter called "district" and the national level, also 
referred to as the country level. 
1.8 the data
Quantitative comparative studies are restricted by the availability of data. Early cross-
country analyses became possible with the lABoRSTA database from Ilo. Unfortu-
nately, unpaid work within the household is not included in lABoRSTA, so these early 
figures probably substantially underestimate the size of the problem (Edmonds, 2008). 
The rising availability of detailed household surveys since the 1990s, however, allows for 
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large-scale cross-country research on issues like school attendance, women’s employ-
ment and child labor in developing countries. For studying child labor, surveys such as 
the Demographic and health Surveys (DhS) and UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Surveys 
(MICS) have proven to be very useful. originally, the DhS surveys were designed for 
monitoring population, health, and nutrition in developing countries, and the MICS for 
monitoring the progress towards an internationally agreed set of mid-decade goals in 
1995. Although these household surveys were not in the first place designed for scien-
tific research into the causes of child labor, they have already demonstrated their value 
in numerous scientific and policy papers (DhS, 2012; UNICEF, 2012).
 In this thesis I use data from over 20 DhS and MICS surveys. For the purpose of 
studying child labor, the MICS is the most useful data source, because the questions on 
children’s engagement in child labor of the third wave (2005–06) are standardized. The 
fact that the questions MICS-surveys contain the same wording, albeit in translation for 
each country, makes comparative research such as in this study much easier. Further, a 
unique feature of the MICS is that these surveys contain questions on the time involve-
ment in the different kinds of work. Still, information on child labor is available in a 
substantial number of DhS-surveys; hence both DhS and MICS surveys will be used 
for this research.
 To see which factors determine whether a child is engaged in commercial child 
labor, I use data for 18 countries from DhS in Chapter 3 to subject the model to a first 
empirical test. Because the questions regarding to the types of work and time involve-
ment are standardized and more detailed in the MICS surveys, I use MICS data for 16 
countries in Africa and Asia for part 2 (Chapter 4 to 7) of this thesis. The context infor-
mation about culture, position of women, and educational facilities, is generally proxied 
by aggregating from the household surveys to the district level.
1.9 overvieW of Chapters
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, I will give a description of the data 
and method(s) that will be used. The theoretical model is described in Chapter 3. In this 
chapter, this model is also subjected to a first empirical test focusing on the engage-
ment in commercial child labor. I will do this by applying multilevel analysis on data for 
239,120 children living in 221 districts of 18 developing countries in latin America, Africa 
and India. 
 Part 2 (Chapter 4 to 7) focuses on child labor in Asia and Africa. In Chapter 4, using 
data for approximately 178,000 children living in 16 countries, I provide descriptive 
statistics for the involvement in commercial work, housework, family business work 
and unpaid work outside the household. These statistics are derived from the MICS. In 
Chapter 5 to 7, I will use the theoretical model to explain the variation in hours worked 
in the four distinguished types of child labor. Chapter 5 will focus on the hours spent 
on commercial work. In Chapter 6, I explain the driving factors of the involvement in 
housework and family business work, such as working at the family farm or selling 
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goods in the streets for the family business. Chapter 7 is about unpaid work outside 
the household.
 By disentangling the different forms of child labor in this systematic way and provid-
ing empirical information on children’s engagement in these four forms of child labor, 
this thesis aims to make a valuable contribution to existing child labor research. By 
combining theories from various disciplines into one theoretical model and by system-
atic hypothesis testing, this model is thoroughly tested. Furthermore, because I not 
only focus on commercial work, but also research the incidence and determinants of 
neglected forms of unpaid labor, this thesis offers a more detailed insight into the reality 
of working children throughout the developing world. 
 In part 3 of this thesis I will reflect upon my findings. I will describe the relationship 
between child labor and school enrollment in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 concludes. In this 
chapter, the results in this thesis are summarized to answer the five research questions. 
Furthermore, I will also give some directions for policy making and future research.
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Chapter 2
28
2.1 introdUCtion
In this chapter I give an overview of the data and methods used in this thesis. This chap-
ter is organized as follows. Firstly, the data are introduced in section 2.2. In section 2.2.1 
a description of the DhS-data used in part 1 of this thesis and an overview of variables 
are provided. Subsequently, I will do the same for the MICS-data in 2.2.2. In section 2.3 
the method(s) are introduced and discussed.
2.2 data
All the data used in this thesis are also part of the Database Developing World (DDW; 
www.datdevworld.org). The DDW is a large infrastructure containing datasets for more 
than 100 developing countries with information on individuals, the households they live 
in, as well as context information at the sub-national and national level (DDW, 2012). 
2.2.1 desCription of the dhs data 
The data used in Chapter 3 are derived from the Demographic and health Surveys 
(DhS). These are large representative household surveys held since the 1980s in many 
developing countries. I use recent surveys for eighteen countries; Benin 2006, Bang-
ladesh 2004, Chad 2004, Congo DR 2007, Congo-Brazzaville 2005, Egypt 2005, liberia 
2007, Morocco 2003, Mali 2001, Malawi 2004, Senegal 2005, Sierra leone 2008, Uganda 
2001, Colombia 2000, Dominican Republic 2007, Nicaragua 2001, Peru 2004–2008 and 
India 2006. 
 The Demographic and health Surveys are household surveys that provide data on 
population, health, and nutrition; sponsored by USAID. They consist of a household sur-
vey and a women’s survey. The household surveys contain information about household 
characteristics (e.g. size, type of housing, urbanization etc.) and general information 
about each of the household members (such as age, school enrollment, relationship to 
household head etc.). The women’s surveys are held amongst women aged 15–49 and 
provide detailed information on literacy, education, employment, reproductive health 
issues, decision making and domestic violence, women’s and children’s health, nutri-
tion and fertility. Many, but not all, DhS-surveys also contain a male survey, with similar 
detailed questions asked to eligible men. For details on the data, see www.measuredhs.
com.
 The countries used for Chapter 3 of this thesis are chosen because the DhS data 
included information on the labor market participation of young children. For most of 
these countries, this was collected through questions in a specific child labor mod-
ule asked to potential child laborers under a certain age. The other surveys contained 
country-specific questions about the economic activities in the week before the survey 
that were asked to all household members.
 Table 2.1 presents an overview of the countries, the number of districts for which 
context data could be included, survey year, household survey response rate and num-
ber of respondents of the household sample. Table 2.1 shows that the overall response 
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rate is high. In all but two countries, it is above 95 percent. The response rate in Nicara-
gua and Colombia is lower, but with over 90 percent still very high. 
vARIABlES USED FRoM DhS SURvEYS
Dependent variable
In the analyses based on DhS data in Chapter 3, child labor is measured by a construct-
ed dummy variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) the child performed any economic 
activity for non-household members in the week before the survey. Because questions 
on child labor are not standardized in DhS surveys, I recoded the relevant country-
specific variables into one new variable that is the same for each country.
Independent variables
Independent variables at the household level are socio-economic characteristics (pa-
rental education and occupation, household wealth), demographic characteristics (sex, 
age, number of brothers and sisters, birth order, whether or not the child is a biologi-
cal child and household composition). Since income is lacking in most of the surveys, 
household wealth was used as an alternative. household wealth is measured by an 
index constructed on the basis of household assets, such as Tvs, cars, telephones, and 
World region Country number of
districts
household 
survey year
response
rate
respondents
latin America Dominican Republic 32 2007 99.2 8,212
Colombia 12 2000 92.9 45,291
Peru 25 2004–2008 99.2 97,211
  Nicaragua 3 2001 92.5 58,209
North Africa Egypt 26 2005 98.9 106,635
Morocco 15 2003 98.8 60,795
West Africa Benin 6 2006 99.1 86,515
liberia 6 2007 97.2 33,456
Mali 9 2001 97.9 64,116
Senegal 4 2005 98.5 63,494
Sierra leone 14 2008 97.6 41,608
Central Africa Chad 8 2004 99.4 27,879
Congo DR 11 2007 99.3 47,228
Congo-Brazzaville 11 2005 99.2 29,588
East Africa Uganda 4 2001 95.8 36,528
Southern Africa Malawi 3 2004 97.8 58,886
Asia Bangladesh 6 2004 99.8 51,255
India 26 2006 97.7 515,507
table 2.1 Data information DhS data
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housing characteristics (such as floor material, roofing, toilet facilities). Using a method 
developed by Filmer and Pritchett (1998), all households within a country are ranked 
from low to high on the basis of their assets and subsequently divided this variable into 
wealth deciles.
 Father’s occupation is measured with three categories: (1) farm, (2) lower nonfarm 
(sales, service and manual occupations), (3) upper nonfarm (professional, managerial, 
technical and clerical occupations). Employment of the mother is a dummy indicating 
whether (1) or not (0) the mother is employed. Education of the father and mother are 
measured in years. Children with a missing parent were given the mean score of the 
other children in the database on the variables indicating characteristics of the parents. 
Because there are dummies indicating whether or not the mother or father was missing 
in the model, this procedure leads to unbiased estimates of these variables (Allison, 
2001, note 4). 
 Age of the child is measured in years. Number of sisters and brothers and birth 
order are measured by interval variables. Presence of the parents is measured with two 
dummy variables indicating whether (1) or not (0) the mother or father is missing from 
the household. Extended family structure is measured with three categories (0) nuclear 
family, (1) more than two adults in the household but no grandparents, (2) more than two 
adults in the household including grandparents. To indicate traditional value patterns 
at the household level a dummy indicating whether the mother had her first child under 
the age of eighteen (1) and the age difference between spouses (interval variable) are 
included. A dummy indicates whether (1) or not (0) the household lives in a rural area. 
 District level of development is measured by the Tv-index, which reflects the per-
centage of households with a Tv in each region (e.g. Monden & Smits, 2009). To indicate 
the level of the local schooling facilities, the average number of years of education for 
men above the age of 13 is included. The proportion of men in lower nonfarm labor is 
included as an indicator of the availability of jobs for uneducated laborers and hence the 
demand for child labor. As a measure of traditionality of the district the average dif-
ference in age between husbands and wives (age husband minus age wife) is used. In 
more traditional societies, the age difference between husbands and wives tends to be 
larger than in more modern societies, so the higher the mean age difference, the more 
traditional a district is expected to be. Patriarchy is indicated by the percentage of mar-
ried couples living in households with grandparents from father’s side, indicating the 
tendency of parents to let their daughters marry into the family of their future husbands. 
 To compute interaction terms between the independent variables and gender and 
urbanization, centered versions of the involved variables were used. The main effects, 
therefore, can be interpreted as average effects (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). Given the 
large number of possible interactions, only significant interactions were included.
 Table 2.2 presents an overview of the (unweighted) percentage distributions, means 
and standard deviations of the independent variables used in the analysis in Chapter 3. 
The figures in Table 2.2 show that there are many differences among the 18 countries 
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studied in Chapter 3. This can be best illustrated by the averages and standard devia-
tions of the district variables. For example, the average years of male education is 
around 7 years, but in the district with the highest level of education men receive 12.1 
years of education. This is a district in Peru, the country with the highest average years 
of male education. Figure 2.1 to 2.6 will describe the country differences in more detail.
household factors % or mean std. deviation
Socio Economic Factors    
Education father (years) 5.3 5.1
occupation father farm 19.4 % 0.4
occupation father lower nonfarm 21.7 % 0.4
occupation father upper nonfarm 6.8 % 0.3
occupation father missing 52.1 % 0.5
Education mother (years) 3.8 4.7
Mother is not employed 36.6 0.5
Mother is employed 48.9 % 0.5
occupation mother missing 14.5 % 0.4
Wealth Index 5.3 2.9
Demographic factors    
Age 10.5 1.7
Father missing 24.2 % 0.4
Mother missing 13.6 % 0.3
Extended family with grandparents 10.5 % 0.3
Extended family without grandparents 37.5 % 0.5
Biological child 90.2 % 0.3
Birth order child 2.4 1.5
Number of sisters 1.4 1.4
Number of brothers 1.6 1.5
Cultural Factors    
Mother had first child < 18 31.1 % 0.4
age difference between spouses 7.2 5.8
Context factors    
living in rural area 59.0 % 0.5
District level of development 0.5 0.3
Mean years education adult men 6.9 2.6
Proportion men lower nonfarm labor 0.2 0.2
Age difference between spouses 7 2.7
household has grandparents from father’s side 0.1 0.1
table 2.2 Descriptive statistics: Percentages of children in category or mean of the independent 
variables from DhS
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 Figure 2.1 presents the country averages for living in a rural area. For most of DhS 
countries studied in this thesis, more than half of the population lives in the countryside. 
Congo Brazzaville is an example of a country with a relatively large urban population and 
Mali, Uganda and Malawi can be considered to be very rural countries.
 Figure 2.2 shows averages for the measure for the district level of development: the 
Tv-index. These averages show that there is much variation in Africa. low developed 
countries are Uganda, Malawi, liberia and Chad, with less than 10 percent of the house-
hold owning a television; whereas in Egypt the great majority of the households (around 
90 percent) has a Tv. In latin America and Asia, there is less variation, but also here we 
can also make a clear distinction between richer and poorer countries.
 In Figure 2.3 country averages for years of attained education by males are present-
ed. As mentioned before, men received most education in Peru. The difference with the 
other latin-American countries is noteworthy. Especially in Nicaragua, the average edu-
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figure 2.2 DhS Country average households with television
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figure 2.1 DhS Country averages living in a rural area
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cation attained is, with around 6 years, rather low. Not unexpected is the finding that the 
average education attained is lowest in Africa. The situation in Mali can be considered as 
most problematic, with an average resembling only a few years of primary education.
 When we compare Figure 2.3 with Figure 2.4, interesting patterns are revealed. In 
Figure 2.3, I showed that, on average, Egypt has the highest educated population in 
Africa, so it might not entirely come as a surprise that in Egypt only a small proportion of 
men are engaged in unskilled manual professions. however, in Peru, with its high aver-
age of years of education attained, almost 40 percent of adult males are engaged in an 
unskilled manual occupation. When there is no demand on the job market for educated 
people, as seems to be the case in Peru, parents might be less inclined to invest in the 
education of their children. At the same time, a higher demand for unskilled manual 
laborers may result in a higher demand for child laborers.
 Figure 2.5 presents the average age differences between spouses for Africa and 
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figure 2.4 DhS Country average men in unskilled manual occupations
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Asia. The higher the age difference is, the more traditional a country is supposed to be. 
We see that Senegal (13 yrs.), Dominican Republic (6 yrs.) and Bangladesh (10 yrs.) are 
the most traditional countries in Africa, latin America and Asia respectively. Since the 
average age differences in latin America are much smaller than in Africa, latin America 
seems less traditional on the whole.
 In Figure 2.6, I present averages for the second cultural indicator: patriarchy, meas-
ured by the proportion of co-residing grandparents of father’s side. There are interesting 
differences across the countries and continents. Compared to latin America, with an 
average of around 15 (in India) to 20 percent (in Bangladesh) households with co-resid-
ing grandparents from father’s side, Asia can be considered to be a patriarchal region. 
In Africa, many cross-country differences emerge. According to both cultural indicators 
used in my analyses, the position of women is worst in Senegal and best in Malawi and 
Uganda. 
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figure 2.6 DhS Country average households has grandparents from father’s side
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figure 2.5 DhS Country average households age difference between partners
35
 After having discussed the DhS data that will be used in Chapter 3, we now turn the 
discussion of the MICS data that is used in Chapter 4 to 8.
2.2.2 desCription of the MiCs data 
Table 2.3 presents an overview of the countries, the number of districts, survey years, 
household survey response rate and number of respondents of the household sample 
of the MICS-sample used in this thesis. Because Yemen is geographically very close to 
Africa and resembles its African neighbors more than its Arab neighbors, Yemen was 
included in the African subsample. 
 As can be learned from Table 2.3, response rates in the MICS are also very high. 
Yemen has the lowest response rate, but it is still more than 90 percent. All surveys 
were held in the years 2005 and 2006, Mauritania being the sole exception with 2007. 
Bangladesh, Malawi and Sierra leone are the only countries which appear in both 
the DhS and MICS-surveys used for this thesis. For Malawi and Bangladesh, I used 
a different regional division which allowed me to include more districts. Because the 
MICS-survey sample sizes are large, there is ample variation at the district level for a 
multilevel analysis.
World region Country number of
districts
household 
survey year
response
rate
respondents
Africa
Côte D’ivoire 11 2006 100.0 54,402
Gambia 8 2005–06 98.4 44,877
Ghana 10 2006 94.8 24,947
  Guinea Bissau 9 2006 97.4 41,312
Sierra leone 14 2005 99.3 42,719
Togo 6 2006 98.9 30,542
Mauritania 13 2007 97.0 59,572
Burundi 5 2005 99.8 40,634
CAR 16 2006 98.0 117,23
Malawi 6 2006 97.9 131,021
Somalia 18 2006 99.5 33,959
Yemen 8 2006 90.3 26,088
Asia
Syria 14 2006 95.7 107,365
Thailand 4 2005–06 95.8 137,006
vietnam 8 2006 94.1 35,544
Bangladesh 64 2006 92.5 301,732
table 2.3 Data information MICS data
36
vARIABlES
Dependent variables
The questions on the engagement in work for others outside their household in the 
MICS surveys are formulated as follows: “During the past week did (name) any kind of 
work for someone who is not a member of this household?” and if answered with yes: 
“For pay in cash or kind” (which could be answered with “Yes, for pay”, No, unpaid” and 
“No”) and: “About how many hours did he/she do this work for someone who is not a 
member of this household?” I constructed two variables on the basis of these questions 
indicating how many hours a child spent on paid and unpaid labor outside the house-
hold in the previous week. For the activities in the child’s household I used the following 
questions in the child labor module. For housework: “During the past week did (name) 
help with household chores such as shopping, collecting firewood, cleaning, fetching 
water, or caring for children?” and if answered with yes: “About how many hours did he/
she spend doing these chores?” For family business work: “During the past week, did 
(name) do any other family work (on the farm or in a business or selling goods in the 
street)?” and if answered with yes: “About how many hours did he/she do this work?” 
The dependent variables have a minimum value of 0 hours and a maximum of 95 hours1. 
In the descriptive analyses of Chapter 4, I will give an overview of the incidence of these 
types of child labor for each country.
Independent variables
Independent variables at the household level are socio-economic characteristics (pa-
rental education, household wealth), demographic characteristics (sex, age, number 
of brothers and sisters, birth order, whether or not the child is a biological child and 
household composition). Because income is lacking in most of the surveys, household 
wealth is used as an alternative. household wealth is measured by an index constructed 
based on household assets, such as Tvs, cars, telephones, and housing characteristics, 
such as floor material, roofing, and toilet facilities. Using a method developed by Filmer 
and Pritchett (1998), all households within a country were ranked from low to high based 
on their assets and this variable was subsequently divided into wealth deciles. As the 
assets available in the datasets differed among the countries, separate indices for the 
countries had to be constructed. My wealth variable therefore indicates relative wealth. 
landownership is measured with a dummy variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) 
any member of the household owns land that can be used for agriculture. ownership of 
cattle is measured with a dummy variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) a household 
owns livestock, herds, other farm animals, or poultry. As the variables for ownership of 
land and cattle were lacking for three of the Asian countries, they are not included in the 
analyses for Asia. The presence of tap water and electricity are measured with a dummy 
indicating whether (1) or not (0) these facilities were present in the dwelling.
 Education of the father is measured with three categories: (1) none, (2) at least some 
primary and (3) at least some secondary. Given the low educational levels of the mothers 
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in these countries, their education was measured with a dummy indicating whether (1) 
or not (0) the mother had completed primary education. For children with a missing par-
ent, the dummy variable adjustment method (Allison, 2001) was used to address missing 
values on the variables indicating characteristics of the parents. In this procedure, the 
cases with missing values get the mean of the valid values and a dummy is added to the 
model to identify the cases for which the mean was substituted. According to Allison 
(2001, p. 87), this dummy adjustment procedure may lead to unbiased estimates of the 
variables if the missing values are due to non-existence of the respective cases, as is the 
case here with the characteristics of parents who are missing. As a proxy for agricul-
tural parental occupation for the analyses in Chapter 7, I constructed a dummy variable 
whether (1) or not (0) a household owns both land that can be used for agriculture and 
livestock, herds other farm animals, or poultry. As these variables for ownership of land 
and cattle were lacking for three of the Asian countries, no indicator for agricultural oc-
cupation was included in the analyses for Asia.
 Age of the child is measured in years. Number of sisters, brothers, young children 
and birth order are measured by interval variables. Presence of the parents is measured 
with two dummy variables indicating whether (1) or not (0) the mother or father is miss-
ing from the household. Extended family structure is measured with three categories (0) 
nuclear family, (1) more than two adults in the household but no grandparents, (2) more 
than two adults in the household including grandparents. Economic context variables 
are measured in several ways. Urbanization is measured by a dummy indicating whether 
(1) or not (0) the household lives in a rural area. The influence of education and educa-
tional infrastructure is measured by the average number of years of education attained 
for people above the age of 13 in the district.
 As a measure of traditionality and patriarchy of the district I use the mean difference 
in age between husbands and wives. In more traditional societies, husbands tend to be 
(much) older than their wives. The higher the mean difference, the more traditional a 
district is supposed to be. Patriarchy is indicated by the percentage of married couples 
living in households with grandparents from father’s side, indicating the tendency of 
girls to marry into the family of their future husband. 
 National development is measured by national GDP per capita (constant 2000 inter-
national dollar) derived from World Bank (2010).
 Besides models with direct effects, models with interactions between the independ-
ent variables and gender and urbanization are estimated. Similar to the analyses with 
the DhS data, centered versions of the involved variables are used, and consequently 
the main effects can be interpreted as average effects.
 Table 2.4 presents an overview the (unweighted) percentage distributions, means 
and standard deviations of the independent variables used in the analysis in Chapter 4 
to 8. 
 The many differences between Asia and Africa point into the direction of a higher 
level of development in Asia. For instance, in Asia parental educational levels are higher. 
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Besides, there are fewer single parent families in Asia, which could mean that children 
are raised under more stable family circumstances. Furthermore, because families are 
smaller in Asia, children may not have to compete for resources. The national and dis-
trict level of development and the district mean educational level are higher in Asia. The 
same holds for the percentage of households with electricity. however, the percentage of 
households with access to tap water is about the same in both continents. The average 
asia africa
household factors %
or mean
std. 
deviation
%
or mean
std. 
deviation
Socio Economic Factors
Education father none 30.2 % 0.46 48.9 % 0.50
Education father primary 31.4 % 0.46 34.2 % 0.47
Education father > primary 38.4 % 0.49 16.9 % 0.37
Education mother primary or more 61.8 % 0.49 38.8 % 0.49
having land & cattle 63.6 % 0.48 72.4 % 0.45
Wealth Index 5.3 2.85 5.4 2.88
Access to running water 25.3 % 0.43 25.5 % 0.44
household has electricity 70.5 % 0.46 21.3 % 0.41
Demographic factors
Age 10.4 1.70 10.4 1.72
Father missing 14.1 % 0.35 35.8 % 0.48
Mother missing 1.5 % 0.12 5.2 % 0.22
Extended family with grandparents 22.4 % 0.42 39.4 % 0.49
Extended family without grandparents 10.0 % 0.30 6.9 % 0.25
Biological child 99.4 % 0.08 96.3 % 0.19
Birth order child 1.9 1.02 2.3 1.35
Number of sisters 1.0 1.10 1.6 1.44
Number of brothers 1.1 1.10 1.7 1.52
Number of children <5 in household 0.5 0.72 1.1 1.17
Context factors
living in rural area 63.6 % 0.48 72.4 % 0.45
District level of development 0.6 1.00 0.2 0.22
Mean years education adults 7.5 0.75 5.4 1.58
Age difference between spouses 7.1 2.53 8.6 2.64
household has grandparents from father’s 
side
0.1 0.06 0.1 0.05
GDP per capita 1004.4 842.40 345.0 212.51
table 2.4 Descriptive statistics: Percentages of children in category or mean of the independent 
variables from MICS
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age difference between spouses is somewhat higher in Africa, but the percentage of 
households with grandparents from father’s side does not differ between the continents. 
Almost two-third of children in Asia and almost three quarter in Africa live in rural ar-
eas. 
 Figure 2.7 shows that, except for Thailand and Syria, the majority of the people live 
in rural areas. Generally speaking, Asia is slightly more urbanized than Africa and there 
could be a higher demand for child laborers in non-agricultural activities. In Africa, the 
demand for child labor will possibly be concentrated in rural areas and agriculture.
 Figure 2.8 shows national averages for the Tv-index. As I concluded earlier: Asia is 
more developed. however, the indicator for the district level of development suggests 
that Thailand and Syria substantially drive up the average; Bangladesh and vietnam are 
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figure 2.7 MICS Country average living in a rural area
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figure 2.8 MICS Country average households with television
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relatively poor. The differences in Africa are noteworthy. Although I considered Yemen 
to be comparable to other African countries, it is the richest country in this African sub-
sample. however, the differences between the richest and the poorest countries located 
on the African continent (Cote D’Ivoire and Burundi) are also substantial. 
 To some extent, differences in the level of development are also reflected through 
the educational infrastructure (Figure 2.9). Interesting patterns emerge. Although 
households in vietnam and Bangladesh often do not own a television set, the population 
is rather highly educated. Compared to the Asian average, the average educational level 
in Yemen is much lower. This finding justifies my decision to include this country in the 
African sub-sample.
 The average age difference between partners, as summarized in Figure 2.10, rein-
force the earlier finding that Bangladesh is a very traditional country. Although the aver-
age of 9 years is somewhat lower than the 10 years in the DhS-sample, it corresponds 
with this average. In Gambia and Sierra leone, both countries with a large Muslim com-
munity (CIA World Factbook, 2009), the average age differences between spouses (with 
13 and 11 years respectively) are highest.
 Figure 2.11 summarizes country averages for patriarchy. The patterns are quite sim-
ilar to those in Figure 2.9. Exceptions are, among others, Yemen and vietnam, countries 
with relatively low age differences between spouses, but with more patriarchy (around 
15 and 10 percent respectively). As these numbers are country averages, there are also 
differences within the countries in my study. These district differences will be used to 
explain the involvement in the four kinds of child labor researched in this thesis.
2.3 Methods
Both for the DhS analysis in Chapter 3 and for the MICS analyses in Chapters 4 to 8, 
the effects of family background characteristics and contextual factors on child labor 
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figure 2.9 MICS Country average years adult education
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are studied using descriptive (bivariate) analyses and multilevel regression analysis 
(also called mixed models or hierarchical linear models; compare hox, 2002; Snijders & 
Bosker, 1999; Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002; West, Welch & Galecki, 2007). I apply three-
level multilevel models because I use data on families nested within districts nested 
within countries. one of the most important advantages of the large samples used in 
this thesis is the ample variation at the district level which allows for including multiple 
explanatory factors at this level. That is why, in most analyses, the context is repre-
sented by district level variables. In Chapter 6, I also add GDP per capita as a country 
level control variable. That does not mean that I do not check the country variation in the 
other analyses: the country variation is accounted for by its corresponding intercept. In 
all analyses robust standard errors (sandwich estimators) are used.
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figure 2.11 MICS Country average household has grandparents from father’s side
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figure 2.10 MICS Country average age difference between partners
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 In Chapter 3, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether (1) 
or not (0) the child performed any economic activity for non-household members in 
the week before the survey. I will first describe the incidence of child labor and pre-
sent some bivariate relationships with background variables such as urbanization and 
wealth. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous I will use multilevel logistic 
regression analysis for the multivariate part of this chapter. 
 In Chapter 4, I will use the MICS-data to present descriptive statistics on the hours 
spent on commercial work, housework and family business work and unpaid work out-
side the household. I will also discuss the variance components of the multilevel models 
ran on the MICS data in Chapter 4. To determine the variance to be explained by factors 
at the different levels, I will compute the intraclass correlations rho (ρ), or variance 
Partition Coefficients (vPC) (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Goldstein, 2011). The analyses are 
estimated with MlwiN (Rasbash et al., 2005). In this analysis, also the nearby level of the 
cluster (village, neighborhood) is included. The variance components can be interpreted 
as the variance to be explained at the household and context level. Although it will be 
of interest to many readers, it is difficult to give an overview of the explained variances 
of the models, as using R2 as a measure for the goodness of fit of multilevel models is 
problematic. Because of the structure of the multilevel model, there are as many R2’s as 
there are levels and no total one. As is common practice, I therefore focus in this thesis 
on the significance and the direction of the effects, rather than the explained variance or 
goodness of fit.
 In the analyses of Chapter 5, 6 and 7 the dependent variable is continuous and I apply 
multilevel regression analyses for interval dependent variables. The district and country 
differences in child labor are dealt with by estimating random intercepts at the district 
and country level. This can be represented by a model with a response Yijk (hours spent 
on child labor) for child i in district j of country k given by the following equation:
 γijk = β0+ β1xijk +cjkWjk+γkZk + u0jk + v0k + e0ijk
In this equation β0 represents the mean number of hours spent on child labor across 
the sample. Xijk, Wjk and Zk represent vectors of household, district and country-level 
independent variables. The parameters u0jk and v0k represent the random differentials 
from the overall mean at the district and the country level. In Chapter 6, explanatory 
variables for all three levels are included; GDP per capita was used as a control factor at 
the country level for the African subsample. The Asian subsample was, with 4 countries, 
too small to include a national level variable.
 All analyses are restricted to children aged 8–13. The upper limit was chosen 
because the Ilo–conventions on child labor permit light work for 14 and 15 year-olds 
in developing countries. To determine to what degree the effect of the independent 
variables differs between boys and girls and between urban and rural areas, interac-
tions between all independent variables and gender and urbanization were tested and 
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included into the model if found significant.
NoTES
1 Missing values were code as ‘99’ and not included in the analyses.

Chapter 3
1
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3.1 introdUCtion
A worldwide consensus exists that child labor should be eradicated and that it is in the 
interest of both the children and the country as a whole that all children go to school 
(UNICEF, 2008; Sen, 1999; Barro, 1999; Case 2001; World Bank, 2002). hence, dur-
ing the last decades, governments and donor organizations have done major efforts to 
reduce child labor throughout the developing world. In spite of these efforts, still over 
200 million children are estimated to be working as child laborers worldwide (Ilo–
IPEC, 2010b). To improve this situation, it is of fundamental importance to gain a better 
understanding of the factors that influence the decisions of parents (or other caretak-
ers) regarding the engagement in paid employment of their children. likewise, policies 
directed at reducing child labor can only be effective if they are based on a thorough 
understanding of the forces by which young children are pushed or pulled into the labor 
market. 
 Most child labor research focuses on predictors at one level, either the family level 
(e.g. Buchmann, 2000; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997) or the national level (e.g. kis-
katos & Schulze, 2006; Fan, 2004; levy, 1985). however, in reality, the determinants of 
child labor are not restricted to one level alone. The parental decisions regarding child 
labor depend not only on features of children and the family, but just as well on charac-
teristics of the local labor market and of the available educational facilities (Buchmann 
& hannum, 2001). hence, to obtain an encompassing understanding of the roots of child 
labor, the relevant factors at the different levels (household, district and national) should 
be studied simultaneously. Recently, researchers of child labor and school enroll-
ment acknowledge the necessity of such a multilevel approach (Manacorda & Rosati, 
2007; Bashieri & Falkingham, 2006; kis-katos & Schulze, 2006; Smits, 2007; huisman 
& Smits, 2009a). The analysis in this chapter fulfills this necessity by simultaneously 
analyzing the effects of (family) background characteristics and characteristics of the 
context in which the family lives on the engagement in child labor.
 Based on theoretical ideas from various disciplines, an encompassing theoretical 
framework for child labor decisions – including explanatory factors at the household, 
district and national level – is developed that was inspired by models for understanding 
women’s employment (Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010). This framework distinguishes 
three conditions which manifest themselves differently at different levels of analysis: 
resources, structure and culture. Besides direct influences, the framework allows for 
interactions across levels and for studying the determinants in their specific contexts. 
The hypotheses derived from this framework are tested by means of a unique data-
base, containing information of 239,120 children aged 8–13 and their families, living in 
eighteen developing countries from different regions of the developing world. For every 
child, there is information about the engagement in paid labor and the socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics of their family. The household-level information is 
combined with information about the sub-national region (henceforth called ‘district’) 
and the country in which the children live. As 221 districts can be distinguished in the 
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eighteen countries, there is ample explanatory power at the district level for testing 
hypotheses on context effects. The context information includes indicators of level of de-
velopment, degree of urbanization, the position of women and the quality of the available 
educational facilities. 
 The data are analyzed with multilevel logistic regression models enabling to esti-
mate effects of factors at household and the context level simultaneously. To address 
within this framework the fact that each situation is unique – and hence that the effects 
of the various factors could differ depending on the circumstances –, besides direct ef-
fects, also cross-level interaction effects between household-level and context factors 
are studied. The knowledge obtained from this analysis could therefore be helpful in 
developing tailor-made policy interventions aimed at reducing child labor. 
3.2 a CoMprehensive fraMeWork
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, an encompassing understanding of the 
roots of child labor can only be obtained if the relevant factors at different levels are 
studied simultaneously. To guide such an analysis, models for the study of women’s 
employment (Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010; hijab, 2001) were adapted into a new 
theoretical framework for the study of child labor. The framework is based on four pil-
lars: (1) The context in which children live has different levels (household, local, national, 
international). (2) Decisions regarding child labor are made at the household level, by 
parents, caretakers and / or other family members. (3) Different factors at the different 
levels influence these decisions simultaneously. (4) The strength of these influences 
may differ between contexts.
 The model is presented in Figure 3.1. The child is placed in the center. It is embed-
ded in a multilayered context (household, local, national, international). We can think 
of these layers as concentric circles, with the relevant factors at the inner or lower 
levels embedded within – and affected by – the outer or higher levels, thus allowing for 
context-specific effects (Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010). The major decision mak-
ers regarding children’s work are found at the household level. Generally, they are the 
parents or caretakers of the child, but other family members may also have a voice. The 
decision has four possible outcomes (as shown in the center of the model): the child 
can be in school, it can be engaged in paid work, it can be both in school and engaged 
in paid work and it can be neither in school nor engaged in paid work. In the literature, 
the last situation is sometimes called ‘idle’ (Maitra, Panda & Sarangi, 2006; Biggeri et 
al., 2003; Bacolod & Ranjan, 2008), although the child generally is not really idle but 
engaged in housework, work at the family business (Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2012) 
or unpaid work outside the household. That is why this fourth category is referred to as 
‘unpaid work’. In this chapter, I reserve the term child labor for children engaged in paid 
employment (with payment being either in cash or in kind). 
 To comprehend how the multitude of risk factors shapes the outcome of the deci-
sion, they are grouped into three conditions according to the underlying causal mecha-
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nisms: resources, structure and culture. These conditions are associated with different 
strands of literature regarding child labor in developing countries: (1) the (economic) 
literature focusing on resources, (2) studies stressing the importance of structural fac-
tors and (3) (anthropological) work using cultural factors to explain child labor. Econo-
mists, such as Basu and van (1998), state that child labor is an economic decision made 
by parents in order to survive (Grootaert & kanbur, 1995a; Ranjan, 1999). other authors 
stress the importance of family structure factors (such as the number of siblings) (Ed-
monds, 2006) or the labor market structure (Emerson & Souza 2008; Duryea & Arends-
kuenning, 2003); hence these are considered to be structural variables. The third group 
of variables is derived from the literature on cultural explanations (lieten, 2003; lópez-
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Calva, 2002; Nieuwenhuys, 1994; Delap, 2001). The many factors related to child labor 
in Figure 3.1 can be understood in terms of how they shape or reflect certain resources, 
structural characteristics and cultural factors. As explained before, there is assumed 
that it is likely that these factors influence the child labor decision simultaneously. In the 
next section, the conditions will be discussed in more detail.
RESoURCES 
The most important resources at the household level are income/wealth, parental 
education and occupation. The poverty hypothesis, or luxury axiom (Basu & van, 1998), 
assumes that when a household earns enough, there is no need to generate income 
from child labor. Parental education is also an important socio-economic resource. Par-
ents who have reached a certain educational level can be expected to want their children 
to reach at least the same level (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997) and spend more time on 
school. Empirical research shows that school enrollment is, to a large extent, influenced 
by the education of the mother (huisman & Smits, 2009a) and that it is more important 
than the education of the father in child labor decisions in rural India (kurosaki et al., 
2006). 
 In developing countries, many children grow up to do a job similar to their parents; 
hence a strong relationship between parents’ and children’s occupations is expected. 
For some professions, like agricultural work and basic industries, this means that 
parents might believe that training by doing has more value than formal education 
(Bass 2004; Smits & Gündüz-hoşgör, 2006; lieten, 2003; Beegle, Dehejia & Gatti, 2004). 
Boys with fathers working in lower non-farm occupations are expected to work more, 
as they may end up in jobs with low education requirements, such as running a family 
farm or manual labor. As daughters are often expected to marry into the family of their 
husband (Bass, 2004), they will be more likely trained in doing the household chores in 
order to be a good housewife. In this case, parents may find investing in educating their 
daughters not worthwhile as there are no direct returns for the family (Gündüz-hoşgör 
& Smits, 2008; huisman & Smits, 2009a). Since working mothers will bring more income 
into the household, mother’s work outside the home may be considered a resource. on 
the other hand, there is also evidence that children with gainfully employed mothers 
work more (Francavilla & Gianelli, 2007; Bhalotra, 2003), among others because chil-
dren go along with their mother when she works. 
 Economic development at the district level is placed under context-level resources. 
In general, there is more impact of globalization in more modern areas. This includes 
the diffusion of value patterns stressing the importance of education and gender 
equality. Moreover, in urban areas, the infrastructure is better, the state influence is 
stronger and there may be more pressure on parents to send their children to school. 
Nevertheless, the effect of development on the demand for child labor is not clear-cut. 
For instance, when agricultural machines replace unskilled agricultural workers, the 
demand for child labor will drop. on the other hand, mechanization can also increase 
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the demand for child labor in factories, as happened during the Industrial Revolution 
(Nardinelli, 1980). 
 Another important context resource factor is the educational level of the community. 
When surrounded by educated adults, parents are expected to realize that education is 
a prerequisite to acquire human capital (Becker, 1993) and better opportunities at the 
labor market. Therefore, lower levels of child labor in areas with a higher educational 
level are expected. Besides that, a higher community educational level is also an indica-
tor for a better educational infrastructure, which could also be seen as a structural 
characteristic. I will discuss this more extensively in the following section.
STRUCTURE
Structural characteristics at the household level often are resource-dilution variables. 
Individuals with more siblings might be more engaged in child labor because resources 
have to be shared with other family members. on the other hand, more siblings might 
also mean more helping hands. This may lead to more time for school for each child 
(Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997) or, as resources tend to be unequally distributed 
within households (Buchmann, 2000), to child labor for some and schooling for others. 
other structural characteristics of the household are expected to lead to a better access 
to resources. For instance, in extended families there is more manpower to generate 
income or to do housework than in nuclear families. on the other hand, when the father 
or mother is missing from the household, children can be expected to work more. 
 Birth order might be important too. There are indications that firstborn children have 
fewer opportunities than their younger siblings (Chesnokova & vaithianathan, 2008; 
Edmonds, 2006). Under difficult circumstances, the older children may have to work for 
pay or help at home in order to create the opportunity to go to school for their younger 
siblings (Edmonds, 2008). Because the sibling composition might also matter – girls are 
more often involved in housework (Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2012) –, it is important 
to make a distinction between the presence of brothers and sisters. Children with more 
brothers are expected to be less engaged in commercial work, because there are liter-
ally more candidates to do the job (Edmonds, 2006).
 Because developing countries lack old age social security programs, parents might 
prefer their own kin to receive a better education, because they expect that their chil-
dren will take care of them when they are old (Bhalotra & heady, 2000). Moreover, as 
paid child labor often is a last resort to make ends meet (Nkamleu & kielland, 2006), 
foster children are expected to be more often engaged in this kind of work. 
 In the model, structural factors at the context level may create both chances and 
restrictions. Since there are many differences between urban and rural areas, urbaniza-
tion might be an important structural factor. Generally speaking, agriculture accounts 
for 60–70 percent of child labor worldwide (Ilo–IPEC, 2006b, p. 8.; Ilo–IPEC, 2010a) 
and this mostly takes place in rural areas. Because child labor generally is unskilled 
manual work, I expect that children will work more in areas with a higher demand for 
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unskilled manual work. opportunities for paid employment in rural areas will primar-
ily be located on larger farms (e.g. tobacco or cacao) or in the mining industry (e.g. in 
African countries such as Benin, Sierra leone, and liberia; and Nicaragua and Peru in 
latin America). Nevertheless, children are also engaged in child labor in urban areas. 
According to Ilo–IPEC (2010b), child labor in urban areas is mostly an informal sector 
phenomenon, but a relatively low share takes place in factories or sweatshops. Because 
of this ambiguous relationship I cannot formulate a clear-cut hypothesis on the rela-
tionship between child labor and urbanization. however, considerable differences are 
expected for the other effects between rural and urban areas; they will be discussed the 
section on rural and urban differences.
 As mentioned in the previous section, the availability of educational facilities could 
also be regarded as a structural characteristic. When there are no (good) schools in 
the vicinity, children are forced to work or to remain idle (kondylis & Manacorda, 2006). 
Applied to this analysis, it means that a lower involvement in commercial child labor is 
expected in in areas with good educational infrastructures. 
CUlTURE
Norms and values regarding child labor are expected to influence parent’s attitudes to-
wards child labor. Different cultures have different values and views about childhood, the 
labor market participation of children and the role of women in the public sphere. In this 
thesis, I will mainly focus on women’s empowerment, patriarchy and traditionality.
 In general, women’s empowerment is believed to improve the wellbeing, health 
(Mukherjee & Das 2008; hobcraft, 1993) and schooling of their children (huisman & 
Smits, 2009a). More empowered women are more capable of using their influence to 
the benefit of their children (Das & Mukherjee, 2007). This may affect the child labor en-
gagement of both their daughters and sons. In empirical analyses, women’s empower-
ment can be measured on the household level and at the context level. A mother can use 
her influence to get her children in school because she was inspired by other women in 
her surroundings, for example.
 A factor that possibly influences child labor participation of girls is patriarchy. Par-
ents with more patriarchal values probably invest more in the education of sons (kamb-
hampati & Rajan, 2008), since their daughters will marry outside of the family. They 
might keep their daughters out of school to help with housework, but they will prob-
ably not let them work for pay outside the home (kambhampati & Rajan, 2008; Dyson 
& Moore, 1983). I will test for patriarchal values at both the household and the context 
level.
 The second cultural factor that influences child labor by girls is the position of wom-
en. Women (and girls) work less in areas with a taboo on women working in the public 
sphere (Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010). however, this does not necessarily mean that 
girls are in a better position, because a taboo on working in the public sphere might go 
hand in hand with lower school enrollment figures (Sundaram & vanneman, 2008). 
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RURAl- URBAN DIFFERENCES
The framework’s fourth pillar is the idea that effects of determinants of child labor may 
be different under different circumstances. In this respect I will focus on the role of dif-
ferences in level of development, as indicated by the variation between urban and rural 
areas. In more developed/urban areas, the educational infrastructure is generally better, 
allowing children to go to school more frequently, even when they are (relatively) poor. 
on the other hand, it seems likely that under more difficult circumstances as experi-
enced in rural areas of many developing countries, parents with more resources will 
have more possibilities to prevent child labor than parents with fewer resources. Based 
on this idea, several hypotheses on the interactions of resource, structural and cultural 
factors and urbanization are posed. Since there is not much theory on the nature of 
interactions like these, this work is explorative in character. 
 The influence of the resource variable wealth might be nonlinear. According to the 
luxury axiom (Basu & van, 1998), child labor primarily occurs when families live below 
a given subsistence level. Indeed, recent research indicates that the effect of income 
might not be linear. Up to a certain threshold, poverty seems to be the driving force 
behind child labor, but as households obtain more resources, other factors become 
important (e.g. parental education) (Self & Grabowski, 2009). This could partly explain 
why some poor children are engaged in child labor and others are not. There is broad 
evidence that parents with more resources or motivation are better able to get their 
children into school (Filmer & Pritchett, 1999; handa, 2002; Mugisha, 2006; huisman 
& Smits, 2009a). If poor parents cannot afford schooling, this does however not simply 
imply that poor children work for pay. It could be that these children have to do house-
work or help at the farm or family business (Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2012). Parents 
will opt more often for ‘idleness’ in areas with no demand for child labor, effectively 
enforced child labor laws or a strong public opinion against child labor. I therefore 
expect that the effect of poverty is smaller in contexts with a lower demand for child 
labor, or where child labor is prohibited by moral values or law. As laws on school 
enrollment and child labor are probably less strictly enforced in areas with a poorer 
infrastructure such as in rural areas, wealth at the household level is expected to mat-
ter more in rural areas. Similarly, I hypothesize that the district level of development 
has a significantly weaker or no effect in rural areas on the involvement in commercial 
child labor.
 With respect to the resource variable parental education, higher educated parents 
are expected to find ways to educate their children even if they live under harder cir-
cumstances in rural areas. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, empowered 
women are expected to be more capable to educate their children and protect them from 
child labor. In urban areas, I expect to see a higher female educational level and hence a 
higher level of empowerment. Surrounded by other women sharing the same norms and 
values, mothers will be more able to get their children into school. Therefore, a rein-
forced effect of empowerment is expected in urban areas.
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3.3 first eMpiriCal test of the fraMeWork
To find out how the framework works in practice, a first empirical test of the framework 
is conducted for the determinants of commercial child labor for children living in latin 
America, Africa and India using the DhS-data. In 3.3.1 the data and methods used for 
this test are discussed. In Section 3.3.3, the results of the descriptive and multivariate 
analyses are presented. The robustness tests are described in 3.3.4. In 3.4, I discuss the 
findings and conclude.
3.3.2 data and Methods
The data are derived from the Demographic and health Surveys (DhS). These are large 
representative household surveys held since the 1980s in many developing countries. 
I use recent surveys for eighteen countries; Benin 2006, Bangladesh 2004, Chad 2004, 
Congo DR 2007, Congo-Brazzaville 2005, Egypt 2005, liberia 2007, Morocco 2003, Mali 
2001, Malawi 2004, Senegal 2005, Sierra leone 2008, Uganda 2001, Colombia 2000, 
Dominican Republic 2007, Nicaragua 2001, Peru 2004–2008 and India 2006. These 
countries are chosen because the DhS data for them include information on the labor 
market participation of young children. Within these countries 221 districts are distin-
guished. The total number of children aged 8–13 available for my analyses is 239,120 of 
which 121,943 boys and 117,177 girls.
 Besides household-level data, I use context information at the district level. The dis-
trict-level information is derived by aggregating from the household surveys. Because 
the samples are large, district-level indicators could be created by taking the district’s 
average of characteristics of households and individuals (compare huisman & Smits, 
2009a). 
METhoDS
The effect of family background and district characteristics on the participation in 
child labor is studied using multilevel logistic regression analysis (hox, 2002; Snijders 
& Bosker, 1999). I apply three-level multilevel models because I use data on fami-
lies nested within districts nested within countries and explanatory variables at the 
household level and district level are included. In all analyses robust standard errors 
(sandwich estimators) are used. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether (1) or not (0) the child performed any economic activity for non-household 
members in the week before the survey. The analyses are restricted to children aged 
8–13. The upper limit was chosen because the Ilo–conventions on child labor permit 
light work for 14 and 15 year-olds in developing countries. To determine to what degree 
the effect of the independent variables differs between boys and girls and between 
urban and rural areas, interactions between all independent variables and gender and 
urbanization were tested and included into the model if found significant. To compute 
these interaction terms, centered versions of the involved variables were used. The 
main effects, therefore, can be interpreted as average effects. (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). 
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Given the large number of possible interactions, only significant interactions were 
included in the output tables.
vARIABlES
Independent variables at the household level are socio-economic characteristics (paren-
tal education and occupation, household wealth), demographic characteristics (sex, age, 
number of brothers and sisters, birth order, whether or not the child is a biological child 
and household composition). Since income is lacking in most of the surveys, household 
wealth is used as an alternative. household wealth is measured by an index constructed 
on the basis of household assets, such as Tvs, cars, telephones, and housing charac-
teristics (such as floor material, roofing, toilet facilities). Using a method developed by 
Filmer and Pritchett (1998), all households within a country are ranked from low to high 
on the basis of their assets and subsequently divided this variable into wealth deciles.
 Father’s occupation is measured with three categories: (1) farm, (2) lower nonfarm 
(sales, service and manual occupations), (3) upper nonfarm (professional, managerial, 
technical and clerical occupations). Employment of the mother is a dummy indicating 
whether (1) or not (0) the mother is employed. Education of the father and mother are 
measured in years. Children with a missing parent were given the mean score of the 
other children in the database on the variables indicating characteristics of the parents. 
Because there are dummies indicating whether or not the mother or father is missing in 
the model, this procedure leads to unbiased estimates of these variables (Allison, 2001, 
note 4). 
 Age of the child is measured in years. Number of sisters and brothers and birth 
order are measured by interval variables. Presence of the parents is measured with two 
dummy variables indicating whether (1) or not (0) the mother or father is missing from 
the household. Extended family structure is measured with three categories (0) nuclear 
family, (1) more than two adults in the household but no grandparents, (2) more than two 
adults in the household including grandparents. To indicate traditional value patterns 
at the household level a dummy indicating whether the mother had her first child under 
the age of eighteen (1) and the age difference between spouses (interval variable) are 
included. A dummy indicates whether (1) or not (0) the household lives in a rural area. 
 District level of development is measured by the Tv-index, which reflects the 
percentage of households with a Tv in each district. To indicate the level of the local 
schooling facilities, the mean number of years of education for men above the age of 13 
is included. The proportion of men in lower nonfarm labor is included as a measure for 
the demand for child labor. As a measure of traditionalism of the district the average 
difference in age between husbands and wives (age husband minus age wife) is used. 
In more traditional societies, the age difference between husbands and wives tends to 
be larger than in more modern societies, so the higher the mean age difference, the 
more traditional a district is expected to be. Patriarchy is indicated by the percentage 
of married couples living in households with grandparents from father’s side, reflect-
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ing the tendency of parents to let their daughters marry into the family of their future 
husbands. 
3.3.3 resUlts 
DESCRIPTIvE ANAlYSES
Figure 3.2 presents percentages of boys and girls engaged in child labor. Firstly, these 
figures show that African children are more engaged in child labor than latin American 
and Asian children. only in Nicaragua, the percentage of boys engaged in child labor 
is with 17 percent comparable to that of some African countries. In Benin and Uganda 
the percentage (30 to 50 percent) of children engaged in paid work is highest. Children 
in Egypt, Colombia and Dominican Republic are least involved, with between 0.3 and 5 
percent of the children reported to work for pay. In Africa, there are striking differences 
between the countries, with percentages ranging from 0.3 (Egypt) to 50 (Benin). In South 
Asia (India and Bangladesh) the incidence of child labor is with 4 to 10 percent relatively 
low compared to the other regions, but it still implies that millions of Asian children 
work for pay. 
 A second striking finding is the difference in the involvement of boys and girls. In 
some countries boys work much more than girls. The absolute difference between boys 
and girls is largest in Benin, with 30 percent of girls and 50 percent of boys engaged in 
paid work. In Bangladesh, the difference between boys and girls is also considerable. An 
explanation might be found in the fact that both countries have a large Muslim commu-
nity, in which the labor market engagement of women is comparatively low (Spierings, 
Smits & verloo, 2010). For latin America, the gender difference is largest in Nicaragua, 
with four times more boys than girls working. Exceptions to the observed gender differ-
ence are Malawi and liberia, where girls are slightly more engaged in child labor than 
boys.
 Figure 3.3 shows the difference in child labor engagement between urban and rural 
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figure 3.2 Percentages of boys and girls aged 8–13 engaged in child labor by country
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areas. In most countries the incidence of child labor is substantially higher in rural 
areas. Children in these countries probably are engaged in labor intensive agriculture 
(tobacco, tea, groundnuts, cacao etc.) and in mining (diamonds, coals etc.) (Ilo–IPEC, 
2006a; hindman, 2009). Exceptions are Bangladesh, Mali and India, where children in 
urban areas work more. In these countries the demand for commercial child labor is 
more located in work in factories or sweatshops in the carpet- and cigarette industry 
(Global March, 2011).
 There is much variation in the relationship between wealth and child labor among 
the countries in my sample (Figure 3.4). In latin America, the largest differences (about 
10 percent) between the poorest and upper wealth quartiles are found in Peru and Nica-
ragua. on the whole, the results for latin America suggest a negative linear relationship 
between wealth and child labor. This is not the case in Africa, where a very substantial 
percentage of the children from the upper wealth quartile are economically active. In 
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Mali, there is even a completely reversed pattern with (somewhat) more child labor in 
the upper wealth quartile than the lowest. It should however be taken into account that 
the wealth index is a relative index, hence the highest 20 percent of a poor country may 
on average be still relatively poor. 
 In Chad, Congo Brazzaville and Uganda children in the middle wealth group are 
most engaged in commercial child labor. These findings seem to indicate that in these 
very poor African countries, the money brought in by working children is badly needed 
to pull households out of extreme poverty and help them to build up at least some 
wealth. In India, there are only small differences between the upper and the lower 
quartiles. hence, wealth does not seem to play a role of importance there. 
MUlTIvARIATE ANAlYSES
Table 3.1 presents coefficients of the multivariate model. For factors that interact 
significantly with sex and/or living in an urban/rural area, separate coefficients are 
presented for boys and girls, urban and rural areas, or both. Coefficients that do not 
differ according to sex or urbanization are presented in column 1 (All), coefficients that 
differ according to sex in columns 2 and 3, those that differ according to urbanization in 
columns 4 and 5, and those that differ both according to sex and urbanization in columns 
6 to 9. In three cases (occupation father non-farm, mother employed and proportion 
men in unskilled manual jobs) also the three-way interaction with sex and urbanization 
was significant. 
 The variance components (not shown here) of the analyses show that 60 percent of 
the variation in child labor is due to factors at the household level and 40 percent to fac-
tors at the context level. Resources at the household level influence the working status 
of children in several ways. As expected, children of fathers with more education work 
less. In rural areas, the education of the mother does not influence children’s work, 
but in urban areas, children with more educated mothers work less. having a working 
mother is strongly related to the involvement in child labor. Mother’s employment in-
creases the likelihood of children’s work, supporting the earlier findings (e.g. Francavil-
lia & Gianelli, 2007) that children with working mothers tend to work more. As this effect 
is controlled for household wealth, financial reasons cannot be primarily responsible for 
this effect. Maybe these children work more because they go along with their mothers 
into the fields or factories. It is also possible that employment of the mother is a sign of 
demand for cheap female labor at the local labor market. Note that this effect is weaker 
for rural boys, suggesting that there is a greater division between women’s and men’s 
work in rural areas. Children with fathers in upper nonfarm occupations are also less 
engaged in child labor. Rural girls are exceptions; they work significantly more if their 
father works in an upper nonfarm job. I do not have a straightforward explanation for this 
effect. however, note that this is a relative effect in comparison with the reference group 
of fathers with an agricultural occupation. It could very well mean that girls with a father 
with an agricultural occupation in rural areas are more engaged in unpaid activities at 
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all 
1
girls
2
boys
3
Urban
4
rural
5
Urban girls
6
Urban boys
7
rural girls
8
rural boys
9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years)  -0.018 **
Education mother (years -0.030 **   0.015
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm -0.115
upper non-farm1 -0.370 ** -0.242 **  0.205 * -0.289 **
Mother employed1 0.326 ** 0.327 **  0.373 **   0.110 *
Wealth 0.115 **  -0.067 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl 0.196
Age 0.122 ** 0.173 **
Father missing 0.119 **  0.016
Mother missing  0.094 **
Extended family without grandparents -0.026
Extended family with grandparents  0.001
Biological child  -0.064
Birth order child  -0.081 **
Birth order quadratic  0.004 *
Number of sisters  0.034 *
Number of brothers  0.053 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18  0.003
age difference partners  0.001
Context factors
living in rural area  0.100 **
District level development -0.230  -0.019  -0.397 *  -0.187
Mean years of male education   0.261  -0.130
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs1  0.042 0.076 0.203 * 0.322 **
Mean age difference between spouses  -0.121 -0.379 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from 
father’s side
0.357 **  0.035
N 239,120 117,177 121,943 97, 923 141,197 48,078 49,845 69,099 72,098
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
1 three-way interaction with rural*sex is significant 
table 3.1 Coefficients of multilevel logistic regression models for children age 8–13 with working 
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all 
1
girls
2
boys
3
Urban
4
rural
5
Urban girls
6
Urban boys
7
rural girls
8
rural boys
9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years)  -0.018 **
Education mother (years -0.030 **   0.015
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm -0.115
upper non-farm1 -0.370 ** -0.242 **  0.205 * -0.289 **
Mother employed1 0.326 ** 0.327 **  0.373 **   0.110 *
Wealth 0.115 **  -0.067 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl 0.196
Age 0.122 ** 0.173 **
Father missing 0.119 **  0.016
Mother missing  0.094 **
Extended family without grandparents -0.026
Extended family with grandparents  0.001
Biological child  -0.064
Birth order child  -0.081 **
Birth order quadratic  0.004 *
Number of sisters  0.034 *
Number of brothers  0.053 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18  0.003
age difference partners  0.001
Context factors
living in rural area  0.100 **
District level development -0.230  -0.019  -0.397 *  -0.187
Mean years of male education   0.261  -0.130
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs1  0.042 0.076 0.203 * 0.322 **
Mean age difference between spouses  -0.121 -0.379 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from 
father’s side
0.357 **  0.035
N 239,120 117,177 121,943 97, 923 141,197 48,078 49,845 69,099 72,098
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
1 three-way interaction with rural*sex is significant 
outside the household as dependent variable
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their own family farm or for neighbors instead of being engaged in commercial work.
 In line with expectations, I find that rural children living in wealthier families work 
significantly less than children in less well-off families. however, in urban areas children 
from wealthier households tend to work more. In these urban areas, the labor market 
structure must offer opportunities for child labor. Note that the wealth effect is a relative 
effect. Particularly in the poorest countries, being somewhat wealthier does not mean 
that a household has enough resources to free their children from child labor.
 Many effects of the structural demographic variables are the same for boys and girls 
and rural and urban areas. only the effect of age and of a missing father differs between 
boys and girls. older children work more, yet this effect is stronger for boys than for 
girls. When the father is missing from the household, girls are more engaged in child 
labor. When the mother is missing, both boys and girls tend to work more. one would 
think that when the father is missing, boys have to take over the father’s role, but ap-
parently single mothers tend to put economic responsibilities more on the shoulders of 
their daughters than of their sons. In this analysis, no evidence is found for the idea that 
parents favor their own children over foster children. 
 Firstborn children work more than their later born siblings, suggesting that these 
children make money to pay for their sibling’s education. The significant positive quad-
ratic term shows that this effect is nonlinear: for later born children the odds of being 
engaged in commercial child labor decreases slowly. Children with more brothers and 
sisters have to work more. This supports the resource-dilution argument that resources 
are shared with other siblings. Whether the mother had her first child under the age of 
eighteen does not significantly influence the engagement in child labor of her children, 
nor does the age difference between partners. This might mean that cultural factors 
have a smaller influence on child labor than, for example, on educational participation, 
which is found to be lower for children of teenage mothers (huisman & Smits, 2009a).
CoNTEXT FACToRS
The variance components show that 40 percent of the variation in commercial child la-
bor can be attributed to context level factors. Compared to the figures in the rest of this 
thesis and what is known from research on educational achievement in Western coun-
tries, where Breen and Jonsson conclude that 80–90 percent of the variation is due to 
socio-economic factors at the household level (Breen & Jonsson, 2005), this is relatively 
much. With regard to context level resources, we see that children living in rural areas 
work more. only rural girls profit from a higher district level of development; they work 
less in more developed districts. Interestingly, the availability of educational facilities, 
which is proxied by the mean years of male education in the district, does not have an 
effect. however, the effect of the labor market structure in rural areas is in line with ex-
pectations; the larger the proportion of men in unskilled (manual) labor, the more rural 
boys and girls are engaged in child labor. hence, the involvement of adults in unskilled 
manual labor seems to go hand in hand with a higher demand for child labor. 
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 Both cultural context factors have a significant effect. In areas with a weaker position 
of females, indicated by a large age difference between spouses, boys are less involved 
in child labor. So it appears that fathers with a stronger position use this dominant 
position primarily in favor of their sons and get them out of child labor. In urban areas, 
children living in patriarchal families work more. It could be possible that adult women 
are forbidden to work in patriarchal areas and children fill in this labor force gap. Be-
cause patriarchal kinship systems may differ between urban and rural areas, this effect 
might not be present in rural areas. kandiyoti (1988) for example argues that patriarchal 
kinships systems differ in the way women are treated. In rural areas in Africa, women 
are less affected by patriarchal traditional norms and are more involved in work outside 
the household, as opposed to women living in urban areas. hence different patriarchal 
systems may explain this observed difference.
3.3.4 robUstness tests 
Because of the large variation in the involvement in child labor, I performed robustness 
tests to account for the difference between the countries with an extreme child labor 
involvement (Uganda and Benin) and a large number of cases (India). For this purpose 
I have run models without these countries and looked whether the effects remained 
significant and in the same direction. The results for these robustness tests are sum-
marized in Appendix A at the end of this book. Effects that are significantly different from 
the original analysis are printed in bold.
 In general, when the effects for household resource variables change, they get the 
expected sign and become significant. For instance, in the analyses without Benin, 
Uganda or India, children living in rural areas with a mother with more years of educa-
tion are less engaged in commercial child labor. This demonstrates that the unexpected 
effect in the original analyses is not robust and perhaps is influenced by outliers in 
these three countries. Similarly, without Uganda or India in the analyses, the child labor 
reducing effect of having a father with a lower non-farm occupation becomes signifi-
cant. This reinforces earlier findings from the original analyses; but also suggests that 
children in Uganda and India profit less from their father’s resources. In the same way, 
the effect of wealth in urban areas is as expected in each of the robustness analyses; 
children living in wealthier families work less. This suggests that the demand for child 
labor in urban areas in Uganda, Benin and India is higher than in the other countries in 
my study. 
 The effects of the structural variables seem to be more robust. The effects of gender 
and being a biological child are the exceptions. The effect of gender is largely influenced 
by countries with a high child labor engagement. Without Benin or Uganda, girls are 
significantly more engaged in commercial labor. This does not necessarily mean that 
they spend more hours on this kind of work, but more on that in Chapter 5. Further, 
without Benin, Uganda and India in the analyses, biological children are significantly 
less engaged in child labor. These results suggest that in countries with a high child 
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labor involvement, such as in Uganda and Benin, every child –both biological and foster 
children- are expected to contribute to the family income by commercial child labor. In 
Asia, the child labor problem is less extreme; but parents do not seem to differentiate 
between biological and foster children either.
 half of the context factors are robust. I found no changes in significance or the direc-
tion of living in a rural area, the age difference between partners and patriarchy. The 
effect of the other context variables sometimes changes. Most important in this respect 
is the effect of the level of development. Without all three countries, the effect for urban 
girls also becomes negatively significant, which means that girls work less in higher 
developed areas, both in the cities and in the countryside (as in the original analyses). 
 Without India in the model, context effects differ more. For instance, girls are more 
engaged in a highly educated area; which is rather unexpected. Besides that, a higher 
demand for unskilled laborers also increases the engagement in child labor by urban 
girls. Both these effects suggest that girls are more likely to work in countries other 
than India. Although I am not completely sure what drives all these differences, it sug-
gests that context effects can differ to a large extent between countries and continents. 
This is one of the reasons I have chosen to make a distinction between two continents: 
Africa and Asia, in the rest of my thesis.
3.4 ConClUsions
A new multilevel theoretical framework was tested to explain differences in child labor 
engagement and studied effects of household and context variables on the likelihood of 
being engaged in child labor for 239,120 children living in 18 developing countries. This 
framework distinguishes three conditions, namely resources, structure and culture and 
does justice to the multilevel structure of children nested in districts in countries.
 At the household-level, both socio-economic and family structure characteristics 
were included in the analysis. The context in which the household lived was indicated 
by its level of development, quality of the available educational facilities, patriarchy, 
the position of women, and urbanization. Besides direct effects of explanatory factors, 
also interactions with sex and urbanization were studied. In this way new insights were 
obtained into the role of the various determinants of child labor under different circum-
stances.
 In line with expectations, I found resources at the household level to make a con-
siderable difference for children’s employment. In general, children are less involved in 
child labor if their parents have a higher educational level, if their father has an upper 
nonfarm occupation, and if the household is wealthier. In other words: if they have more 
access to resources. on the other hand, children and especially daughters of working 
mothers tend to work more. This finding is in line with earlier research (Bhalotra, 2003; 
Francavillia & Gianelli, 2007). Possible explanations are that girls tend to go along with 
their working mothers to the workplace or that the demand for cheap (female or chil-
dren’s) labor at the local labor market is reflected by the effect of mother’s employment.
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 Besides resource factors, characteristics of the family structure – reflecting in part 
an unequal distribution of resources and duties within the family – are associated with 
child labor. Children work more if they have more siblings and especially if they have 
more brothers. hence the higher economic need of families with many children seems 
to push children into the labor market. Child labor is also higher in families with a 
missing mother. My expectation that non-biological children would be more involved in 
child labor was initially not confirmed by the data. however, the finding that there are 
no differences in the child labor involvement of biological and foster children is largely 
driven by Uganda, Benin and India. Without these countries in the analyses, I found the 
expected effect. Cultural factors at the household level do not influence child labor. 
If the mother had her first child at young age or whether there is a larger age differ-
ence between the parents does not significantly influence children’s labor engagement. 
hence, resources and structural factors seem to matter more than cultural factors at 
the household level. 
 Children are less engaged in commercial work in urban areas. No significant effects 
were found for the other context factors: district level of development, quality of the 
local educational facilities and the position of women. however, that does not imply that 
they are not important. The interaction analysis revealed a substantial number of sig-
nificant interactions between the context factors (including school quality and position of 
women) with sex and urbanization.
 By testing interactions with gender and urbanization, specific information on the 
importance of the risk factors under different circumstances and on the way their ef-
fects differ between boys and girls was obtained. With respect to gender, I found that 
both boys and girls work more when they grow older, but that this effect is stronger for 
boys. More importantly, the absence of the father is especially important for girls. While 
a missing mother increases the chances that both boys and girls work, a missing father 
only increases the employment probability of girls. hence, single mothers seem to put 
economic responsibilities more on the shoulders of their daughters than of their sons. 
This may seem counterintuitive at first sight, but perhaps these single parent mothers 
put their trust more in their daughters in commercial affairs after disappointments with 
their husbands. 
 A cultural factor which is only significant for boys is the district’s average age differ-
ence between spouses. If this difference is larger, meaning a more traditional environ-
ment, boys are less engaged in child labor. This finding is in line with the idea that in 
more traditional and patriarchal areas, families tend to invest more in sons. however, 
in urban areas where more women marry into the families of their husbands, both boys 
and girls tend to work more. 
 Children in rural areas profit from living in a wealthier household and are less 
engaged in child labor. Interestingly, children from wealthier households in urban areas 
tend to work significantly more. This effect might reflect a demand for child labor in the 
cities (especially in unskilled labor intensive work) and the possibility that wealthier 
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parents are better able to find work opportunities for their children. Mother’s educa-
tion is only important in urban areas; in rural areas children cannot profit from their 
mother’s resources.
 The central hypothesis regarding these interactions was that under more difficult 
circumstances parents with more resources would take more effort to prevent their 
children from child labor and that I would find a stronger child labor reducing effect 
of socio-economic resources. This idea was largely disproved by the data. In the initial 
analyses, children from wealthier households work more in urban areas. The influ-
ence of the other socio-economic factors did not differ between urban and rural areas. 
Rural girls are the exception; they seem to miss the boat in profiting from their father’s 
resources. Rural girls work more if their father has an upper nonfarm occupation. on 
the other hand, they are the only ones who profit from living in a more developed area. 
For policy makers, this finding is important. It shows that child labor reducing programs 
might have different and unexpected and unintended effects for different target groups. 
 To conclude, this new theoretical model offers ample opportunities for comparative 
child labor research. If necessary, new indicators can be added to the model, and placed 
under one of the three conditions: resources, structure and culture. Moreover, the mul-
tilevel approach allows for studying the role of context factors and for testing whether 
effects of factors are different under different circumstances. I showed that a substantial 
number of background characteristics have different effects in either rural or urban 
areas. 
 This theoretical model is designed to be applied to other geographical and child 
labor outcomes. Because the extent to which a child suffers from child labor could be 
largely determined by the time involvement, I will apply this same theoretical model 
in most of the following chapters to the analyses on weekly hours spent on child labor. 
Because I use a different data set with more detailed questions on the time involvement 
of children, I will focus the analyses in part 2 of this thesis on 16 countries in Africa and 
Asia.
NoTES
1  This chapter is based on Webbink, E., Smits, J. & de Jong, E. (2013). household and 
context determinants of child labor in 221 districts of 18 developing countries. Social 
Indicators Research, 110 (2): 819–836.
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Part 2
Child Labor in 
Africa and Asia

Chapter 4
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4.1 introdUCtion
In order to get an answer to my first research question about the size of the child 
labor problem, I need to have good comparable data. As explained in Chapter 1, two 
data sources are used in this thesis: the Demographic and health Surveys (DhS) and 
UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). Because all the MICS surveys 
contain the same child labor module with detailed questions on the daily work activities 
of children, these are better suited for comparative research than the DhS. Besides a 
thorough description of the different types of activities of their children, the parents also 
have to give an indication on the weekly time involvement in the different kinds of child 
labor, which is a second advantage.
 The data described in this chapter are all from the MICS 2005–06 wave from which I 
could use 16 countries in Asia and Africa. The countries are Bangladesh, Burundi, Cen-
tral African Republic, Côte D’ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Sierra leone, Togo, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, vietnam, and Yemen. Because the selec-
tion criteria for the dependent variable were different for each of the types of work in 
this thesis, the response rate of the analyses varied and the number of children ranges 
girls boys
average hours average hours
Country work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban total N work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban  total N
Côte D’ivoire 2.5 34.0 28.2 37.9 16.9 16.0 16.6 4,201 5.9 22.9 45.1 32.0 14.3 14.9 14.4 4,538
Gambia 1.0 37.1 40.0 22.9 12.8 12.2 12.5 3,586 1.2 37.2 34.9 27.9 13.0 9.6 11.6 3,484
Ghana 5.1 37.2 38.3 24.5 13.5 6.1 12.0 1,870 4.6 33.0 36.3 30.8 16.1 10.3 15.1 1,957
Guinea Bissau 3.2 33.3 57.0 9.7 10.1 10.4 10.1 2,871 4.4 38.2 48.5 13.2 9.5 11.2 9.7 3,127
Sierra leone 4.7 19.0 62.0 19.0 11.0 6.9 10.2 2,591 5.5 31.0 49.0 20.0 10.3 5.6 9.5 2,649
Togo 3.9 47.5 38.6 13.9 9.6 8.0 9.3 2,590 7.8 44.5 39.7 15.8 9.9 7.3 9.4 2,684
Mauritania 1.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 22.2 22.6 22.4 4,716 1.9 17.0 38.6 44.3 23.2 21.2 22.6 4,792
Burundi 2.7 21.1 37.9 41.1 17.5 31.3 18.5 3,594 2.7 20.9 38.4 40.7 19.4 8.0 19.0 3,446
CAR 4.2 30.1 22.0 48.0 14.5 10.2 13.6 2,954 5.9 35.0 21.7 43.3 12.6 19.3 13.7 3,079
Malawi 6.3 39.1 42.3 18.6 10.6 9.9 10.6 10,231 6.6 34.6 41.2 24.2 12.7 11.3 12.6 10,144
Somalia 1.3 2.9 2.9 94.1 42.5 39.5 41.4 2,615 0.8 0.0 25.0 75.0 32.9 30.5 32.5 2,795
Yemen 1.3 18.5 48.1 33.3 21.0 17.3 20.4 2,155 3.2 13.9 34.7 51.4 23.5 21.1 23.2 2,237
African Average 3.5 33.6 40.5 25.9 12.8 13.6 12.9 43,974 4.3 32.0 39.6 28.3 13.7 12.8 13.5 44,932
Syria 0.5 7.5 20.0 72.5 26.2 26.4 26.3 8,433 2.0 11.2 33.5 55.3 23.4 25.3 24.6 9,010
Thailand 2.3 49.4 35.4 15.2 9.7 8.3 9.0 7,072 2.1 43.4 32.2 24.3 9.9 10.5 10.2 7,419
vietnam 1.5 9.4 15.6 75.0 28.9 38.0 29.8 2,206 0.9 4.5 27.3 68.2 25.4 35.0 26.3 2,335
Bangladesh 1.6 7.1 15.6 77.3 33.6 46.1 40.2 20,995 4.6 3.9 14.4 81.7 43.1 47.6 44.6 21,747
Asian Average 1.5 19.3 21.6 59.1 25.5 34.5 29.8 38,706 3.3 9.4 19.2 71.4 37.8 37.7 37.8 40,511
Total Average 2.5 29.7 35.3 35.1 15.2 25.00 17.6 82,680 3.8 22.7 31.2 46.1 29.1 21.8 23.5 85,443
table 4.1 Percentages and averages hours worked of girls and boys aged 8–13 engaged in paid 
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from 168,000 to 178,000 children. In this thesis, I focus my analyses on children aged 
8–13. 
4.2 the engageMent in paid labor
Table 4.1 presents information on the hours children work for pay. on average around 4 
percent of African girls and African boys, 2 percent of Asian girls and 3 percent of Asian 
boys in this sample are engaged in paid labor. In both continents, there are substantial 
inter-country differences. For African girls, estimates range from 1 percent in Gambia 
and Mauritania to 6 percent in Malawi; the numbers for African boys vary from less than 
1 percent in Somalia to 8 percent in Togo. In Asia, figures range for girls from less than 
1 percent in Syria to 2 percent in Thailand and for boys from 1 percent in vietnam to 5 
percent in Bangladesh. In most countries, boys are more involved in paid labor than 
girls. Exceptions are Ghana, Somalia, Thailand and vietnam, where boys are slightly less 
engaged in paid labor than girls.
 Although the number of children working for pay does not seem very large, the time 
involvement is substantial. In the week before the survey, girls engaged in paid labor 
girls boys
average hours average hours
Country work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban total N work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban  total N
Côte D’ivoire 2.5 34.0 28.2 37.9 16.9 16.0 16.6 4,201 5.9 22.9 45.1 32.0 14.3 14.9 14.4 4,538
Gambia 1.0 37.1 40.0 22.9 12.8 12.2 12.5 3,586 1.2 37.2 34.9 27.9 13.0 9.6 11.6 3,484
Ghana 5.1 37.2 38.3 24.5 13.5 6.1 12.0 1,870 4.6 33.0 36.3 30.8 16.1 10.3 15.1 1,957
Guinea Bissau 3.2 33.3 57.0 9.7 10.1 10.4 10.1 2,871 4.4 38.2 48.5 13.2 9.5 11.2 9.7 3,127
Sierra leone 4.7 19.0 62.0 19.0 11.0 6.9 10.2 2,591 5.5 31.0 49.0 20.0 10.3 5.6 9.5 2,649
Togo 3.9 47.5 38.6 13.9 9.6 8.0 9.3 2,590 7.8 44.5 39.7 15.8 9.9 7.3 9.4 2,684
Mauritania 1.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 22.2 22.6 22.4 4,716 1.9 17.0 38.6 44.3 23.2 21.2 22.6 4,792
Burundi 2.7 21.1 37.9 41.1 17.5 31.3 18.5 3,594 2.7 20.9 38.4 40.7 19.4 8.0 19.0 3,446
CAR 4.2 30.1 22.0 48.0 14.5 10.2 13.6 2,954 5.9 35.0 21.7 43.3 12.6 19.3 13.7 3,079
Malawi 6.3 39.1 42.3 18.6 10.6 9.9 10.6 10,231 6.6 34.6 41.2 24.2 12.7 11.3 12.6 10,144
Somalia 1.3 2.9 2.9 94.1 42.5 39.5 41.4 2,615 0.8 0.0 25.0 75.0 32.9 30.5 32.5 2,795
Yemen 1.3 18.5 48.1 33.3 21.0 17.3 20.4 2,155 3.2 13.9 34.7 51.4 23.5 21.1 23.2 2,237
African Average 3.5 33.6 40.5 25.9 12.8 13.6 12.9 43,974 4.3 32.0 39.6 28.3 13.7 12.8 13.5 44,932
Syria 0.5 7.5 20.0 72.5 26.2 26.4 26.3 8,433 2.0 11.2 33.5 55.3 23.4 25.3 24.6 9,010
Thailand 2.3 49.4 35.4 15.2 9.7 8.3 9.0 7,072 2.1 43.4 32.2 24.3 9.9 10.5 10.2 7,419
vietnam 1.5 9.4 15.6 75.0 28.9 38.0 29.8 2,206 0.9 4.5 27.3 68.2 25.4 35.0 26.3 2,335
Bangladesh 1.6 7.1 15.6 77.3 33.6 46.1 40.2 20,995 4.6 3.9 14.4 81.7 43.1 47.6 44.6 21,747
Asian Average 1.5 19.3 21.6 59.1 25.5 34.5 29.8 38,706 3.3 9.4 19.2 71.4 37.8 37.7 37.8 40,511
Total Average 2.5 29.7 35.3 35.1 15.2 25.00 17.6 82,680 3.8 22.7 31.2 46.1 29.1 21.8 23.5 85,443
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worked on average 18 hours and boys 24 hours, which is a considerable workload for 
children in this age group. In Asia, on average girls tended to work even as much as 30 
hours and boys 38 hours; in Africa girls worked on average 13 hours and boys 14 hours. 
hence, in Asia fewer children are engaged in paid labor, but the ones who do work are 
engaged in paid labor for many more hours than in Africa. 
4.3 the engageMent in hoUseWork and faMily bUsiness Work
In Chapter 1, I explained that child labor encompasses all work that may possibly ham-
per a child’s education or health. Especially for girls and children living in rural areas, 
not including unpaid housework and family business work in child labor statistics may 
lead to an underestimation of the incidence of child labor. Table 4.2 presents for each 
country the percentages of girls and boys according to number of hours (0; 1–5; 6–15; 
16+) they worked in the week before the survey in housework and family business work. 
Table 4.2 also presents the average number of hours girls and boys in the country were 
engaged in these forms of work. Because children can be engaged in both kinds of 
activities, total hours are also presented. In the week before the survey, girls on average 
housework family business work total hours
girls boys girls boys girls boys
Country 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. N
Côte D’ivoire 22 31 30 17 8 49 27 18 6 4 54 16 16 15 7 50 14 16 20 9 19 20 29 32 15 32 17 24 27 13 9,039
Gambia 18 41 30 11 7 38 33 25 5 4 48 34 15 3 3 67 20 11 2 2 16 31 33 20 10 33 28 28 11 6 7,639
Ghana 14 35 38 13 8 23 32 35 10 7 54 15 15 16 7 50 14 18 18 9 12 24 33 31 15 16 22 30 32 15 4,378
Guinea Bissau 11 33 42 14 9 24 27 36 12 8 53 14 22 12 6 50 14 22 13 6 8 25 36 31 14 16 22 33 28 14 6,325
Sierra leone 13 48 32 8 6 12 49 32 7 6 48 19 19 14 6 46 20 21 13 6 8 36 29 28 13 7 36 30 27 12 6,781
Togo 13 29 42 17 10 21 32 36 10 7 61 16 17 7 4 61 15 17 7 4 9 22 39 30 13 15 25 37 23 11 5,780
Mauritania 35 26 28 11 7 53 20 18 8 5 83 6 9 3 2 77 7 11 5 3 34 21 29 17 9 46 16 22 16 8 9,636
Burundi 8 14 43 36 15 9 15 42 34 14 94 3 3 1 1 91 3 4 2 1 7 13 42 38 16 9 13 42 37 15 7,128
CAR 16 29 26 29 12 23 28 26 23 10 49 19 14 19 7 57 15 12 16 6 10 24 23 43 19 16 23 24 36 16 7,882
Malawi 7 24 44 24 12 15 27 40 18 9 69 13 13 5 3 63 16 15 6 4 6 21 39 34 15 13 22 37 28 13 23,532
Somalia 17 1 25 57 22 36 2 30 32 14 59 1 13 28 12 56 1 14 29 13 13 1 18 68 34 25 1 20 53 27 5,550
Yemen 28 11 33 28 12 50 13 23 14 7 85 2 7 7 3 80 3 8 10 4 25 10 30 35 15 42 11 23 24 11 4,475
African Average 17 27 34 22 11 29 25 30 15 8 63 13 14 11 5 62 12 14 12 6 14 21 32 34 16 23 20 29 29 13 98,145
Syria 54 20 22 4 4 64 18 16 1 2 97 1 2 1 0 94 2 3 1 1 54 20 22 5 4 62 18 17 3 3 17,527
Thailand 19 46 33 3 5 28 45 26 2 4 89 6 5 1 1 88 5 6 1 1 18 43 34 6 6 26 41 28 5 5 14,802
vietnam 27 11 48 14 9 45 12 35 8 6 80 3 10 8 3 79 2 9 10 4 25 9 40 26 12 38 9 32 21 9 4,559
Bangladesh 17 16 53 14 9 47 18 32 4 4 96 2 2 1 0 79 6 11 4 3 17 16 53 15 10 37 17 35 11 7 43,485
Asian Average 29 23 39 9 7 46 23 27 4 4 91 3 5 3 1 85 4 7 4 2 29 22 37 13 8 41 21 28 10 6 80,373
Total Average 20 26 36 19 9 34 25 29 12 6 70 11 11 9 3 68 10 12 10 4 18 21 33 29 12 27 20 29 24 10 178,518
table 4.2 Percentages and averages of girls and boys aged 8–13 engaged in housework and family 
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worked 12 hours in these forms of hidden child labor and boys 10 hours, but these hours 
were not evenly divided over the children and the countries. of the girls, 18 percent not 
at all worked in these forms of labor, whereas 29 percent worked more than 15 hours. 
For boys these percentages are 27 percent and 24 percent respectively. hence, girls are 
somewhat more involved than boys in these forms of child labor and the percentage of 
girls working many hours is also higher than the corresponding percentage for boys.
 When we look at the country differences, we see that countries with relatively low 
levels of hidden child labor are Syria (on average 4 hours for girls and 3 hours for boys) 
and Thailand (6 and 5 hours) in Asia, and Gambia (10 and 6 hours) and Mauritania (9 and 
8 hours) in Africa. Countries with high levels are vietnam (12 and 9 hours) in Asia, and 
Burundi (16 and 15 hours), CAR (19 and 16 hours) and Somalia (34 and 27 hours) in Africa. 
In Yemen 35 percent of girls and 24 percent of boys worked for more than 15 hours, in 
vietnam these percentages were 26 percent and 21 percent, in Burundi 38 percent and 37 
percent, in CAR 43 percent and 36 percent and in Somalia even 68 percent and 53 percent. 
 The number of hours worked in the family business is generally lower than the 
number of hours worked in the household. Table 4.2 shows that in the week before the 
housework family business work total hours
girls boys girls boys girls boys
Country 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. 0 1–5 6–15 16+ Avg. N
Côte D’ivoire 22 31 30 17 8 49 27 18 6 4 54 16 16 15 7 50 14 16 20 9 19 20 29 32 15 32 17 24 27 13 9,039
Gambia 18 41 30 11 7 38 33 25 5 4 48 34 15 3 3 67 20 11 2 2 16 31 33 20 10 33 28 28 11 6 7,639
Ghana 14 35 38 13 8 23 32 35 10 7 54 15 15 16 7 50 14 18 18 9 12 24 33 31 15 16 22 30 32 15 4,378
Guinea Bissau 11 33 42 14 9 24 27 36 12 8 53 14 22 12 6 50 14 22 13 6 8 25 36 31 14 16 22 33 28 14 6,325
Sierra leone 13 48 32 8 6 12 49 32 7 6 48 19 19 14 6 46 20 21 13 6 8 36 29 28 13 7 36 30 27 12 6,781
Togo 13 29 42 17 10 21 32 36 10 7 61 16 17 7 4 61 15 17 7 4 9 22 39 30 13 15 25 37 23 11 5,780
Mauritania 35 26 28 11 7 53 20 18 8 5 83 6 9 3 2 77 7 11 5 3 34 21 29 17 9 46 16 22 16 8 9,636
Burundi 8 14 43 36 15 9 15 42 34 14 94 3 3 1 1 91 3 4 2 1 7 13 42 38 16 9 13 42 37 15 7,128
CAR 16 29 26 29 12 23 28 26 23 10 49 19 14 19 7 57 15 12 16 6 10 24 23 43 19 16 23 24 36 16 7,882
Malawi 7 24 44 24 12 15 27 40 18 9 69 13 13 5 3 63 16 15 6 4 6 21 39 34 15 13 22 37 28 13 23,532
Somalia 17 1 25 57 22 36 2 30 32 14 59 1 13 28 12 56 1 14 29 13 13 1 18 68 34 25 1 20 53 27 5,550
Yemen 28 11 33 28 12 50 13 23 14 7 85 2 7 7 3 80 3 8 10 4 25 10 30 35 15 42 11 23 24 11 4,475
African Average 17 27 34 22 11 29 25 30 15 8 63 13 14 11 5 62 12 14 12 6 14 21 32 34 16 23 20 29 29 13 98,145
Syria 54 20 22 4 4 64 18 16 1 2 97 1 2 1 0 94 2 3 1 1 54 20 22 5 4 62 18 17 3 3 17,527
Thailand 19 46 33 3 5 28 45 26 2 4 89 6 5 1 1 88 5 6 1 1 18 43 34 6 6 26 41 28 5 5 14,802
vietnam 27 11 48 14 9 45 12 35 8 6 80 3 10 8 3 79 2 9 10 4 25 9 40 26 12 38 9 32 21 9 4,559
Bangladesh 17 16 53 14 9 47 18 32 4 4 96 2 2 1 0 79 6 11 4 3 17 16 53 15 10 37 17 35 11 7 43,485
Asian Average 29 23 39 9 7 46 23 27 4 4 91 3 5 3 1 85 4 7 4 2 29 22 37 13 8 41 21 28 10 6 80,373
Total Average 20 26 36 19 9 34 25 29 12 6 70 11 11 9 3 68 10 12 10 4 18 21 33 29 12 27 20 29 24 10 178,518
business work by number of hours worked last week
74
survey, girls were on average for 9 hours engaged in housework and for 3 hours in fam-
ily business work. For boys these figures were 6 and 4 hours. hence girls work substan-
tially more in the household, whereas boys work somewhat more in the family business. 
 overall, Table 4.2 illustrates that a large number of African and Asian children are 
for many hours per week involved in housework and family business work and that the 
size of the problem differs among countries and between the continents. In some coun-
tries many more children are involved and have worked many more hours than in other 
countries.
4.4 the engageMent in Unpaid Work
Table 4.3 presents the percentages of girls and boys engaged in unpaid labor for others 
outside their household. For these children who are engaged in unpaid labor, I also re-
port the hours children spend on this work (with three categories: 1–5; 6–15; 16+ hours) 
and the average hours according to urbanization.
 In the week before the survey, 9 percent of the African and 1 percent of Asian girls 
worked for others in unpaid labor. The average engagement for boys is 8 percent in Af-
girls boys
average hours average hours
Country work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban total N work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban total N
Côte D’ivoire 3.2 51.5 23.5 25.0 14.8 11.2 13.1 4,164 3.5 47.4 25.0 27.6 13.8 17.9 15.5 4,499
Gambia 8.2 59.1 34.9 6.0 6.1 7.2 6.3 3,864 6.0 50.0 41.6 8.4 7.4 5.9 7.0 3,592
Ghana 11.0 55.8 33.5 10.7 9.9 5.3 8.1 1,949 12.4 45.2 39.0 15.8 10.3 8.3 9.8 2,082
Guinea Bissau 4.7 43.7 47.4 8.9 9.6 7.9 9.3 2,886 4. 50.0 41.1 8.9 9.6 6.3 8.6 3,128
Sierra leone 20.7 63.8 27.5 8.7 6.6 5.0 6.0 3,166 23.2 64.9 27.5 7.6 6.3 4.5 5.7 3,282
Togo 7.9 63.5 28.9 7.6 7.2 4.6 6.4 2,672 7.9 63.3 25.6 11.2 8.9 4.5 7.7 2,707
Mauritania 0.9 59.1 27.3 13.6 9.0 5.2 7.2 4,687 1.0 58.3 16.7 25.0 10.3 18.2 14.3 4,735
Burundi 0.6 40.0 30.0 30.0 16.3 8.5 15.6 3,495 0.7 45.8 29.2 25.0 10.2 - 10.2 3,356
CAR 16.8 65.0 22.6 12.4 7.3 6.3 6.9 3,649 17.5 65.7 22.9 11.4 6.8 6.5 6.6 3,756
Malawi 15.6 50.2 40.9 9.0 7.4 6.8 7.4 1,1350 11.4 50.2 40.5 9.3 7.7 7.5 7.7 10,690
Somalia 2.4 12.7 38.1 49.2 22.1 18.5 21.1 2,638 1.5 14.0 39.5 46.5 22.7 19.6 21.8 2,814
Yemen 1.8 22.5 72.5 5.0 9.6 7.7 9.2 2,164 1.9 30.2 60.5 9.3 9.5 8.3 9.4 2,207
African Average 9.0 55.1 34.5 10.4 7.8 6.5 7.5 46,684 8.1 55.5 33.2 11.3 8.1 7.2 7.9 46,848
Syria 0.3 52.0 12.0 36.0 23.1 9.1 17.5 8,419 0.6 32.1 33.9 33.9 16.9 13.4 15.6 8,889
Thailand 1.8 64.6 25.4 10.0 5.2 7.1 6.1 7,036 1.9 67.1 24.5 8.4 6.0 5.6 5.8 7,411
vietnam 0.6 15.4 38.5 46.2 16.6 17.5 16.8 2,184 0.2 60.0 20.0 20.0 13.0 3.0 9.0 2,318
Bangladesh 1.5 63.3 25.3 11.3 8.4 5.0 7.6 20,590 2.0 50.5 19.4 30.1 14.4 24.5 17.5 21,026
Asian Average 1.2 61.8 25.0 13.2 8.6 6.4 8.0 38,229 1.6 52.8 21.9 25.3 13.1 17.0 14.5 39,644
Total Average 5.5 55.8 33.5 10.7 7.9 6.5 7.5 84,913 5.1 55.1 31.6 13.3 8.7 9.1 8.8 86,492
table 4.3 Percentages and averages hours worked of girls and boys aged 8–13 engaged in unpaid 
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rica and 2 percent in Asia; which means that girls and boys in both continents are about 
equally engaged in work without pay. The differences in the engagement in unpaid labor 
between Africa and Asia are rather high, but these numbers are averages; the inter-
country differences are more substantial. In Burundi, for example, less than 1 percent of 
the children are engaged in unpaid work. on the other extreme are Sierra leone and the 
Central African Republic, where between 17 and 23 percent of the children are engaged 
in unpaid labor. There are fewer extremes in Asia; the highest and the lowest values are 
more centered on the average. In Syria, a relatively small share of children are engaged 
in unpaid labor (less than 1 percent for both girls and boys); and in Thailand and Bangla-
desh children are most engaged in unpaid labor. however, with 2 percent as the high-
est average engagement, this is, when compared to most African countries, relatively 
low. As gender differences are concerned, girls and boys in Africa are almost equally 
engaged in unpaid labor. In some African countries, boys are relatively more engaged 
in unpaid labor; in other countries, girls work a bit more. The same holds true in Asia. 
hence, the involvement of children in unpaid labor does not seem to be gender-specific.
 What may be more important than the engagement in unpaid labor itself, is the 
girls boys
average hours average hours
Country work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban total N work 1–5 6–15 16+ rural urban total N
Côte D’ivoire 3.2 51.5 23.5 25.0 14.8 11.2 13.1 4,164 3.5 47.4 25.0 27.6 13.8 17.9 15.5 4,499
Gambia 8.2 59.1 34.9 6.0 6.1 7.2 6.3 3,864 6.0 50.0 41.6 8.4 7.4 5.9 7.0 3,592
Ghana 11.0 55.8 33.5 10.7 9.9 5.3 8.1 1,949 12.4 45.2 39.0 15.8 10.3 8.3 9.8 2,082
Guinea Bissau 4.7 43.7 47.4 8.9 9.6 7.9 9.3 2,886 4. 50.0 41.1 8.9 9.6 6.3 8.6 3,128
Sierra leone 20.7 63.8 27.5 8.7 6.6 5.0 6.0 3,166 23.2 64.9 27.5 7.6 6.3 4.5 5.7 3,282
Togo 7.9 63.5 28.9 7.6 7.2 4.6 6.4 2,672 7.9 63.3 25.6 11.2 8.9 4.5 7.7 2,707
Mauritania 0.9 59.1 27.3 13.6 9.0 5.2 7.2 4,687 1.0 58.3 16.7 25.0 10.3 18.2 14.3 4,735
Burundi 0.6 40.0 30.0 30.0 16.3 8.5 15.6 3,495 0.7 45.8 29.2 25.0 10.2 - 10.2 3,356
CAR 16.8 65.0 22.6 12.4 7.3 6.3 6.9 3,649 17.5 65.7 22.9 11.4 6.8 6.5 6.6 3,756
Malawi 15.6 50.2 40.9 9.0 7.4 6.8 7.4 1,1350 11.4 50.2 40.5 9.3 7.7 7.5 7.7 10,690
Somalia 2.4 12.7 38.1 49.2 22.1 18.5 21.1 2,638 1.5 14.0 39.5 46.5 22.7 19.6 21.8 2,814
Yemen 1.8 22.5 72.5 5.0 9.6 7.7 9.2 2,164 1.9 30.2 60.5 9.3 9.5 8.3 9.4 2,207
African Average 9.0 55.1 34.5 10.4 7.8 6.5 7.5 46,684 8.1 55.5 33.2 11.3 8.1 7.2 7.9 46,848
Syria 0.3 52.0 12.0 36.0 23.1 9.1 17.5 8,419 0.6 32.1 33.9 33.9 16.9 13.4 15.6 8,889
Thailand 1.8 64.6 25.4 10.0 5.2 7.1 6.1 7,036 1.9 67.1 24.5 8.4 6.0 5.6 5.8 7,411
vietnam 0.6 15.4 38.5 46.2 16.6 17.5 16.8 2,184 0.2 60.0 20.0 20.0 13.0 3.0 9.0 2,318
Bangladesh 1.5 63.3 25.3 11.3 8.4 5.0 7.6 20,590 2.0 50.5 19.4 30.1 14.4 24.5 17.5 21,026
Asian Average 1.2 61.8 25.0 13.2 8.6 6.4 8.0 38,229 1.6 52.8 21.9 25.3 13.1 17.0 14.5 39,644
Total Average 5.5 55.8 33.5 10.7 7.9 6.5 7.5 84,913 5.1 55.1 31.6 13.3 8.7 9.1 8.8 86,492
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time spent on this kind of work. helping out for a couple of hours at a neighboring farm 
may not be damaging to a child, but it is something quite different when children work 
so many hours that it becomes harmful to their health or education. The majority of 
children work less than 6 hours in unpaid labor (55 percent in Africa and 62 percent in 
Asia respectively). on the other hand, in countries with a relatively small percentage of 
working children, the children who are engaged in this form of unpaid child labor tend to 
spend many hours on this work. In Yemen for example, almost 75 percent of the working 
children spend 6 to 15 hours on unpaid labor, and in Somalia the majority of working 
children does so for more than 15 hours per week. likewise, in Cote d’Ivoire and Burun-
di, a quarter (or more) of the children spend more than 15 hours on unpaid labor. In Asia, 
the situation is similar. In countries where unpaid labor is a rare phenomenon, children 
who are engaged in unpaid labor work relatively more hours than in countries with a 
higher engagement in unpaid labor. For example, in Syria, about one third of the working 
children are engaged in unpaid labor for more than 15 hours. In vietnam, the situation 
for working girls is even worse; almost half of the girls who are engaged in unpaid labor 
spend more than 15 hours per week. Note that boys in Thailand have a relatively smaller 
workload than girls.
 Table 4.3 also presents the average working hours for children who are engaged in 
unpaid labor. The averages do not differ much between Africa and Asia. only Asian boys 
tend to spend more time on unpaid labor than boys living in Africa. These results indi-
cate that, although unpaid labor seems to be uncommon for boys in Asia, their workload 
is substantially higher than that of the African working boy. In Africa, boys more often 
help others out just for a couple of hours.
 In Asia, although the average engagement of girls and boys is about equal, work-
ing girls, on average, spend more time on unpaid labor than boys. In Bangladesh only, 
the average number of hours of boys exceeds that of girls. In Bangladesh, more than 60 
percent of girls engaged in unpaid labor only occasionally help out. Further, in vietnam, 
there are large differences between the average hours worked by urban and rural boys. 
however, taken into account that less than 1 percent of the boys in vietnam are engaged 
in unpaid labor and that most Asian children live in rural areas (see Table 2.4), this aver-
age is determined by only a small number of cases. 
4.5 varianCe CoMponents
To get an impression of the degree to which the engagement in child labor is affected 
by factors at the household and context level, I have estimated variance components 
for empty models1 using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) – estimation for the dif-
ferent forms of child labor. In multilevel analyses, the variance is estimated at each 
specified level. This corresponds with – in case of a three level model – three variance 
components. To determine the variance that can be attributed by factors at the different 
levels, the intraclass correlations rho (ρ), or variance Partition Coefficients (vPC) (Sni-
jders & Bosker, 1999; Goldstein, 2011) are computed. The intra-class correlation can be 
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considered as the proportion of the overall variation in hours worked attributable to, for 
example, districts. The analyses are estimated with MlwiN (Rasbash et al., 2005).
 In Table 4.4, I present the percentages that can be attributed to the household and 
the context2  level. To make a clear division between the household and the context in 
this table, the context level values represent the total variance that cannot be attributed 
to the household level. Generally speaking, the estimates make clear that most (60–99 
percent) of the variation in child labor can be attributed to household factors. however, 
the differences illustrate that some types of work may be better explained by factors 
close to home and while others are more influenced by factors further away.
 In line with the general finding, household level variables also seem to determine 
the involvement in commercial work (95 percent in Asia and 90 percent in Africa). In 
Asia, context factors are slightly more important in urban areas, possibly reflecting a 
higher demand for commercial child labor. In Africa, commercial work is somewhat 
more influenced by demand side factors or (infra)structural factors at the context 
level.
 For housework in Asia, around 70 to 80 percent of the variation can be ascribed to 
factors at the household level. The involvement in housework of rural girls in Asia and 
Africa is relatively less attributable to factors at the household level compared to other 
areas, suggesting that context factors, such as patriarchy and traditionality or a lack of 
school facilities may drive these rural girls into housework.
 The patterns for family business work resemble those for housework. In Asia, there 
is much variation, with variances at the household level ranging from 69 to 92 per-
cent. Moreover, the involvement of girls is, to a large extent, attributed to factors at the 
context level. In Africa, the context in rural areas seems to determine family business 
slightly more than in urban areas. This finding possibly illustrates the importance of the 
educational infrastructure and dominant cultura l patterns in rural areas.
 The involvement in unpaid work in Asia is mainly determined by factors at the house-
hold level. In Africa, unpaid work is relatively more determined by context level factors. 
This could indicate that African children mostly perform unpaid work in their direct sur-
roundings.
4.6 ConClUsion
In this chapter, I have made an overview of the work activities of children in Asia and 
Africa. In this way, I could get a detailed picture of the child labor problem. That work-
ing may be problematic is best described by the number of children engaged in each 
of the four types of child labor. The average workload in some types of child labor is so 
high that it is not unlikely that it might negatively affect children's health or educational 
outcomes. For example, the engagement of children in paid labor may not be very high 
compared to the other forms, but in some countries, children spend as much as 40 
hours on paid labor, which is a relatively high workload. Roughly speaking, these long 
workweeks occur in countries with a small share of working children, such as in Bang-
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ladesh, vietnam and Somalia. In Asia, children living in urban areas work more hours in 
commercial child labor compared to working children in rural areas.
 In addition, the statistics in this chapter suggest that for a clear understanding of 
the child labor problem, we should also look at the engagement of children in unpaid 
labor, such as housework, family business work and unpaid work for others. Work in the 
household is not necessarily bad for children; it is only natural that a child is expected 
household Context
Commercial work Asia Total 95 5
Rural Girls 95 5
Rural Boys 95 5
Urban Girls 93 7
Urban Boys 91 9
Africa Total 90 10
Rural Girls 87 13
Rural Boys 89 11
Urban Girls 97 3
Urban Boys 96 4
housework Asia Total 78 22
Rural Girls 67 33
Rural Boys 79 21
Urban Girls 72 28
Urban Boys 82 18
Africa Total 70 30
Rural Girls 65 35
Rural Boys 67 33
Urban Girls 72 28
Urban Boys 70 30
household Context
Family Business work Asia Total 86 14
Rural Girls 69 31
Rural Boys 84 16
Urban Girls 86 14
Urban Boys 92 8
Africa Total 64 36
Rural Girls 62 38
Rural Boys 60 40
Urban Girls 78 22
Urban Boys 77 23
table 4.4 Percentages to be explained at the household and context level
79
to help with the household chores. It becomes a problem when children are kept out 
of school to work in the household or family business. It could also be harmful when 
children are too tired in school or cannot do their homework. The descriptive analyses 
in this chapter show that girls spend more time on housework than boys and they are 
somewhat less engaged in family business work. Adding up the hours, girls spend rela-
tively more time on hidden household labor than boys. In Africa, girls are also relatively 
more engaged in unpaid labor outside their household. All in all, these data show that 
neglecting the engagement of girls in unpaid activities may lead to an underestimation 
of the child labor problem. 
 To give an indication of whether the engagement in child labor is influenced by 
factors at the household or context level, variance components of multilevel models 
without explanatory variables were presented. These models made clear that child labor 
can for the largest part be attributed to factors close to the home. In Africa, however, the 
engagement in child labor can be more explained by community factors than in Asia. In 
the following chapters, I will describe which factors at the household and the context 
level explain the engagement in all types of child labor.
NoTES
1 These are models without explanatory variables
2 The models in this chapter are all four-level models. The context is defined for three 
levels: household, cluster (village, neighborhood), district and country. The multi-
variate regression analyses in the rest of thesis are three- level (country, district, 
household) analyses. Due to data constraints, I could not include background char-
acteristics at the cluster level.
Unpaid Work Asia Total 99 1
Rural Girls 98 2
Rural Boys 99 1
Urban Girls 95 5
Urban Boys 94 6
Africa Total 87 13
Rural Girls 85 14
Rural Boys 88 12
Urban Girls 88 12
Urban Boys 85 15
table 4.4 Continued
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5.1 introdUCtion
In Chapter 3, I looked into the factors determining the engagement in commercial work 
in eighteen countries in latin America, Africa and India. however, treating child labor 
as an either-or problem may be problematic (e.g. Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997; 
Canagarajah & Nielsen, 2001; Emerson & Souza, 2008). The degree to which a child’s 
development and schooling suffer from being employed in paid labor depends to a large 
extent on the time involvement (Rosati & Rossi, 2003; Dorman, 2008). Children’s lives 
are much less affected if they work only a few hours a week than if they work many 
hours. The focus of this chapter will therefore be on the number of hours children are 
engaged in paid work.
 Starting point in this chapter is the theoretical framework that includes explanatory 
factors at the household, district and national level (Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2013) 
previously described in Chapter 3. To test the hypotheses derived from this framework, 
I use a unique database containing information of 168,123 children aged 8–13 living in 
sixteen low-income countries in Africa and Asia, for which is known whether they work 
for pay outside the household and for how many hours. I also have information on the 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of their family background and of the 
context in which they are living. This context information is at the district level within the 
16 countries. As 214 districts can be distinguished, there is ample explanatory power 
at the sub-national level for testing hypotheses on socio-economic and cultural context 
effects. 
 To find out which factors at which level of aggregation are most important in explain-
ing the number of hours a child is engaged in paid labor, multilevel regression models 
that allow estimating simultaneously the effects of factors at the household and context 
level are applied. Each situation is unique, in the sense that the effects of the various 
relevant factors might differ depending on the circumstances. In a multilevel context, 
this uniqueness can be addressed by studying interactions between household and 
context factors (huisman & Smits, 2009a). In my analyses, this possibility is worked out 
by studying how the effects of risk factors differ between urban and rural areas.
5.2 theoretiCal baCkgroUnd
To guide my research, I use the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3. This 
framework is influenced by models for understanding women’s employment (hijab, 
2001; Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010) and is presented in Figure 3.1. It is based on 
four pillars: (1) The context in which children live has different levels (household, local, 
national, international). (2) Decisions regarding child labor are made at the household 
level, by parents, caretakers, or other family members. (3) Different factors at the differ-
ent levels influence these decisions simultaneously. (4) The strength of these influences 
may differ between contexts. 
 The focus of my research is on the individual children, who are placed in the center 
of the figure. Each child is embedded in a multilayered context, represented by the 
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concentric circles surrounding the child. The first circle represents the nearby context 
of the household in which the child lives, the second circle the local context in which the 
household is situated, and the third circle the more distant context of the national and 
international factors that may influence child labor. The factors at the inner, or lower, 
levels are supposed to be embedded in – and shaped by – more distant factors. In this 
way the model addresses the fact that determinants of child labor may be context-spe-
cific.
 The decisions of parents (or other family members) regarding work or schooling of 
children are supposed to have four possible outcomes: the child can be in school, it can 
be engaged in paid work, it can be both in school and engaged in paid work and it can be 
neither in school nor engaged in paid work. The last situation is sometimes called ‘idle’ 
(Bacolod & Ranjan, 2008), although the child often is not really inactive but engaged 
in work at home, on housework or for the family business (Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 
2012). 
 In the model, the many factors at different levels that may affect child labor deci-
sions are grouped into three conditions according to the underlying causal mechanisms. 
These conditions, called resources, structure and culture, are discussed in the next sec-
tions.
RESoURCES
The role of resources has been studied extensively in the child labor literature; child la-
bor is generally considered to be a strategy used by poor households in order to survive 
(Nkamleu & kielland, 2006). The poverty hypothesis assumes that children do not have 
to be engaged in child labor when a household earns enough. however, other resource-
related factors, like parental education and occupational status could also play roles. 
Children of more highly educated parents are more in school and less often engaged 
in child labor, because parents generally want their children to reach at least the same 
educational level as they have reached themselves (huisman & Smits, 2009a; Webbink, 
Smits, de Jong, 2012). Further, more educated, hence empowered women are more 
capable of using their influence to the benefit of their children (Das & Mukherjee, 2007) 
hence, the educational level of the mother sometimes is found to be more important 
than that of the father (kurosaki et al., 2006).
 Economic development at the district level is placed under context-level resources. 
More modern areas are influenced more by globalization, including the diffusion of 
value patterns that stress the importance of education and gender equality (huisman 
& Smits, 2009a). In urban areas, the road and transport infrastructure is generally 
better, the state influence is stronger and there may be more pressure on parents to 
send their children to school. District educational level is also an important contextual 
resource factor. It indicates the level of development of the area, but at the same time is 
related to the availability of educational facilities and to norms in the region about the 
importance of sending children to school. As an indicator of the educational infrastruc-
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ture, district educational level is also a structural factor; hence I will come back to it in 
the next section.
STRUCTURE
Both family structure, such as the number of siblings (Edmonds, 2006), and structural 
context factors, like the educational infrastructure and labor market situation (Em-
erson & Souza, 2008; huisman & Smits, 2009a), may affect children’s engagement in 
paid labor. Structural characteristics at the household level often are resource-dilution 
variables. Individuals with more siblings could be more engaged in child labor, because 
scarce resources have to be divided among more family members. on the other hand, a 
higher number of siblings also means more helping hands. This may lead to more time 
for school for the children (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997; Nauck, 2007). Children 
living in extended families might work less, because there are more adults present to 
generate household income. Correspondingly, in households where one of the parents is 
missing, children are expected to work more.
 Birth order is important as well. In poor households, the older (first-born) children 
may have to work for pay or help at home and their labor may create the opportunity for 
their younger siblings to go to school (Edmonds, 2008). In this respect it is important to 
distinguish between the presence of brothers and sisters. Girls are more often involved 
in housework and boys more in commercial work (Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2012; 
2013). hence, children with more brothers might be less engaged in commercial work, 
because there are more candidates to do the job (Edmonds, 2006). Foster children are 
expected to be more engaged in paid work than biological children. As biological chil-
dren often take care of their elderly fathers and mothers, parents might be prepared to 
invest more in their education than in that of non-biological children (Serra, 2009). 
 Important structural context factors are the educational infrastructure and the local 
labor market structure. When there are no (good) schools in the vicinity, they will have 
to work (at home or at the labor market) or remain idle (kondylis & Manacorda, 2006). 
likewise, without work opportunities, children simply cannot be engaged in paid labor. 
Differences between urban and rural areas are important too. As we also saw in Chapter 
3, it is reported that most child labor is concentrated in rural areas (Ilo–IPEC 2010a, 
p.13.), where children may work on large farms (e.g. tobacco or cacao), or in the mining 
industry. Child labor in urban areas usually takes place in the informal sector, such as 
scavenging, vending and selling (Ilo–IPEC, 2010b). It is reported that this number is 
relatively higher than the number of children working in factories or sweatshops. (Ilo–
IPEC, 2011). 
CUlTURE
The third group of variables is derived from the literature on cultural explanations 
(lieten, 2003). Parents’ attitudes towards child labor are expected to be influenced by 
norms and values dominant in the context where they live. views on childhood and child 
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labor are not everywhere the same and are related to the position of women (kandiyoti, 
1988; Nieuwenhuys, 1996). In a classical patriarchal system, a woman is subordinated 
to her husband and works in his house. She may not be allowed to develop a business or 
work outside the home (Moghadam, 2004; Gündüz-hosgör & Smits, 2008). As a conse-
quence, many women in classical patriarchal societies do not accumulate assets and 
depend on their male family members (their husbands, brothers, and sons) for old-age 
security. If education is regarded as a way of enhancing a child’s future income, parents 
in such a system can be expected to invest more in the education of their sons than of 
their daughters. Systems of classical patriarchy are found in North Africa, the Middle 
East and South and East Asia (kandiyoti, 1988, p. 278). The dominant patriarchal system 
in sub-Saharan Africa is different. In sub-Saharan African countries, the insecurities of 
polygyny lead to greater autonomy for women. Sub-Saharan African women are primar-
ily responsible for their children’s sustenance, including the costs of education; men feel 
less obliged to contribute (kandiyoti, 1988, p. 277). This might also mean that in these 
countries women are more inclined to let their children work for pay, if they do not get 
enough from the fathers to make ends meet. 
RURAl-URBAN DIFFERENCES
The theoretical framework’s fourth pillar is the idea that effects of risk factors of child 
labor may differ depending on the circumstances. In this respect, I focus on differences 
between urban and rural areas in this (and the following) chapter(s). In urban areas of 
poor countries, facilities are often better, the influence of globalization stronger, and the 
idea that child labor is objectionable and children should be in school more dominant 
(huisman & Smits, 2009a). In these areas, children are expected to work less and to be 
more in school, even if they are (relatively) poor. In rural regions, schooling may entail 
higher costs due to more limited availability and accessibility of schools (hazarika, 2001; 
huisman & Smits, 2009a; Mugisha, 2006). Under these circumstances, parents with few 
resources might have fewer possibilities to get their children into school and choose 
to have them help at home or work for pay instead. hence according to the situational 
dominance hypothesis, the effects of resources depend on the circumstances. A more 
severe situation is associated with weaker positive effects, because there are fewer pos-
sibilities in these areas anyway (compare Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010).
5.3 data and Method 
DATA
Data are used from the third wave (2005–06) of UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS, www.childinfo.org) for five developing countries in Asia and eleven in 
Africa. The data are derived from the Database Developing World (www.datdevworld.
org), a multilevel data infrastructure in which MICS and other surveys are connected 
and supplemented with context information at district and national level. The countries 
are Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte D’ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
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Sierra leone, Togo, Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia, Bangladesh, Syria, Thailand, vietnam 
and Yemen. 
 Besides household-level data, context information at the district and national level 
is used. Within the 16 countries, 214 districts can be distinguished for which I included 
district-level context factors. Since the samples are large, these district-level variables 
could be created by calculating the district’s average of households’ and individuals’ 
characteristics (compare huisman & Smits, 2009a). Given the huge cultural and institu-
tional differences between Asia and Africa, separate analyses for these continents are 
performed. Since Yemen is geographically very close to Africa and resembles its African 
neighbors more than its Arab neighbors, Yemen is included in the African subsample. 
METhoD 
The data are analyzed with multilevel regression models (also called mixed models or 
hierarchical linear models; see Snijders & Bosker, 1999), with hours spent during the 
past week (seven days) on paid labor as the dependent variable. Because I use data on 
families nested within districts nested within countries, three-level models are applied 
and explanatory variables at household and district level are included. 
 The analyses focus on children aged 8–13. The questions on paid labor in the MICS 
surveys are formulated as follows. “During the past week did (name) any kind of work 
for someone who is not a member of this household?” If this question was answered 
with yes, it was subsequently asked whether this work was “For pay in cash or kind” 
and “About how many hours did he/she do this work for someone who is not a mem-
ber of this household?” The dependent variable has a minimum value of 0 hours and 
a maximum of 95 hours. Children who worked for a non-household member and were 
paid in cash or kind are considered to be engaged in paid labor for the number of hours 
mentioned. All other children are considered to work zero hours in this kind of work. 
 Independent variables at the household level are socio-economic characteristics 
(parental education, household wealth), demographic characteristics (sex, age, number 
of brothers and sisters, birth order, whether or not the child is a biological child and 
household composition). household wealth is measured by an index constructed on the 
basis of household assets, such as Tvs, cars, telephones, and housing characteristics, 
such as floor material, roofing, and toilet facilities. Education of the father is measured 
by using three categories. Given the low educational levels of the mothers, their educa-
tion was measured with a dummy indicating whether or not she completed primary 
education.
 Age of the child is measured in years. Number of sisters and brothers and birth 
order are interval variables. Presence of the parents is measured with dummy variables 
indicating whether or not the mother or father is missing from the household. Extended 
family structure is measured with three categories: nuclear family, more than two adults 
in the household but no grandparents, more than two adults in the household includ-
ing grandparents. Urbanization is measured by a dummy indicating whether or not the 
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household lives in a rural area. For educational infrastructure I use the average number 
of years of education for people aged over 13 in the district. As a measure of tradition-
ality of the district the average difference in age between husbands and wives (age 
husband minus age wife) is used. Patriarchy is indicated by the percentage of married 
couples living in households with grandparents from father’s side, indicating the tradi-
tion of girls to marry into the family of their husband.
 For children with a missing parent, the dummy variable adjustment method (Allison, 
2001) was used to address missing values on the parental characteristics. In this pro-
cedure, the cases with missing values get the mean of the valid values and a dummy is 
added to the model to identify the cases for which the mean was substituted. According 
to Allison (2001, p. 87), this procedure delivers unbiased estimates of the variables if the 
missing values are due to non-existence of the respective cases, as is the case here with 
the characteristics of parents who are missing. 
 By adding quadratic terms to the models, I tested for nonlinearity of the continuous 
variables. To test whether the effects of the explanatory variables differ between boys 
and girls interactions between all variables and sex were computed. If the interaction 
was significant, separate coefficients for boys and girls were estimated. If not, a general 
coefficient was presented. To address the possibility that effects differ between urban 
and rural areas, I also tested for interactions with urbanization and added the significant 
interactions to the model. 
5.4 resUlts
In Chapter 4, I showed that, with averages ranging from less than 1 to 7 percent, chil-
dren in Asia and Africa are not much engaged in paid child labor. however, the children 
who are engaged in commercial child labor tend to spend much time on this kind of 
child labor. Especially Asian children work long hours; on average, they work more than 
30 hours. In Africa, working children have more time to perform other activities. This 
might not mean that they go to school instead; they could also be engaged in the other 
types of unpaid work described in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
MUlTIvARIATE ANAlYSES
The variance components of the multilevel regression models described in Chapter 2 
show that in Asia as much as 95 percent of the variance in hours worked in paid labor 
can be explained by household level factors. In Africa this percentage is with 90 percent 
somewhat lower, but still substantial. hence in these countries it is mainly the house-
hold situation that determines whether children work for pay. There are hardly any 
differences in this respect between boys and girls, but substantial differences between 
urban and rural areas, which, interestingly, are in opposite direction in the two conti-
nents. In Africa the proportion of variation explained by household level factors is around 
96 percent in urban areas and 88 percent in rural areas, whereas in Asia it is 92 percent 
in urban areas and 95 percent in rural areas. 
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asia africa
all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father
none
at least some primary -0.238 * -0.827 ** -0.085 *
at least some secondary -0.373 ** -1.140 ** -0.081
Education mother at least some primary -0.401 ** -1.046 ** -0.116 **
Wealth -0.045 ** -0.132 ** -0.050 ** -0.077 **
Demographic factors
Sex = boy 1.251 ** 0.126 **
Age -0.869 ** -0.508 ** 0.092 ** 0.144 **
Age squared 0.049 **
Father missing 0.470 ** 0.086 **
Mother missing 0.329 ** 0.084
Extended family without grandparents -0.146 ** 0.017
Extended family with grandparents -0.181 * -0.012
Biological child 0.721 -0.081
Birth order child -0.080 -0.351 ** -0.027
Number of sisters 0.159 ** 0.014
Number of brothers 0.077 0.276 ** 0.019
Number of young children in household -0.077 -0.238 ** 0.025
Economic context factors
living in rural area -0.698 ** -0.952 ** -0.033
Mean years education adults in district -0.148 -0.479 ** -0.073
Cultural context factors
Mean age difference between spouses in district 0.060 0.387 ** -0.197 **
District % hh with grandparents from father’s side  0.030 0.050
table 5.1 Continues on next page
table 5.1 Coefficients of multilevel linear regression models for children age 8–13 with hours 
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all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Biological child 0.721 -0.081
Birth order child -0.080 -0.351 ** -0.027
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Number of young children in household -0.077 -0.238 ** 0.025
Economic context factors
living in rural area -0.698 ** -0.952 ** -0.033
Mean years education adults in district -0.148 -0.479 ** -0.073
Cultural context factors
Mean age difference between spouses in district 0.060 0.387 ** -0.197 **
District % hh with grandparents from father’s side  0.030 0.050
table 5.1 Continues on next page
spent on paid child labor as dependent variable
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 Table 5.1 presents the multilevel regression coefficients. For variables that inter-
acted significantly with sex, separate coefficients for boys and girls are presented; 
otherwise a general coefficient is presented under ‘All’ (columns 1 and 4). Significant 
interactions with urbanization are presented in the bottom part of the table.
 The first striking finding is that in Asia the coefficients of all variables but one are 
significant, whereas in Africa this is only the case with one third of the variables. All Asian 
coefficients are also larger than the corresponding ones for Africa and they differ more 
between boys and girls and between urban and rural areas. In Asia more than half the 
coefficients differ according to sex and over one third between urban and rural areas. In 
Africa only two coefficients (wealth and age) differ according to sex and between urban 
and rural areas. hence, in all respects there is much more variation in Asia than in Africa.
 A higher education of both parents reduces the time their children spent on paid 
labor. In Asia this effect is significantly larger for boys than for girls; in Africa girls and 
boys benefit to the same amount of their parents’ education. In Africa, the fathers’ sec-
ondary education has no significant effect. household wealth shows the expected effect: 
children are significantly less engaged in paid work if the household is wealthier. This 
wealth effect is stronger for boys than for girls in both continents. I tested for nonlinear 
effects of this variable, but they turned out to be linear. 
 In Africa, the only significant demographic effects are those for sex, age, and 
absence of the father. Boys, older children and children with a missing father work 
significantly more. In Asia, all demographic factors are significant. There, the effect of 
table 5.1 Continued
asia africa
all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
interactions with living in a rural area
Age -0.157 ** 0.021 0.071 **
Father missing -0.469 **
Mother missing 1 1.449 **
Education father at least some primary 0.174 0.795 **
Education father at least some secondary 0.356 *
Education mother at least some primary 0.755 **
Wealth -- 0.027 *
Number of sisters -0.203 **
Mean age difference between spouses in district -0.320 ** -0.060
N 79,217 38,706 40,511 88,906 43,974 44,932
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
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age is nonlinear. Boys and girls older than 9 (indicated by the quadratic effect) are more 
engaged in paid labor the older they get. however, this increase in workload is higher 
for boys than for girls. The gender difference in child labor is much more pronounced in 
Asia than in Africa. This could be related to the African traditional patriarchal system.
 If the father or mother (Asia only) is missing from the household, children spend 
more time on paid labor, probably because they have to compensate for the labor of the 
missing parent. In Asia living in an extended family reduces the hours children work for 
pay. Apparently, members of the extended family are willing and able to work in order to 
reduce the workload of children. The idea that adopted or foster children would be more 
involved in paid work than biological children is not confirmed by the data.
 later-born Asian children tend to spend fewer hours on paid labor than their older 
siblings. In Asia, children with more siblings work more hours, but having more brothers 
only increases work hours of boys. In households with young children, boys tend to work 
less for pay. on the whole, these findings suggest that if there are boys in a household, 
they will be the first to be engaged in commercial work. The many significant effects for 
boys in Asia suggest that the place of girls is much more in the home than in Africa; they 
only seem to work if there is no other option. 
 Regarding the context factors, we see that Asian children work less if they live in a 
rural area. Asian boys also work less if they live in a more highly educated area. living 
in a more traditional area, as indicated by a larger age difference between husbands and 
wives, significantly increases hours worked by Asian boys. In Africa, a larger age differ-
table 5.1 Continued
asia africa
all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
interactions with living in a rural area
Age -0.157 ** 0.021 0.071 **
Father missing -0.469 **
Mother missing 1 1.449 **
Education father at least some primary 0.174 0.795 **
Education father at least some secondary 0.356 *
Education mother at least some primary 0.755 **
Wealth -- 0.027 *
Number of sisters -0.203 **
Mean age difference between spouses in district -0.320 ** -0.060
N 79,217 38,706 40,511 88,906 43,974 44,932
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
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ence between partners is associated with less paid labor of children. This might be due 
to the lack of opportunities for paid work in more traditional areas. Patriarchy has no 
significant effect.
INTERACTIoNS WITh URBANIZATIoN
To test the fourth pillar of the model, the idea that determinants of child labor may work 
different under different circumstances, I analyzed interaction effects with living in a 
rural area. In Asia, there are much more differences between urban and rural areas 
than in Africa. Rural children seem to start working at an older age; missing a father is 
less problematic for them, but missing a mother is associated with more hours work. 
Parental education is less important in rural areas of Asia. The effect of the number of 
sisters is almost reduced to zero in rural areas. In more traditional rural areas of Asia, 
indicated by a larger age difference between partners, children also work less. 
 In Africa, only the effects of age and wealth differ regarding urbanization. Both fac-
tors are more positive in rural areas, which means that the increase in child labor with 
age is stronger and the influence of wealth weaker there.
 The results in this chapter support the situational dominance hypothesis. The inter-
action effects show that education in Asia and wealth in Africa make less of a difference 
in rural areas, possibly because there are fewer possibilities to go to school and/or a 
higher demand for child labor.
5.5 ConClUsions
In this chapter, I aimed at gaining insight into the determinants of the number of hours 
spent on paid child labor, by analyzing representative data for 168,000 children living in 
214 districts of 16 developing countries. The data show that child labor incidence varies 
between less than 1 percent and 8 percent, with generally higher percentages in Africa 
than in Asia. These percentages might not be extremely high, but the average time in-
volvement of working children is substantial. This is particularly true in Asia, where girls 
work on average 30 hours per week and boys work an average of 38 per week. In Africa 
the average is, with about 13 hours, lower, but still substantial. The lower average in 
Africa might be due to a lack of paid work in this lower developed continent. If so, child 
labor may rise in Africa if the continent’s level of development increases.
 To gain insight into the driving factors behind paid child labor, a multilevel analysis 
was performed in which effects of socio-economic, demographic and cultural fac-
tors at the household and context level were studied simultaneously. Given the huge 
differences between the Asian and African context, this analysis was performed for 
each continent separately. The multilevel analyses indeed revealed large differences 
between Africa and Asia. In Asia, almost all explanatory variables contributed sig-
nificantly to the involvement in paid labor; in Africa this was the case with only a few 
variables. Gender differences were also much more pronounced in Asia. The conti-
nents are similar in the way household resources, in the form of parental education or 
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wealth, reduce the number of hours children spent on paid work. however, in Africa 
hardly any other factors were important, whereas in Asia, besides resources, structur-
al and cultural factors also played roles. It seems that in the least developed (African) 
countries, lack of resources is the major driving factor behind child labor, whereas at 
a higher level of development (such as in the Asian countries), other factors become 
important. 
 living in an extended family reduces child labor in Asia, whereas having more 
siblings increases it. This especially applies to boys. Asian girls are substantially less in-
volved in paid labor. This does not imply that Asian girls are always better off. The Asian 
girls who are engaged in paid labor tend to work much more hours than their African 
counterparts. The same is true for Asian boys. 
 An important contribution of this study is that effects of household and context fac-
tors are studied simultaneously for such a large number of countries for the first time. 
My findings show that it is to a large extent the household situation that determines the 
number of hours a child is involved in paid labor. The context seems to be especially 
important in rural areas in Asia. To end child labor, improving the household situation 
seems to be a first prerequisite. In rural areas, a lack of possibilities might dominate 
and improving the (educational) infrastructure might be a second step forward there.
NoTES
1 This chapter is based on Webbink, E., Smits, J. & de Jong, E. (2012). "Child labor in 
Africa and Asia: household and context determinants of hours worked in paid labor 
by young children in 16 low-income countries", which has been submitted to a peer-
reviewed international journal
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1
96
6.1 introdUCtion
Child labor has different faces. When we hear the term child labor, we generally think 
of market work: we visualize poor children working in mines or knitting our carpets. In 
the previous chapters I studied the involvement in commercial child labor, but as was 
explained earlier: this is just one of the different faces of child labor and only a minor-
ity of working children is engaged in market work (Edmonds, 2008). Many children in 
developing countries are neither enrolled in school nor engaged in paid employment. 
Although these so-called “idle” children are not gainfully employed, many of them 
tend to work in more hidden forms of child labor, like work in the household, at the 
family farm, or in the family business. This “idleness-problem” and the notion that 
these children might be involved in these hidden forms of child labor have become 
more and more recognized (Amin, Quayes, & Rives, 2006; Ray & lancaster, 2005). Still, 
comparative research into the factors that influence this kind of child labor is largely 
lacking. 
 Work done at home is often not included in employment statistics, leaving us with 
restricted knowledge about the children performing these tasks. The few available 
statistics indicate that the percentage of these children varies among countries and 
regions, that up to a quarter of the school-aged children may belong to this group, and 
that the majority are girls (Biggeri et al., 2003; Cigno, Rosati & Tzannatos, 2002). Given 
the scale of this problem, it is important to gain insight into its determinants so that 
policies aimed at reducing hidden child labor can be developed.
 This chapter aims at getting a better understanding of the child labor phenomenon 
by determining the factors that influence the engagement of children in two hidden 
forms of child labor: housework (including activities as shopping, collecting firewood, 
cleaning, fetching water, or caring for children) and family business work (including 
activities as farm work, work in a family owned shop or workplace, and selling goods 
from the family’s farm or business in the street and at the market). Previous child labor 
research into these forms of child labor suffered from data restrictions. I use a unique 
new data source, the 2005–06 wave of the UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys 
that allows me to present detailed information on the prevalence of these two forms of 
hidden child labor and their determinants at household and context level for 16 low-
income countries in Africa and Asia. The term housework is reserved for activities in the 
household (chores, housekeeping) that do not contribute economically to the household. 
Family business work consists of unpaid activities at the family farm, workplace, or shop 
that do contribute economically to the household.
6.2 theoretiCal baCkgroUnd
Children in developing countries have several options regarding work and education. 
They can go to school, work for the market, do housework, work in the family business, 
or do a combination of these activities. hidden child labor refers to the last two activi-
ties: housework and work in the family business. 
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 The children’s parents generally decide which activity a child performs. The paren-
tal decisions are assumed to be guided by a trade-off between costs and benefits for 
themselves, their family, and the children concerned. These costs and benefits can be 
direct – the costs of a school uniform or the income derived from child labor – or be 
opportunity costs; the income foregone by sending children to school. They can relate to 
the present and to the future. An example of the latter is the expected higher income as 
a result of following an education in the present. The parental decision is also assumed 
to be influenced by cultural patterns and local traditions.
 housework, family business work and work for the market give a direct return to the 
family. This return can be in cash or in the relief it gives adults, so that the latter can 
work for the market or in the family business. These forms of child labor are in gen-
eral regarded as possibly detrimental for the children; because time spent on working 
cannot be spend on schooling and school-related activities. There is broad evidence 
that all forms of child labor, including housework and family business work, negatively 
affect educational participation and attainment of children (Allais, 2009; Amin, Quayes, & 
Rives, 2006; Assaad, levison, & Zibani, 2010; levison & Moe, 1998). This does, however, 
not always mean that these children are in a bad position compared with children who 
are able to spend more time on schooling. In developing countries many children end 
up in occupations for which work experience is more important than formal education. 
Through “learning by doing” these children may acquire skills they need later in life. 
From this point of view, the engagement in agricultural and family business work may 
be considered as education by the parents (e.g. Cigno & Rosati, 2005; Emerson & Souza, 
2007). This also applies to housework which often is considered a good preparation for 
marriage for girls by their parents. 
 Nevertheless, in spite of these positive returns associated with family business work 
and housework, in the long run negative individual and social effects dominate. Beegle, 
Dehejia & Gatti (2004) estimated on the basis of panel data for vietnam that the short-
term effects of family business work on earnings may be positive, but that from age 30 
onward the foregone earnings attributable to lost schooling dominate any positive effect. 
Besides these economic reasons, one can also argue that less schooling leads to fewer 
capabilities in the spirit of Sen’s (1999) Capability Approach; which may reduce individual 
welfare and social capital. The latter can have detrimental societal effects such as less 
pressure for openness and transparency. In sum, nonextreme forms of child labor can 
have short term benefits, such as higher earnings and experience. In the long run nega-
tive individual and social benefits seem to dominate.
 Sending children to school has relatively high costs in the present. Parents often 
have to pay for uniforms or books. More importantly though are opportunity costs as 
the forgone income and work in the household which cannot be simultaneously done. 
The future benefits can be relatively large if formal education gives access to better paid 
jobs. This higher income in the future serves the children when they are adults and pro-
vides them with future resources, which can also be used to care for the parents when 
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they are old. In addition, parents might value education as a benefit in itself. Nonethe-
less, even though parents value the importance of education, they might be constrained 
by the costs or poor educational infrastructure and feel forced to let their children 
involve in child labor (hilson, 2010). 
 The weight parents attach to each of the characteristics of the different forms of 
child activity will depend on the child’s sex, the economic position of the family, other 
characteristics of the family, the culture and traditions in the area, the work opportuni-
ties, etc. These explanatory variables refer to characteristics at three different lev-
els: the family level, the sub-national level, and the national level. In this chapter, the 
national level is represented by using data for 16 countries and the sub-national level 
by distinguishing 214 districts within these countries. Because the larger institutional 
context in which the household lives is caught by the national level, the district-level 
variables are expected to represent the more near-by environment of the household 
(compare Smits, keij & Westert, 2005). 
 Figure 6.1 provides the theoretical framework that will guide my analyses. The 
framework in this chapter looks slightly different from the framework I apply in the rest 
of this thesis, but the independent variables in this framework can be placed under the 
shaping factors explained in the model described in Chapter 3. 
SoCIo-ECoNoMIC FACToRS
Children of poor families are less enrolled in school (huisman & Smits, 2009a) and 
tend to work more (e.g. Basu & Tzannatos, 2003; Basu & van, 1998; Bourdillon, 2006; 
Suryahadi, Priyambada & Sumarto, 2005). If parents cannot afford to pay for schooling 
and paid labor is not a valid alternative, keeping children at home and let them help with 
housework or in the family business seems a reasonable option. 
 Possession of land and livestock is associated with higher levels of child labor (Gou-
lart & Bedi, 2008). If wealth is measured by land ownership, this phenomenon is known 
as the “wealth paradox” (Bhalothra & heady, 2003), which can be explained by a higher 
labor demand within the family in households rich in land and (or livestock) (Cigno, Ro-
sati & Tzannatos, 2002). Both boys and girls are known to be engaged in herding small 
animals, whereas boys generally look after large animals (Cockburn & Dostie, 2007). on 
the other hand, owning large animals like oxen may reduce the household’s workload 
because they can be used for efficiency promoting techniques such as plowing. Simi-
larly, the demand for child labor at home might increase with farm size to the point that 
parents can afford to hire laborers. After that point children’s engagement is expected 
to decline (Basu, Das, & Dutta, 2010). hence, the effect of wealth in the form of land or 
livestock possession on family business work might be nonlinear.
 Another important dimension of wealth is being connected to basic services, like 
electricity and (tap) water. Without such services, household chores are more time-
consuming, thus creating a higher demand for children’s labor (Guarcello, lyon & 
Rosati, 2004; Shafic, 2007). For example, although there are many traditional methods 
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to conserve food, a refrigerator reduces the number of times to shop for groceries. 
Fetching water often is a time-consuming activity that is reduced substantially if water is 
available at the premises (hutton & haller, 2004; UN, 2006). Empirical evidence suggests 
that children, especially girls, are more involved in housework when there is no access 
to running water (levison & Moe, 1998). I, therefore, assume that the availability of tap 
water and electricity reduces the time involvement in housework.
 Regarding the effects of parental education, children of educated parents are expected 
to be less involved in the hidden forms of child labor. Parents who received some educa-
tion themselves know the value of schooling and its returns and will, therefore, be more 
motivated to send their children to school (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Mukherjee & Das, 
2008). For girls, their mother’s education is probably most important, because mothers 
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
- parental education
- household wealth
- connected to electricity
- connected to tap water
- possession of land
- possession of cattle
RESOURCES
CONTEXT LEVEL
- level of development
- urbanization
- educational infrastructure
RESOURCES / STRUCTURE
- patriarchy
- traditionality
CULTURE
- sex of child
- age of child
- number of siblings
- birth order of child
- biological child
- mother / father missing
- extended family
- young children present
DEMOGRAPHIC / STRUCTURE
- HOUSEWORK
- FAMILY BUSINESS WORK
figure 6.1 Determinants of housework and family business work
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who have succeeded in completing a certain level of education have experienced the value 
of education and know that it is within the reach of girls to obtain schooling. Therefore, I 
expect them to use the bargaining power and insights derived from their higher education 
to make sure that their daughters work less at home and can go to school (Basu, Das, & 
Dutta, 2010; Emerson & Souza, 2007; Smits & Gündüz-hosgör, 2006).
DEMoGRAPhIC FACToRS
Children’s engagement in household and family business work might also depend on de-
mographic characteristics and the composition of the household. There are, for example, 
considerable differences in this respect between boys and girls (Amin, Quayes, & Rives, 
2006; Cigno, Rosati & Tzannatos, 2002). An explanation for this can be found in the way 
parents perceive returns to education. In many cultures, girls are not supposed to pursue 
an education since they are expected to grow up to be housewives. If they do go to school, 
parents might believe that learning basic skills, like reading and writing, are enough and 
take them out of school after two or three years to help their mothers at home (huis-
man & Smits, 2009b). Boys often are expected to contribute to agricultural tasks, such 
as herding animals and plowing, or to assist in the family business. Girls are therefore 
expected to be more involved in housework and boys more in family business work.
 If one of the parents is absent from the household, children are expected to work 
more because they might have to take over tasks of the missing parent. Therefore, I ex-
pect that if the father is not present, boys spend more time on family business work and 
if the mother is not present girls spend more time on housework. obviously there might 
also be spill-over effects leading to an increased workload for all family members if one 
of the parents is absent.
 The family structure of extended families incorporates a shared responsibility for 
household tasks which may reduce the demand for children’s labor within the house-
hold. This effect might depend on the composition of the extended family. There are 
indications that living in an extended family is especially beneficiary if there are grand-
parents present (huisman & Smits, 2009a). In developing countries, child fostering is a 
common practice. They are, for example, sent away to meet a demand for labor in the 
hosting family or to go to school. There is little empirical information on child labor by 
foster children. however, it has been assumed that the blood-band between parents and 
children is the basis for parental altruism and nonbiological children may, therefore, be 
more involved in (domestic) child labor (Beegle et al, 2010; Ainsworth, 1996).
 Birth order and family size might be important too. Firstborn children often have 
fewer opportunities than their later-born siblings (Chesnokova & vaithianathan, 2008). 
Firstborn children often are disadvantaged and are reported to work more which may 
give their siblings the chance to go to school (Edmonds, 2006; Punch, 2001). With regard 
to family size, I expect that children are more involved in housework or family busi-
ness work with every sibling they have, because there are more mouths to feed, more 
work to be done at home, and higher schooling costs (Emerson & Souza 2008; Patrinos 
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& Psacharapoulos, 1997). on the other hand, more brothers and sisters means more 
helping hands, which allows for a division of household labor. This may lead to more 
time for school for each child (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997) or, when resources are 
unequally distributed (Buchmann, 2000), to schooling for some and housework or family 
business work for others. 
 Due to the gendered division of housework, girls with more brothers are expected to 
be more involved in household chores. likewise, this also implies that boys with more 
sisters might work less in the household, because the largest share of the work is done 
by their sisters (Morduch, 2000). The age of the sibling might matter too. As very young 
children generally constitute a burden to the family, older children (particularly girls) 
might have to spend more time on housework if there are young children present (levi-
son & Moe, 1998; Boockmann, 2010; Cockburn & Dostie, 2007).
CoNTEXT FACToRS
Previous research indicates that the outcome of parental decisions regarding labor 
engagement and educational participation of their children depends on the context in 
which the family lives (e.g., huisman & Smits, 2009a; Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2013). 
Important factors in this respect are the local context’s level of development and degree 
of urbanization. In more modern areas, there is more impact of globalization, includ-
ing the diffusion of value patterns that stress the importance of education and gender 
equality. In urban areas, the road and transport infrastructure is generally better, the 
state influence is stronger, and there may be more pressure on parents to send their 
children to school. Both engagement in housework and family business work are, there-
fore, expected to be lower in more developed and urban areas. 
 An important cultural factor is the position of women in the region where the house-
hold lives. There is broad evidence that women’s empowerment improves their children’s 
well-being, health, and school enrolment (e.g. hobcraft 1993; huisman & Smits 2009a; 
Mukherjee & Das 2008). It is therefore expected that parents invest more in the education 
and welfare of children (especially daughters) and that they are less engaged in house-
work and family business work in environments with a better position of women.
 kinship patterns may also influence parent’s decisions regarding child labor (kamb-
hampati & Rajan, 2008; Bass, 2004)). When girls marry within the families of their hus-
bands, investing in their education might not be considered worthwhile (Gündüz-hoşgör 
& Smits, 2008). This could explain why girls are more involved in household chores in 
patriarchal areas (e.g. kambhampati & Rajan, 2008). 
6.3 data and Method 
DATA
Data are used from the third wave (2005–06) of UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS, www.childinfo.org) for five developing countries in Asia and eleven in 
Africa. The data are derived from the Database Developing World (www.datdevworld.
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org), a multilevel data infrastructure in which MICS and other surveys are connected 
and supplemented with context information at district and national level. The countries 
are Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte D’ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Sierra leone, Togo, Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia, Bangladesh, Syria, Thailand, vietnam 
and Yemen. 
 Besides household-level data, context information at the district and national level 
is used. Within the 16 countries, 214 districts can be distinguished for which I included 
district-level context factors. Since the samples are large, these district-level variables 
could be created by calculating the district’s average of households’ and individuals’ 
characteristics (compare huisman & Smits, 2009a). Given the enormous cultural and 
institutional differences between Asia and Africa, separate analyses for these conti-
nents are performed. Since Yemen is geographically very close to Africa and has more 
in common with its African neighbors than the Asian, Yemen is included in the African 
subsample. 
METhoD 
Similar to the analyses in Chapter 5, the data are analyzed with multilevel regression 
models (Snijders & Bosker, 1999), with hours spent during the past week (seven days) 
on household and family business work as dependent variables. Because I use data on 
families nested within districts nested within countries three-level models are applied 
and explanatory variables at each of these levels of aggregation are included. 
 The analyses focus on children aged 8–13. The questions on hidden child labor in 
the MICS surveys are formulated as follows. For housework: “During the past week 
did (name) help with household chores such as shopping, collecting firewood, clean-
ing, fetching water, or caring for children?” and if answered with yes: “About how many 
hours did he/she spend doing these chores?”. For family business work: “During the 
past week, did (name) do any other family work (on the farm or in a business or selling 
goods in the street)?” and if answered with yes: “About how many hours did he/she do 
this work?”. The housework and family business variables have a minimum value of 0 
hours and a maximum of 95 hours.
 Independent variables at the household level are socio-economic characteristics 
(parental education, household wealth), demographic characteristics (sex, age, num-
ber of brothers and sisters, birth order, whether or not the child is a biological child 
and household composition). household wealth is measured by an index constructed 
on the basis of household assets, such as Tvs, cars, telephones, and housing charac-
teristics, such as floor material, roofing, and toilet facilities. Education of the father 
is measured with three categories. Given the low educational levels of the mothers, 
their education was measured with a dummy indicating whether or not she completed 
primary education. landownership is measured with a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not any member of the household owns land that can be used for agricul-
ture. ownership of cattle is measured with a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
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a household owns livestock, herds, other farm animals, or poultry. As these variables 
for ownership of land and cattle were lacking for three of the Asian countries, these 
are not included in the analyses for Asia. The presence of tap water and electricity are 
measured with a dummy indicating whether or not these facilities were present in the 
dwelling.
 Age of the child is measured in years. Number of sisters and brothers and birth 
order are interval variables. Presence of the parents is measured with dummy variables 
indicating whether or not the mother or father is missing from the household. Extended 
family structure is measured with three categories: nuclear family, more than two 
adults in the household but no grandparents and more than two adults in the household 
including grandparents. Urbanization is measured by a dummy indicating whether or 
not the household lives in a rural area. For educational infrastructure I use the average 
number of years of education for people aged over 13 in the district. As a measure of 
traditionality of the district the average difference in age between husbands and wives 
(age husband minus age wife) is used. Patriarchy is indicated by the percentage of mar-
ried couples living in households with grandparents from father’s side, indicating the 
tradition of girls to marry into the family of their husband.
 For children with a missing parent, the dummy variable adjustment method (Allison, 
2001) was used to address missing values on the parental characteristics. In this pro-
cedure, the cases with missing values get the mean of the valid values and a dummy is 
added to the model to identify the cases for which the mean was substituted. According 
to Allison (2001, p. 87), this procedure delivers unbiased estimates of the variables if the 
missing values are due to non-existence of the respective cases, as is the case here with 
the characteristics of parents who are missing. 
 By adding quadratic terms to the models, I tested for nonlinearity of the continuous 
variables. To test whether the effects of the explanatory variables differ between boys 
and girls interactions between all variables and sex were computed. If the interaction 
was significant, separate coefficients for boys and girls were estimated. If not, a general 
coefficient was presented. In this way, a clear and concise overview of the relevant coef-
ficients is obtained. To address the possibility that effects differ between urban and rural 
areas, I also tested for interactions with urbanization and added the significant interac-
tions to the model. 
6.4 resUlts
In Chapter 4, I showed that a large number of African and Asian children are involved 
in housework and family business work for many hours a week and that the size of the 
problem differs among countries and between the continents. In some countries many 
more children are involved and many more hours are worked than in others. Preliminary 
analyses show that also within countries large differences between districts can exist. 
In the multilevel analyses, this variation is used to gain insight into the effects of the 
circumstances under which families live on the hidden forms of child labor. 
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MUlTIvARIATE ANAlYSES
The variance components in Chapter 4 of the multilevel regression models explaining 
hours spent on housework show that in Asia 78 percent and in Africa 70 percent of the 
variance is due to factors at the level of the household. For the models explaining hours 
spent in family business work, the household component is 86 percent in Asia and 64 
percent in Africa. These figures show that factors in the nearby environment of the child 
and household are much more important than factors farther away, and that nearby fac-
tors are particularly important in Asia. 
 Table 6.1 and 6.2 present the regression coefficients of the multilevel models for 
housework and family business work. The coefficients for Asia are presented in columns 
1, 2 and 3; those for Africa in columns 4, 5 and 6. For those variables that interacted 
significantly with sex, separate coefficients for boys and girls are presented; otherwise a 
general coefficient is presented under “All” (columns 1 and 4). 
hoUSEWoRk
Table 6.1 shows mixed results for the effects of resources at the household level. The 
effect of father’s education is at first sight counterintuitive. Both boys and girls tend 
to work more in the household if their father is more highly educated and this effect 
is stronger for boys. only for girls in Asia with a father with more than primary educa-
tion we see the expected housework- reducing effect. A possible explanation for the 
unexpected effect of father’s education is that this variable catches to a certain extent 
the effect of the father’s work (which is not available in the data). Fathers with at least 
some education can be expected to work more often outside the home than fathers 
without education (who may be working in simple jobs close to their homes, if they 
have work at all). The wives of these fathers carry the responsibility for all the work 
to be done at home; and they therefore, may be more dependent on the labor of their 
children. 
 As expected, higher education of the mother reduces work hours in Asia, but is not 
significant in Africa. household wealth also shows the expected negative effect: Children 
are significantly less engaged in housework if the household is relatively wealthier. In 
Asia, boys and girls profit almost equally of household wealth; in Africa, the wealth ef-
fect is stronger for boys than for girls. I tested for nonlinear effects of this variable, but it 
turned out to be linear.
 In African households with own land or cattle, both boys and girls spend more time 
on housework. This is in line with the idea that every adult family member is working in 
farming households and children have to take over household tasks otherwise done by 
the parents. For Asia these coefficients could not be estimated, as these independent 
variables were lacking for most countries. My idea that presence of electricity and tap 
water might reduce hidden child labor by making housework more efficient is confirmed 
by the data: Children are significantly less involved in housework if their house is con-
nected to these basic services.
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 Demographic factors influence the engagement in housework largely as hypo- 
thesized. Girls and older children spend more time on housework than boys and 
younger children. The age effect is significantly stronger for girls. In Africa, the age ef-
fect is nonlinear, with hours spent on housework at first increasing more steeply as age 
increases than in Asia. If the father is missing from the household, children spend more 
time on housework, probably because the mother has to take over tasks usually done 
by the father. If the mother is missing, Asian girls work more in the household. In Africa, 
we see no effect of the absence of the mother on engagement in housework. The effect 
of living in an extended family is as expected in Asia but not in Africa. In Asia, apparently, 
mothers and extended family members are willing and able to reduce the hours children 
have to spend on housework, whereas in Africa they are not. The idea that adopted or 
foster children would be more involved in housework than biological children is, neither 
in Asia nor in Africa, confirmed by the data.
 later-born children tend to spend fewer hours on housework than their older 
siblings. The significant quadratic effect of this variable indicates that household tasks 
are disproportionally put on the shoulders of the oldest children. having more siblings 
generally means more housework for all children. only Asian girls with more sisters and 
African boys with more brothers are not more engaged in housework. In Asia, there is an 
additional effect for girls if there are (more) children under five in the household. Such 
an additional effect is not found in Africa. 
 District level variables also have a substantial impact on the children’s involvement 
in housework. our indicators of development generally show the expected effect, but 
the coefficients are not always significant. In Asia children work more in the household 
if they live in a rural area. In both continents, children, and especially girls, work less in 
the household if they live in districts with a more highly educated adult population (in-
dicating a better educational infrastructure). Urbanization and GDP per capita have no 
significant effect in Africa. I also estimated (not presented) models with level of develop-
ment measured by the percentage of households with a Tv in the district instead of adult 
education, but this variable turned out to be insignificant.
 living in a more traditional area, as indicated by a larger average age difference 
between husbands and wives, does not significantly influence the hours worked by 
children in the household. our second cultural district-level indicator, the degree to 
which women come to live in the household of their partners, is in Asia associated with 
more housework for children, whereas in Africa it is associated with less housework 
for children. This might be due to the fact that the patriarchal kinship system in Africa 
differs from that in Asia. According to kandiyoti (1988), in rural areas in Africa women 
are less affected by patriarchal traditional norms and are more involved in work outside 
the household compared to patriarchal areas in Asia. Perhaps, this also leads to more 
empowerment and a better living situation for their children.
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asia africa
all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father
none
at least some primary 0.609 ** 1.153 ** 1.856 ** 2.890 **
at least some secondary -0.386 ** 0.450 ** 1.871 ** 3.154 **
Education mother at least some primary -0.468 ** -0.238 ** -0.117
Wealth -0.056 ** -0.129 ** -0.208 **
household has own land ---- 0.374 ** 1.371 **
household has cattle ---- 0.408 **
household has tap water -0.335 ** -0.224 *
household has electricity -0.394 ** 0.051 -0.915 **
Demographic factors
Sex = boy -4.087 ** -3.591 **
Age 1.147 ** 0.418 ** 1.870 ** 1.558 **
Age squared -0.045 **
Father missing 2.076 ** 0.847 ** 0.443 **
Mother missing 1.605 ** -0.199 -0.314
Extended family without grandparents -0.888 ** -0.218 ** 0.042
Extended family with grandparents -1.015 ** -0.383 ** -0.219
Biological child -0.451 -0.341
Birth order child -1.040 ** -1.226 ** -0.875 **
Birth order squared 0.090 ** 0.089 **
Number of sisters -0.059 0.220 ** 0.211 **
Number of sisters squared 0.030 **
Number of brothers 0.200 ** 0.327 ** 0.218 ** 0.065
Number of young children in household 0.273 ** 0.054 -0.006
economic context factors
living in rural area 0.370 ** 0.141 0.278
Mean years education adults in district -1.695 ** -0.884 * -2.139 ** -1.630 **
National GDP per capita ---- -0.745 -2.135
Cultural context factors
Mean age difference between spouses in district 0.449 -1.370 ** -0.192 -0.026
District % hh with grandparents from father’s side 1.807 1.257 ** -1.304 *
N 80,373 39,206 41,167 98,145 48,823 49,322
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
table 6.1 Coefficients of multilevel linear regression models for children age 8–13 with hours 
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spent on housework as dependent variable
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FAMIlY BUSINESS WoRk 
The first interesting conclusion that can be drawn from Table 6.2 is that in Asia the de-
terminants of family business work differ much more between boys and girls than in Af-
rica. This seems to imply that there are differences in the way boys and girls are treated 
between Asia and Africa. This observation is in line with the idea about stronger gender 
differences and a weaker position of women as a result of a different kind of patriarchal 
system in Asia.
 Regarding the effect of parental education, we see that in Asia boys work less in the 
family business if their fathers are more highly educated, which is in line with expecta-
tion. In Africa, on the other hand, children are found to work more in the family business 
if their father has at least some primary education. This might be due to the fact that in 
Africa, with its much lower level of development (see Table 2.4), people without resour-
ces have little opportunity to start a business at all. The effect of mother’s education is 
as expected: children having an educated mother hours spent less time on family busi-
ness work in both Asia and Africa.
 Possession of land and cattle increases the hours that African children are engaged 
in family business work, but wealthier households in Africa probably have more resourc-
es to hire employees for their businesses. In Asian households with tap water, boys are 
significantly less involved in family business work. having water on the premises may 
reduce time needed for irrigation. As irrigation often is a male task (harris, 2006), this 
result is in line with findings in other Asian countries. For Asian and African boys, elec-
tricity is also associated with less family business work, probably because their manual 
labor is replaced by electrical equipment.
 In Asia, boys work more hours in the family business than girls, but in Africa boys 
have a significantly smaller workload (after controlling for the other factors in the mod-
el). This finding is in line with the idea of stricter gender roles in the Asian patriarchal 
system and more economic involvement of women in Africa. older children spend more 
time on family business work. The effect of age is nonlinear, for Asian girls it accelerates 
after a low level and in Africa it decelerates after a high level. having a missing parent 
does not influence children’s time involvement in family business work, but living in an 
extended family without grandparents increases the workload for boys in Asia. hence, 
in contrast with earlier expectations, the presence of more relatively young adult family 
members may lead to more economic activity in the family business.
 Biological children do not work more in family business work than adopted or foster 
children. however, earlier born children work significantly more than their later born 
siblings (except for Asian girls). Asian children with more sisters work more in the family 
business; and in both continents, all children having more brothers are more engaged in 
this kind of work. Endogeneity might play a role here; parents who run a family business 
perhaps get more children because they can work as cheap laborers.
 Regarding the effect of context factors, there are considerable differences between 
Asian and African children. only the effect of living in a rural area is comparable in both 
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continents: children living in rural areas work more hours on family business work in 
Asia as well as in Africa. This effect is particularly strong for boys, which again il-
lustrates that family business work is often agricultural work mostly done by boys. In 
Africa, children work significant less in areas with an on average higher educational 
level of the adult population. This is in line with the idea that better educational facilities 
pull children out of family business work and into school. however, in Asia, the effect of 
adult education is not significant. In Africa, the effect of GDP per capita is not significant, 
indicating that resource factors further away matter less than close to home.
 living in a more traditional area, as indicated by a larger average age difference 
between husbands and wives, is in Asia associated with less family business work for 
girls but not for boys. This finding is in line with the idea that in more traditional areas in 
Asia, family business work is male work. In Africa no such age-difference effect is found. 
however, my other cultural indicator, the degree to which women come to live in the 
household of their partners, is in Africa associated with less family business work for all 
children. Maybe there are fewer possibilities for family business work in these patriar-
chal areas to begin with. 
6.5 ConClUsions
In this chapter I aimed at gaining insight into the determinants of two hidden forms of 
child labor – housework and family business work – by analyzing representative data 
for 178,000 children living in 214 districts of 16 developing countries. Using multilevel 
analyses, I explained the variation on the basis of socio-economic, demographic and 
cultural factors at the household, district, and national level. Given the enormous differ-
ences between the Asian and African context, the analyses were performed separately 
for the Asian and African countries in my database. 
 As shown in Chapter 4, many children spent time on these forms of child labor. In 
eleven of the sixteen countries over a quarter of children spent more than fifteen hours 
a week on hidden child labor. Because the involvement in these activities is known to 
hamper educational enrollment and success of children, these findings are very impor-
tant. They tell us that policies aimed at reducing child labor should not only focus on 
market labor, but also on informal labor in and around the home. 
 To gain insight into the factors at household and context level associated with hidden 
child labor, multilevel analyses were performed with the hours spent on housework and 
family business work as dependent variables. A decomposition of the dependent vari-
ables’ variances revealed that the greatest part of the variance is at the household level; 
about 80–85 percent of the variation in Asia and 60–70 percent of the variation in Africa 
can be attributed to the household level. hence, for developing policies aimed at reduc-
ing hidden child labor, the focus should be in the first place on the household level.
 As expected, socio-economic characteristics of the household are very influential. 
If the household is wealthier or the mother has some education, children are gener-
ally less involved in these forms of child labor. The effect of education of the father was 
110
asia africa
all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father
none
at least some primary 0.028 -0.330 ** 0.258 **
at least some secondary -0.147 -0.828 ** 0.054
Education mother at least some primary -0.159 * -0.550 ** -0.212 *
Wealth -0.008 -0.302 **
household has own land ---- 1.471 **
household has cattle ---- 1.565 **
household has tap water 0.038 -0.458 ** -0.110
household has electricity -0.021 -0.551 ** 0.149 -0.212 *
Demographic factors
Sex = boy 1.593 ** -0.121 *
Age -0.420 ** 0.553 ** 1.049 **
Age squared 0.026 ** -0.028 *
Father missing -0.056 -0.127
Mother missing -0.016 0.354
Extended family without grandparents -0.060 0.187 ** 0.135
Extended family with grandparents -0.050 0.256 -0.293
Biological child 0.069 -0.028
Birth order child 0.005 -0.158 ** -0.183 *
Number of sisters 0.117 ** 0.074
Number of brothers 0.078 * 0.211 ** 0.137 *
Number of young children in household -0.016 0.015
economic context factors
living in rural area 0.201 ** 0.483 ** 1.254 ** 2.075 **
Mean years education adults in district -0.005 -0.213 -1.778 ** -2.280 **
National GDP per capita ---- 0.723 1.527
Cultural context factors
Mean age difference between spouses in district -1.340 ** -0.695 0.853
District % hh with grandparents from father’s side 0.745 -1.113 *
N 80,373 39,206 41,167 98,145 48,823 49,322
table 6.2 Coefficients of multilevel linear regression models for children age 8–13 with hours 
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
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* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
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unexpected. Children of educated fathers work more in the household and in Africa also 
more in the family business. It is possible that educated fathers are more often engaged 
in work outside the home, and therefore are less able to contribute to housework. If Af-
rican fathers do work at home, they might more often run a family business which also 
increases the labor demand within the household.
 Children’s involvement in both forms of hidden child labor is substantially increased if 
the household has land or cattle and if they live in a rural area, thus confirming the labor 
intensity of (family) farm work. Possession of other assets generally reduces the involve-
ment of children in this work. The same is true for the connection to basic services like 
electricity and water, which may substantially reduce the workload both in the household 
(e.g. fetching water, shopping) and in the family business (e.g. irrigation, use of machines). 
 Demographic factors have an important influence. housework is sex-specific, 
dependent on age, and birth order of children. Family size, measured by the number of 
brothers or sisters, is important as well, particular when there are more sons. When the 
father is absent, all children spend more time on housework; when the mother is absent 
this is only the case for Asian girls. Children living in extended families in Asia are less 
involved in housework.
 With respect to the role of the context in which the household lives, children are less 
involved in hidden child labor if they live in more developed (urban, more highly educated) 
areas. hence good educational facilities and the influx of modern ideas regarding the 
children’s roles and importance of education might pull children out of child labor. living 
in a traditional context means less hidden child labor for African boys and girls and less 
time involvement in family business work for Asian girls. In Asia this might be due to the 
stricter gender roles in the Asian patriarchal system, with paid work considered primarily 
the responsibility of males. The fact that gender differences are much more pronounced 
in the Asian models is in line with this explanation. The lower levels of hidden child labor 
in more traditional areas of Africa might simply reflect the lack of any work there.
PolICY RECoMMENDATIoNS
The analyses in this chapter reveal that hidden child labor is associated with a large 
number of socio-economic, demographic, and cultural factors, both at household level 
and at the level of the context in which the households live. Although the effects of these 
factors need not be strictly causal, the information on the associations presented here 
may in several ways help policy makers who want to identify and solve problem situa-
tions. Firstly, it provides them with a basic set of variables to look at when diagnosing 
potential problem situations, together with information on the relative strength of their 
associations with household and family business work of young children.
 Secondly, these analyses suggest that the availability of electricity and tap water on 
the premises may significantly reduce the number of hours children spend on house-
work and boys spend on family business work. As children’s work does not connect 
households to these services, this association cannot be caused by reversed causality. 
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Given the large number of variables in the model it is also unlikely that this is caused by 
selectivity problems. The theoretical underpinning of these associations is also unam-
biguous; fetching water, irrigation, daily shopping and many forms of manual labor are 
time consuming activities that can be reduced very much when water and electricity 
are available at the premises. Improving these basic facilities in problem areas might, 
therefore, reduce the time households need to get the work at home done.
 Thirdly, besides investments in public utilities, also investments in educational infra-
structure might lead to a reduction of hidden child labor. In districts with better facilities, 
Asian girls were less involved in housework and African children were less involved in 
both forms of hidden child labor. Policies aimed at increasing educational participation, 
like investments in infrastructure and monetary transfers conditional on children’s school 
attendance have been found to be highly effective in in different regions of the developing 
world (e.g. for Uganda: Deininger, 2003; for latin American countries: lomeli, 2008; for 
Cambodia: Filmer, 2006). Theoretical evidence points in this direction as well (Cigno, 2011). 
hence governments that aim to reduce hidden child labor might focus on such policies.
 Fourthly, children spend fewer hours on both types of child labor if the mother is 
more highly educated. hence, policies aimed at reaching the uneducated mothers seem 
important for improving problem situations. As these mothers generally cannot read or 
write, an important role has to be played by local agents, like community workers and 
school teachers, and by the media which can develop information campaigns targeted at 
these women. 
 Fifthly, the number of hours worked increases with the number of brothers and sis-
ters. For family business work this might be the result of a deliberate choice of the par-
ents, as children are cheap laborers. however, as far as a large family size is the result 
of cultural habits, lack of knowledge, or unmet need for contraceptives, the number of 
hours a family has to spend on housework can be reduced substantially by giving women 
the information and means to realize a more effective family planning. hence, a reduc-
tion of hidden child labor and increased educational participation might be an important 
additional benefit of policies aimed at reducing family size and improving family planning.
 Besides commercial child labor (analyzed in Chapter 3 and 5) and unpaid work 
for their own household, children may also be engaged in unpaid work outside their 
household. Examples of this kind of work are neighboring help in (harvest) peak times 
and unpaid apprenticeships. In the following chapter, I will research the determinants of 
hours spent on unpaid work outside the household. 
NoTES
1 This chapter is based on Webbink, E., Smits, J. and Jong, de E. (2012). hidden child 
labor: determinants of housework and family business work of children in 16 devel-
oping countries. World Development, 40: 631–642.

Chapter 7
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7.1 introdUCtion
In the previous chapters, I focused on commercial child labor and unpaid housework 
and family business work. In this chapter I would like to make a step forward in our 
knowledge about child labor and study the engagement of children engaged in unpaid 
work outside the household. This type of child labor has not received much attention in 
the literature until now. This kind of work may range from incidental help to neighbors 
and unpaid apprenticeships to bonded child labor to pay off debts or even outright forms 
of slavery. This chapter aims to contribute to the literature by providing figures and 
studying the determinants of the involvement of children in unpaid work outside their 
household in 16 African and Asian countries.
 When studying the determinants of child labor it is important to study factors at 
the household level, where parents decide about work and schooling of their children, 
simultaneously with factors in the context where the children live. Those context factors 
include the demand for (unpaid) child labor and the economic, cultural and political fac-
tors that promote or hinder the engagement of children in this kind of labor (Edmonds, 
2008). This chapter provides a cross-national multilevel research in which attributes of 
both the household level and the local context are jointly researched to determine the 
factors that influence the engagement in unpaid child labor.
 Starting point for the research in this chapter is the theoretical framework for ana-
lyzing child labor decisions (Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2013) described in Chapter 3. 
To test the hypotheses derived from this framework, I use a unique database containing 
information of 171,405 children aged 8–13 and their families, living in sixteen develop-
ing countries from different regions of the developing world. For each of these children I 
know whether they are engaged in unpaid labor outside the household and the number 
of hours they spend on this work. I also have information on the socio-economic and de-
mographic characteristics of their family and of the context in which the households are 
living. This context information is at the sub-national district level within the countries. 
Within the sixteen countries studied, 214 districts can be distinguished. hence there 
is ample explanatory power at the district level that can be used to test hypotheses on 
context effects.
 To find out which factors at which level of aggregation are most important in ex-
plaining the number of hours a child is engaged in unpaid labor outside the household, 
multilevel regression models – allowing simultaneous estimation of the effects of fac-
tors at the household and district level – are applied. In order to address the uniqueness 
of each situation in the analyses, a study has been conducted how the risk factors vary 
according to selected characteristics of the context. In this way, I hope to obtain better 
fitting situation specific information to develop policy measures for solving unwanted 
situations.
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7.2 theoretiCal baCkgroUnd
7.2.1 Unpaid labor: baCkgroUnd
Although there is a growing literature on children’s unpaid work within their own house-
holds, unpaid work for others often seems to be invisible. As this work is unpaid and 
informal of character, it is not included in statistics and therefore no official information 
on it. The few things known about it are based on qualitative case studies that provide 
insight into specific situations, but are difficult to generalize. The current study in this 
chapter explicitly aims to produce more general information. 
 Based on the existing literature and country reports, I would argue that there are 
basically four types of unpaid work done by children for non-household members: (1): 
children who work as a result of the demand for temporary labor in risk sharing local 
communities (Fafchamps, 1999), (2) unpaid apprenticeships (Morice,1982; Peeters et 
al., 2009), (3) bonded child labor in which children are ‘forced’ to work due to tenancy 
systems or to pay off debts (otañez et al, 2006; Simelane 1998; Tucker, 1997). Fourth 
(4), outright forms of slavery where children are sold by their parents or kidnapped 
and forced to work under extreme circumstances far from their parental home, like in 
sweatshops or the sex industry. As the focus in this chapter is on forms of unpaid child 
labor by children residing in their own household, only the first three forms are relevant 
here. In the next sections, these forms will be discussed in more detail.
RISk ShARING l ABoR
The first category includes work done as a result of risk sharing (Fafchamps, 1999). 
life is full of risks and fluctuations. Some can be predicted, such as events caused by 
the changing of the seasons, others are more difficult to anticipate and events such as 
sickness, deaths and severe draughts can cause temporary income shocks that can 
lead people in developing countries into extreme poverty. Additionally, life in develop-
ing countries is more often dominated by diseases and environmental hazards than in 
the developed world. There are more outbreaks of epidemic diseases and draughts, 
and insect swarms pose a serious threat to agricultural crop output. Besides that, most 
people in developing countries do not work for wages in permanent contracts; resulting 
in fluctuating (household) incomes.
 People cannot insure themselves against these kinds of threats in developing coun-
tries and must rely on coping strategies, which I divide into three categories. one way is 
(1) to reduce the exposure to risk itself (examples are selecting a living environment with 
low risk of disease or insect plagues; specialization by growing crops that are resistant to 
environmental risk factors and flexibility in agriculture, such as replanting and weeding 
decisions), the other is (2) saving or borrowing, and last one is (3) risk sharing. Risk shar-
ing can result into a higher engagement of children in unpaid work (Grootaert & kanbur, 
1995a). 
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 Risk sharing within households is extensively described in the literature (Jacoby & 
Skoufias, 1997; Grootaert & kanbur, 1995a; Guarcello, Mealli & Rosati, 2010; Dercon & 
krishan, 2000). They describe how resources, such as food and income and labor are di-
vided among the household’s family members. It is also argued that parents base fertil-
ity decisions on the economic value of children (levy, 1985; Grootaert & kanbur, 1995a). 
Because of the possible endogeneity of fertility, this is difficult to prove, but something 
can be said in favor of the argument that in some households children are taken out of 
school in order to serve as a household buffer (Maitra, Panda & Sarangi, 2006). Accord-
ing to this strand of the literature, idle children (who are neither in school nor working 
for pay), could serve as an ‘insurance’ for uncertain times, and help during sudden labor 
shortages. Indeed, empirical research shows that children work during harvest peak 
periods (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997). Furthermore, there are indications that risks and “the 
explicit pooling of resources” also take place in larger communities, such as villages 
(Fafchamps, 1999). For example, in village communities, property and other resources 
(food, grains) are shared as an ‘insurance’ against temporary food and harvest shocks. It 
is therefore likely that in rural subsistence economies, people expect mutual reciprocity 
and will also help each other whenever there is work to be done. hence, with the expec-
tation that they get the favor back when needed, parents will let their children do unpaid 
work outside the household for their community members.
APPRENTICEShIPS
The second category of unpaid work consists of children working in unpaid apprentice-
ships in the informal sector. In many developing countries, children work as unpaid 
learners, for example in the Indian carpet weaving industry (harvey & Riggin, 1994), 
metal work in Senegal (Morice, 1982), work in shops run by friends of the family in 
Sierra leone (Peeters et al., 2009), selling goods in the streets and working in the car-
pentry industry in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 1991). Since many of these children work long 
hours under dangerous work circumstances (Sachikonye, 1991), some of these appren-
ticeships can be considered child labor instead of tuition. This is also illustrated by case 
studies, such as Morice’s (1982) study. he reports that the apprentices are often school 
drop-outs and do not work for wages and their status is low and non-institutionalized. 
BoNDED ChIlD l ABoR 
The third category includes children working in rural tenancy systems. Under these sys-
tems, farmers grow their crops on tenured land. The farmers and landlords agree that 
the farmer receives seeds, utensils and other supplies from the landlord. In return, the 
farmer sells the harvest produce for a reduced price. In these systems, often only one 
employee is paid, but his entire household (including children) helps to meet production 
quota. According to Ilo (2002), who refers to these kinds of arrangements as ‘bonded 
child labor’ and ‘modern slavery’, many children all over the world are forced to work in 
agriculture. Debt bondage is especially common in rural areas with its traditional class 
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and caste structures. Particularly groups with less resources and a lack of access to 
credit are the victims of these arrangements (Ilo, 2002; Basu & Chau, 2004). 
 Bonded child labor can be found in small scale agriculture, in which land, seeds or 
crops are provided in return of the harvest. It also takes place on large scale commercial 
farms and plantations, where tobacco (otañez et al, 2006), sugar cane, tea, or rubber 
(Ilo, 2002) is grown. In Asia, bonded labor is also reported to occur in commercial fish-
ing industries (Edmonds, 2003). These arrangements resemble the common tenancy 
structures in traditional colonial countries such a colonial Swaziland, where boys are, 
for example, reported to be engaged in cattle herding (Simelane, 1998). 
 Bonded child labor is not restricted to agriculture and rural areas, but can also be 
found in urban areas, for example in the carpet weaving industry (Tucker, 1997), where 
poor parents often feel forced to sell a child into bondage. It is difficult to get accurate 
estimates on the incidence of bonded child labor, but it has been reported for at least 40 
countries by Basu and Chau (2002).
7.2.2 theoretiCal fraMeWork
To guide my research, I use a theoretical framework developed in earlier work (Web-
bink, Smits & de Jong, 2013), that was inspired by models for understanding women’s 
labor market participation (Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010; hijab 2001). The framework, 
presented in Figure 3.1 of Chapter 3, is a general model that can be applied to all forms 
of child labor, including unpaid forms. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is based on four pil-
lars: (1) The context in which children live has different levels (household, local, national, 
international). (2) Decisions regarding child labor are made at the household level, by 
parents, caretakers and / or other family members. (3) Different factors at the different 
levels influence these decisions simultaneously. (4) The strength of these influences 
may differ between contexts. 
 In this framework, the factors affecting decisions regarding unpaid child labor are 
grouped under three conditions according to the underlying causal mechanisms. These 
conditions are called resources, structure and culture. Resources are the means by 
which households can provide their members with food, shelter, education and health, 
as well as the services, regulations and information available in the context that may 
help households fulfill these needs. Structure refers to structural characteristics of 
households (e.g. nuclear or extended family, number of children, absence of parents) 
and of the context in which they live (e.g. labor market, legal framework). Culture en-
compasses local and national views of society on childhood, children’s work and the role 
of women. In the next sections, the factors grouped under the conditions are discussed 
in more detail.
RESoURCES
of the resources available at the household level, income or wealth often is gener-
ally considered the most important factor influencing child labor (Basu & van, 1998; 
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Grootaert & kanbur, 1995a; Ranjan 1999; Nkamleu & kielland, 2006), but it cannot 
explain in a straightforward manner why children work in unpaid child labor. however, 
a lack of resources can explain why some children are not in school or idle. It is argued 
that idle children sometimes serve as a household buffer to be prepared for idiosyncrat-
ic or collective shocks (Guarcello, Mealli, & Rosati, 2010; Maitra, Panda & Sarangi, 2006) 
and I therefore expect that children from poorer families are more engaged in unpaid 
work for others outside their household.
 Income/wealth is not the only resource-related factor that plays a role; other socio-
economic resources, like parental education, employment status, and job-level may be 
important too. Similar to earlier research, children of more highly educated parents are ex-
pected to be more in school and less engaged in unpaid labor, because their parents want 
their children to reach at least the same educational level as they have reached themselves 
(Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Webbink, Smits & de Jong, 2013; huisman & Smits, 2009a). 
 In the previous section, I argued that unpaid work often consists of work done during 
peak times. I expect that children living in households owning land or livestock are more 
often involved in unpaid work for others, as their parents can expect help from their 
neighbors in return.
 Economic development at the district level is a context-level resource. however, the 
effect of development on children labor engagement could be both positive and nega-
tive. I expect that unpaid labor mostly takes place in less developed areas, because the 
educational infrastructure is worse and the economy relies more on more subsistence 
agriculture (with risks of failed harvests) and tenancy arrangements. Moreover, laws 
regarding school and child labor probably are less strictly enforced. on the other hand, 
more development could also lead to more economic activities and to more unpaid ap-
prenticeship opportunities (Nkamleu & kielland, 2006). 
 District educational level is also an important contextual resource factor. It indicates 
the level of development of the area, but is at the same time related to the availability of 
educational facilities and to norms about the importance of schooling in the region. As 
an indicator of the educational infrastructure, district educational level is also a struc-
tural factor; hence I will come back to it in the next section.
STRUCTURE
Both family structure (such as the number of siblings) (Edmonds, 2006) and structural 
context factors (like the labor market and educational infrastructure) (Emerson & Souza, 
2008; Duryea & Arends-kuenning, 2003) may affect children’s engagement in unpaid la-
bor. Structural characteristics at the household level can be divided in resource-dilution 
variables (number of brothers and sisters, birth order) and into structural characteris-
tics of the household which may lead to better access to resources (such as living in an 
extended family).
 Structural characteristics of the context in which children live may influence the 
demand for child labor. A major factor in this respect is urbanization (Ilo–IPEC, 2010a; 
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Ilo 2006). In the case of unpaid labor, I think that tenancy arrangements are mostly lo-
cated in the rural areas, but many unpaid apprenticeships will be located at (work)shops 
in the cities. hence, the effect of urbanization is ambiguous.
CUlTURE
Norms and values regarding child labor are expected to influence parent’s attitudes 
towards child labor (lieten, 2003; lópez-Calva, 2002; Nieuwenhuys, 1994; Delap, 2001). 
Cultural factors can be distinguished in values about the labor market participation of 
children (and views on childhood), the role of women in the public sphere, and the adap-
tation of modern values.
 The way children and child labor are looked upon is not everywhere the same and is 
closely related to the position of women (kandiyoti, 1988). With regard to unpaid labor, 
views on childhood and labor engagement may be gender-specific and depend on the 
context in which children live. With regard to unpaid labor as a way of risk sharing, both 
girls and boys are expected to be equally involved in unpaid labor for others when there 
is a sudden peak demand. During these times, all helping hands will be asked to join. 
on the other hand, I expect that boys work more as unpaid apprentices, because these 
arrangements are mostly found in the informal crafting and manufacturing sector. With 
regard to bonded labor, girls and boys are expected to be about equally involved. how-
ever, girls probably work more often as domestic laborers, but testing this is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
 As cultural context factors, the position of women and patriarchy may affect the 
involvement in unpaid labor. In more traditional areas, boys are more often expected to 
take over the family business. Because an apprenticeship is a form of learning by do-
ing, boys living in more traditional areas are more likely to be engaged in unpaid labor. 
As girls are expected to marry into their husband’s family and to be housewives, girls 
living in more traditional and patriarchal systems are expected to be less in school and 
more engaged in unpaid work. however, since patriarchal systems dominant in Africa 
allow women to be more involved in work outside the household (kandiyoti, 1988), it is 
expected that the involvement in unpaid labor outside the household by girls is higher in 
Africa than in Asia.
RURAl-URBAN DIFFERENCES
The theoretical framework’s fourth pillar is the idea that effects of risk factors of child 
labor may differ depending on the circumstances. In this respect, I focus on differences 
between urban and rural areas. In urban areas of developing countries, facilities are 
often better, the influence of globalization stronger, and the idea that child labor is ob-
jectionable and children should be in school more dominant (huisman & Smits, 2009a). 
In those areas, children are expected to work less and be more in school, even if they are 
(relatively) poor. In rural regions, schooling may entail higher costs due to more limited 
availability and accessibility of schools (hazarika, 2001; huisman & Smits, 2009a; Mu-
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gisha, 2006). Under these circumstances, both poorer and wealthier parents have fewer 
possibilities to send their children to school and might choose to let them help at home 
or their neighbors. hence according to the situational dominance hypothesis, the effects 
of resources depend on the circumstances (compare Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010) 
and are likely to decrease.
 In addition, I also expect that the nature of work and circumstances in rural ar-
eas might lead to stronger effects of specific resource factors. As neighboring help is 
expected to occur more in rural areas, the effect of living in an agricultural household 
is likely to be reinforced in rural areas, because there is more work to be done. In this 
case, a higher demand for child labor and work opportunities dominate. 
7.3 data and Methods 
DATA
Data are used from the third wave (2005–06) of UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS, www.childinfo.org) for five developing countries in Asia and eleven in 
Africa. The data are derived from the Database Developing World (www.datdevworld.
org), a multilevel data infrastructure in which MICS and other surveys are connected 
and supplemented with context information at district and national level. The countries 
are Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte D’ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Sierra leone, Togo, Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia, Bangladesh, Syria, Thailand, vietnam 
and Yemen. 
 Besides household-level data, context information at the district and national level 
is used. Within the 16 countries, 214 districts can be distinguished for which I included 
district-level context factors. Since the samples are large, these district-level variables 
could be created by calculating the district’s average of households’ and individuals’ 
characteristics (compare huisman & Smits, 2009a). Given the huge cultural and institu-
tional differences between Asia and Africa, separate analyses for these continents are 
performed. Since Yemen is geographically very close to Africa and resembles its African 
neighbors more than its Arab neighbors, Yemen is included in the African subsample. To 
control for domestic slavery, only children related to the household head are included.
METhoD 
The data are analyzed in a similar way as the analyses in Chapter 4 and 5 with multilevel 
regression models (Snijders & Bosker, 1999), with hours spent during the past week 
(seven days) on unpaid labor as the dependent variable. Because I use data on families 
nested within districts nested within countries, three-level models are applied and ex-
planatory variables at each of these levels of aggregation are included. The district and 
country differences in unpaid labor are dealt with by estimating random intercepts at the 
district and country level. 
 The analyses focus on children aged 8–13. The questions on the engagement of work 
for others outside their household in the MICS surveys are formulated as follows: “Dur-
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ing the past week did (name) any kind of work for someone who is not a member of this 
household?” and if answered with yes: “For pay in cash or kind” (which could be an-
swered with “Yes, for pay”, No, unpaid” and “No”) and: “About how many hours did he/she 
do this work for someone who is not a member of this household?” I constructed a vari-
able on the basis of these questions indicating how many hours a child spend on unpaid 
labor for others outside their household. This variable has a minimum value of 0 hours 
(for the children who were not engaged in unpaid labor) and a maximum of 95 hours. 
 Independent variables at the household level are socio-economic characteristics 
(parental education, household wealth), demographic characteristics (sex, age, number 
of brothers and sisters, birth order, whether or not the child is a biological child and 
household composition). household wealth is measured by an index constructed on the 
basis of household assets, such as Tvs, cars, telephones, and housing characteristics, 
such as floor material, roofing, and toilet facilities. Education of the father is measured 
with three categories. Given the low educational levels of the mothers, their education 
was measured with a dummy indicating whether or not she completed primary educa-
tion. As a proxy for agricultural parental occupation, I constructed a dummy variable 
whether or not a household owns both land that can be used for agriculture and live-
stock, herds other farm animals, or poultry.
 Age of the child is measured in years. Number of sisters and brothers and birth 
order are interval variables. Presence of the parents is measured with dummy variables 
indicating whether or not the mother or father is missing from the household. Extended 
family structure is measured with three categories: nuclear family, more than two 
adults in the household but no grandparents and more than two adults in the household 
including grandparents. Urbanization is measured by a dummy indicating whether or 
not the household lives in a rural area. For educational infrastructure I use the average 
number of years of education for people aged over 13 in the district. As a measure of 
traditionality of the district the average difference in age between husbands and wives 
(age husband minus age wife) is used. Patriarchy is indicated by the percentage of mar-
ried couples living in households with grandparents from the father’s side, indicating the 
tradition of girls to marry into the family of their husband.
 For children with a missing parent, the dummy variable adjustment method (Allison, 
2001) was used to address missing values on the parental characteristics. In this pro-
cedure, the cases with missing values get the mean of the valid values and a dummy is 
added to the model to identify the cases for which the mean was substituted. According 
to Allison (2001, p. 87), this procedure delivers unbiased estimates of the variables if the 
missing values are due to non-existence of the respective cases, as is the case here with 
the characteristics of parents who are missing. 
 By adding quadratic terms to the models, I tested for nonlinearity of the continuous 
variables. To test whether the effects of the explanatory variables differ between boys 
and girls, interactions between all variables and sex were computed. If the interaction 
was significant, separate coefficients for boys and girls were estimated. If not, a general 
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coefficient was presented. In this way, a clear and concise overview of the relevant coef-
ficients is obtained. To address the possibility that effects differ between urban and rural 
areas, I also tested for interactions with urbanization and added the significant interac-
tions to the model. When an interaction effect is significant for rural areas, it means that 
the effect is significantly higher or lower in rural areas. 
7.4 resUlts 
MUlTIvARIATE ANAlYSES
The variance components of the multilevel regression models (in Chapter 4) on hours 
worked on unpaid labor show that in Asia 99 percent and in Africa 87 percent of the vari-
ance is due to factors at the level of the household or of the local community in which 
the household lives. These percentages are relatively high and indicate that children’s 
engagement in unpaid labor is largely driven by factors close to home.
 Table 7.1 presents the regression coefficients of the multilevel models for unpaid 
labor. The coefficients for Asia are presented in columns 1, 2 and 3; those for Africa in 
columns 4, 5 and 6. For those variables that interacted significantly with sex, separate 
coefficients for girls and boys are presented; otherwise a general coefficient is pre-
sented under ‘All’ (columns 1 and 4). Significant interactions with living in a rural area 
are presented under the main results. Note that the presented main effects are average 
effects across urban and rural areas. In order to keep the interpretation of the results 
comprehensive, I will discuss the significant interaction effects after in a separate sec-
tion.
 The first conclusion that can be drawn from Table 7.1 is that the background char-
acteristics of unpaid labor differ more between girls and boys in Asia than in Africa. As 
can be seen from the separate columns for girls and boys in Table 7.1, in Africa only two 
effects are significantly different between girls and boys, whereas in Asia, more differ-
ences occur. This result is consistent with the results for paid work in Chapter 5.
 Turning to the socio-economic factors, we see that Asian children with a father with 
a higher education are less engaged in unpaid labor than children with lower educated 
fathers. In Africa, there is, on average, no effect of fathers’ education. In Asia, the educa-
tion of the mother only influences boys’ engagement in unpaid labor; hence it seems 
that more educated mothers use their bargaining power in favor of their sons. Children 
with a higher educated mother work more hours on unpaid labor in Africa. Although I 
could not control for mother’s occupational status, it could be that these women work 
outside their household and take their children along to help. It is also possible that 
both the mother and her children are hired for the job, while the mother is the only one 
who gets officially paid. Wealth has the expected effect in Asia: in wealthier households, 
children are less engaged in child labor. In Africa, the effect is nonlinear. As wealth rises 
until the tipping point around the fourth wealth decile, children are more engaged in 
unpaid labor; after that point, the expected decline in work hours is observed. There 
may be two explanations for this nonlinear effect. Firstly, the poorest children might be 
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more engaged in paid labor and have no time to be engaged in unpaid labor. Secondly, 
this result might reflect the nature of unpaid work in risk sharing communities. Poorer 
households probably do not have their own farm or business and are less likely to have 
a network and a social safety net, hence they simply cannot engage in the ‘reciprocity 
economy’ of risk and labor sharing.
 I assume that basic services such as running water and access to electricity are 
community based and lead to more efficient techniques and hence to a smaller demand 
for unpaid labor. Interestingly, the availability of electricity reduces hours in unpaid labor 
for boys in Asia, but in Africa for girls. Perhaps, Asian boys work more as apprentices 
in workshops doing manual labor that will replaced by machines if there is electricity 
available.
 Structural characteristics at the household level influence the engagement in unpaid 
labor. however, there are many differences between Asia and Africa. In Asia, boys are 
significantly more engaged in unpaid labor for others outside their household than 
girls, which suggest that the place of girls is more in the household. Remarkably, in 
Africa, girls work slightly fewer hours; indicating that the gender division in Africa is less 
distinct. As in most child labor studies, the number of hours worked increases with age; 
indicating that older children are more able to perform unpaid labor and that parents 
and society allows them to. Note that this is not the case for Asian girls. Boys living in 
extended families in Asia spend less time on unpaid labor, indicating that adults are pre-
ferred to children as unpaid laborers. In Africa, later born children spend less time on 
unpaid labor, allowing them to spend more time on other activities, such as schooling. 
According to the significant quadratic term, after the fourth child, later born children are 
more engaged in unpaid labor. 
 There are several significant effects at the district level. The context factors are 
gender-specific and only influence the engagement in unpaid labor by boys. In Asia, un-
paid child labor seems to be an urban phenomenon. In Asia, boys probably work as ap-
prentices in the cities, for example in the leather tanning industry in Bangladesh, where 
many boys are reported to perform unpaid work (lieten et al., 2010). In areas with a 
better educational infrastructure, indicated by the average number of years of education 
of adults, boys seem to profit from these facilities and are less engaged in unpaid labor. 
In areas with a higher age difference between spouses, Asian boys are more engaged 
in unpaid child labor. In my opinion, this indicator could also reflect a more traditional 
economy with more tenancy structures or mutual reciprocal neighboring aid. In Africa, 
there are no direct significant effects of context factors, but there are many significant 
interaction effects with urbanization.
 To summarize, the descriptives in Chapter 2 indicate that Asia and Africa are in dif-
ferent phases of development. There are also many differences in the involvement and 
determinants of unpaid work between the continents. In Asia, boys spend more hours 
on unpaid labor and this mostly takes place in urban areas. In Africa, girls and boys are 
about equally involved in unpaid labor and this work is more often done when the pa-
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asia africa
all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father
none
at least some primary -0.079 ** 0.037
at least some secondary -0.107 ** -0.084
Education mother at least some primary -0.031 -0.133 ** 0.090 **
Wealth -0.017 ** 0.086 **
Wealth squared -0.010 **
household has tap water 0.000 0.035
household has electricity 0.017 -0.124 ** -0.124 ** 0.046
household has land & livestock -- -- 0.095 **
Demographic factors
Sex = boy 0.319 ** -0.058 *
Age 0.013 0.082 ** 0.060 **
Father missing 0.008 -0.012
Mother missing 0.136 0.142
Extended family without grandparents 0.005 -0.087 ** -0.014
Extended family with grandparents 0.032 0.052
Biological child 0.227 0.052
Birth order child -0.019 -0.085 **
Birth order squared --- 0.010 **
Number of sisters 0.007 -0.001
Number of brothers 0.006 0.000
Number of young children in household -0.001 0.017
economic context factors
living in rural area -0.014 -0.274 ** -0.029
Mean years education adults in district -0.020 -0.170 ** -0.003
Cultural context factors
Mean age difference between spouses in district 0.007 0.072 * -0.053 0.013
District % hh with grandparents from father’s side  0.015 0.189
table 7.1 Continues on next page
table 7.1 Coefficients of multilevel linear regression models for children age 8–13 with hours 
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table 7.1 Continues on next page
spent on unpaid child labor as dependent variable.
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rents are involved in agriculture. I therefore think that unpaid child labor in Asia mostly 
is done by unpaid apprentices; in Africa unpaid children’s work is work done at neigh-
boring farms, most likely during peak harvest times. 
INTERACTIoNS WITh URBANIZATIoN
To test the fourth pillar of the model, the idea that determinants of child labor are dif-
ferent under different circumstances, I analyzed interaction effects with living in a rural 
area. In Asia, there are fewer differences between urban and rural areas than in Africa. 
Moreover, in Asia also two three-way interaction effects are only significant for boys, as 
can be seen from the different effects for boys in column 3.
 The interaction effects with urbanization all increase work hours on unpaid labor. 
The beneficiary effect of mother’s education for boys disappears in rural areas. More-
over, in rural Asia; boys work more hours if their household has access to electricity. 
Perhaps access to electricity works both ways. It reduces time spent on housework 
(compare Chapter 6) for girls in Asia, but it also means increased productivity in small 
businesses otherwise impossible if not connected to basic services. There are no direct 
effects of having a missing parent in Asia. however, in rural areas, Asian children with 
a missing mother are more engaged in unpaid labor. This could indicate that these chil-
dren rely on help from neighbors or others in their community and work to return the 
favor. lastly in rural areas in Asia, children with more brothers spend slightly more time 
on unpaid labor than the average. It could be that this effect reflects a more traditionally 
table 7.1 Continued
asia africa
all girls boys all girls boys
1 2 3 4 5 6
interactions with rural area
Education father at least some primary -- -0.327 **
Education mother at least some primary -0.014 0.191 ** 0.124 *
household has tap water -- -0.148 *
household has electricity -0.132 0.550 ** --
Age -- 0.031 *
Father missing -- 0.115 *
Mother missing 0.433 ** --
Number of brothers 0.047 ** -0.048 **
Number of young children in household -- -0.076 **
household has land & livestock -- 0.175 *
Mean years education adults in district -- 0.084 *
N 77,873 38,229 39,644 93,532 46,684 46,848
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oriented family structure in which unpaid labor through apprenticeships is more impor-
tant than formal schooling.
 In Africa, the significant interaction effects with urbanization are both positive and 
negative. For example, in rural areas in Africa, children with a father with at least some 
primary education are less engaged in unpaid work for others. This supports the educa-
tional dominance hypothesis and implies that parents with a higher education put more 
effort into giving the child the opportunity to go to school. (Spierings, Smits & verloo, 
2010).This is not the case for mother’s education. In rural areas, the child labor increas-
ing effect of mother’s education is even stronger. This might indicate that children go 
along with their mothers and help out while they are on the job. In contrast to Asia, the 
availability of tap water reduces hours children spend on unpaid labor in rural areas. 
They might be less engaged in water fetching or irrigation related task for their neigh-
bors. The effects of structural characteristics at the household level are also different in 
rural areas. older children work even more hours in rural areas than the average. Simi-
lar to the effect of mother missing in rural areas in Asia, children with a missing father 
are more engaged in unpaid labor. They might also rely on neighboring help and return 
the favor with unpaid labor. on the other hand, in rural Africa, it appears that brothers 
alleviate some of their siblings’ workload. If there are young children in the household in 
rural areas, children have less time to be engaged in unpaid work.
 The effect of having land and livestock is reinforced in rural areas, supporting the 
idea that unpaid work in Africa is mostly neighboring help for other community mem-
table 7.1 Continued
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bers. The second interaction effect with the average years of adult education indicates 
that in areas with a better educational infrastructure, children spend more hours on 
unpaid labor. This could reflect more possibilities to engage in unpaid apprenticeships in 
manual professions in these areas.
7.5 ConClUsions
I aimed at gaining insight into the determinants of unpaid children’s work, by analyzing 
representative data for 171,500 children living in 214 districts of 16 developing coun-
tries. Using multilevel analysis, I explained the variation on the basis of socio-economic, 
demographic and cultural factors at the household and the context level. 
 The Asian countries in my sample all have a higher level of development than the 
sub-Saharan African countries; which is reflected by, amongst others, higher education-
al levels and the higher proportion in Asia having access to electricity. Given these differ-
ences between the Asian and African context, the analyses were performed separately 
for the Asian and African countries in my database. 
 I showed in Chapter 4 that in the week prior to the survey, on average, around 0.5 to 20 
percent of the Asian and African children have worked for others outside their household. 
In countries with a relatively low engagement, children who are engaged in unpaid labor 
have the largest workload compared to children living in countries with a relatively low 
engagement. Taken these findings into account, it is very important to shed more light on 
the factors that drive parent’s decision on their children’s engagement in unpaid labor.
 The descriptive analyses show that, in general, children in Africa are more often 
engaged in unpaid labor than in Asia. In my opinion, this could be explained by the differ-
ences in the level of development and their economic systems. The multilevel regres-
sions reinforce the differences between Africa and Asia. For example, in Asia, the in-
volvement in unpaid labor by children is, to a large extent, influenced by resources at the 
household level. A higher educational level of both parents reduces the number of hours 
children spend on unpaid work, but the education of the mother (at least some primary) 
only matters for boys. however, boys and girls profit equally from living in wealthier 
households in Asia. These results confirm that more access to resources leads to less 
involvement in unpaid child labor in Asia.
 In Africa, children’s engagement in unpaid labor is influenced by resources at the 
household level in a different manner than in Asia. For example, father’s education has, 
on average, no effect on the engagement of children in unpaid labor. however, a higher 
education of the mother is related to more unpaid labor. Perhaps these children work 
alongside their mothers. The idea that unpaid labor is often neighboring help is sup-
ported by the effect of wealth in Africa. We see that the very poorest children are not 
engaged in unpaid labor, reflecting the absence of economic productivity, community 
networks and social safety net.
 Structural characteristics at the household level do not seem to influence the 
engagement in unpaid labor to a large extent. however, we cannot neglect the most 
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important factor in this respect: gender. In Asia, the place of girls is much more at the 
home, while in Africa everybody, regardless their sex, seems to help in the unpaid work. 
Further, In Asia, children are less engaged in unpaid work if they live in an extended 
family. In Africa, firstborn children are more engaged in unpaid labor, indicating that they 
have to work in order to give their siblings an opportunity to perform other activities.
 The effects of the context factors reflect differences between the Asian and African 
economy and culture. In Asia, only the engagement of boys is affected by characteristics 
of the context. They work less in urban areas and in districts with better educational fa-
cilities. on the other hand, they work more hours in more traditional areas. Unpaid labor 
seems to have a different character in the African context. In Africa, the direct effect of 
having land and livestock as well as the interactions with living in a rural area indicate 
that unpaid labor mostly is work at (neighboring) farms in their community. Besides, one 
of the characteristics of lower developed economies is that they rely heavily on subsist-
ence farming, which is dominated by temporary shocks and peaks in labor demands. 
The results of my analyses support the impression that during these peaks everybody 
is involved in this kind of work in Africa. In Asia, we see different patterns: unpaid labor 
mostly is an urban phenomenon and it is the boy who is engaged in it. hence, although 
Asia is economically more developed, gender differences are much more pronounced. 
The role of girls and women is that of caretaker within the household and women and 
girls do not participate much in work outside the family sphere.
 The idea that factors may differ under different circumstances is supported by the 
data. Both in Asia and Africa, we see that there are differences for resource and struc-
tural factors. The results of this analysis reinforce the earlier finding that in Asia more 
effects are gender specific and that in Africa, unpaid labor mostly is an agricultural and 
rural phenomenon. 
 In the theoretical section of this chapter, I argued that there may be three kinds of 
unpaid labor of importance in this study: 1) neighboring help related to crop and risk 
sharing, 2) unpaid apprenticeships and 3) bonded child labor. Unfortunately, I can only 
guess what the activities exactly are. The returns to apprenticeships and risk shar-
ing are clear. An apprentice can acquire valuable work experience, and a household 
helping their neighbors can ask help in return. If children’s unpaid work is restricted to 
these activities, it might not be that bad. Bonded child labor, however, should always be 
prevented, because the circumstances under which this takes place are usually unfa-
vorable. The children in this study live at home in their own household; hence in this 
study there are no children held captive as (domestic) laborers. It is possible however, 
that there are situations where entire households are forced to engage in bonded labor 
to repay debts. Unfortunately, the data did not allow me to control for this possibility.
 That said, in my opinion, I do have unraveled some of the mysteries of children’s 
unpaid labor. Considering the level of development in Asia and Africa, I would argue that 
that the results of my analyses resemble two different prevalent forms of unpaid labor. 
Firstly, unpaid children’s work in Asia often involves apprenticeships in which boys learn 
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for their future professions. Secondly, in Africa, unpaid work is dominated by work with a 
rural agricultural character in which everybody helps out. Although the general engage-
ment is lower in Asia, children who work are often engaged in unpaid labor for many 
hours. It could be argued that apprentices learn by doing for their future professions. on 
the other hand, it is also often reported that they work very long hours under sometimes 
dangerous circumstances. In Africa, the proportion of children working long hours in 
unpaid work is lower than in Asia. Because they may also perform other activities such 
as paid child labor, housework and family business work, this might not mean that this 
work is not a deterrent to their health or education. Moreover, the results of this study 
suggest that in Africa the very poorest households and children do not have a com-
munity network or social safety net. All in all, the results in this chapter show that for 
an encompassing understanding of child labor all forms should be taken into account 
to determine whether it has a positive or negative effect on children’s development. In 
the following chapter, I will therefore research the relationship between work hours and 
school enrollment.
NoTES
1 This chapter is based on Webbink, E., Smits, J. & de Jong, E. (2012). "Unpaid chil-
dren’s work: household and context determinants of hours worked in unpaid labor 
by young children in 16 low-income countries in Asia and Africa".
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Evaluation and 
Conclusion
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8.1 introdUCtion
In the child labor literature, scholars and policymakers have continuously focused the 
attention on the relationship between children’s work and school enrollment. Because 
generally speaking, time spent on working cannot be devoted to school or homework, 
child labor is often been assumed to be a deterrent to schooling (Zabaleta, 2011; Amin, 
Quayes, & Rives, 2006; Rosati & Rossi, 2003; Baland & Robinson, 2000; levison & Moe, 
1998). others (Canagarajah & Coulombe, 1997; Grootaert & kanbur, 1995b) assume that 
learning by doing may also provide children with valuable work experience and help 
them to prepare for adult life. This may especially be the case in the (rural) informal 
economy of developing countries, where there is less need to pursue a formal education 
because only a basic knowledge of reading, writing and mathematics is sufficient for 
many occupations.
 Although many researchers have researched the relationship between child labor 
and schooling, only some have addressed the fact that time involvement is one of the key 
factors to determine whether children’s work is harmful. Since children are expected 
to be present in school and the workplace according to fixed time schedules, this could 
very well be the case. Because housework and family business work can be planned 
after school hours, it could be highly likely that this work interferes to a lesser extent 
with schooling. When there is a correlation between children’s work and schooling 
outcomes, it remains the question whether this relationship is linear. For example, in a 
study on child labor in Cambodia, it was found that children can work up to 22 hours per 
week without a negative effect on educational enrollment (Phoumin, 2008). In this study, 
hours worked is measured as total hours worked in both economic and non-economic 
activities, so it still remains possible that one form of child labor has a more negative 
effect on children’s schooling than the other. other researchers have made a distinction 
between the types of child labor. In a paper on educational success in Portugal (Goulart 
& Bedi, 2008), educational attainment is negatively influenced by commercial work; but 
not by domestic work. In another study on Ghanaian children, heady (2003) studied the 
relationship between family business work and work outside the household and found 
that children’s work negatively influences learning achievements. This holds for both 
types of work, but the effect for work outside the household is twice as high.
 In this chapter, I will give an overview of the relationship between work hours and the 
engagement in school for children in Asia and Africa and discuss these findings. First, 
I will present bivariate relationships with work hours with whether a child is enrolled 
in school. Second, I will present similar tables with the average days children spend in 
school according to work hours. I will do this for boys and girls separately.
8.2 the relationship betWeen Work hoUrs and sChool enrollMent
In this section, I present bivariate relationships for work hours and school enrollment 
for girls and boys separately. Because school success probably also depends on how 
many days children spend in school, I will also give an overview of the relationship 
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between child labor and the average number of days per week children are in school. 
Because this second variable is (almost completely) missing for Somalia, Mauritania and 
Yemen, these countries are excluded in the second analysis. In order to make a clear 
comparison, I present figures for children in the lowest and highest category. Because 
doing some housework is normal, the lowest category for housework ranges from 0 to 5. 
For the other types of work I compare children who are not engaged with children work-
ing 261 hours and more per week. Because only the non-enrollment percentages are 
presented, row totals do not add up to 100 percent.
 Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present the relationship with work hours and non- enrollment for 
children with the lowest compared to the highest workload. These tables are presented 
and described in separate sections for girls and boys. Some general conclusions can be 
drawn from Table 8.1 and 8.2. Firstly, on average, both girls and boys are more enrolled 
in school in Asia than in Africa. however, compared to the other countries in Asia, chil-
dren in Bangladesh are substantially less enrolled in school. Secondly, the total averag-
es (presented in the bottom row) suggest a negative relationship between the engage-
ment in each type of work and school enrollment. Because these figures are averages, I 
willt elaborate on country difference more in the following sections.
8.2.1 the relationship betWeen Child labor and non-enrollMent for 
girls
The overall average (not shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2) school non-enrollment is 26.3 
percent for African and 12.9 percent for Asian girls respectively. Compared to these 
averages, it does seem that girls who are engaged in housework for more than 26 hours 
per week are less enrolled in school. however, there are many differences across the 
continents and countries. In some African countries, there is no clear negative relation-
ship. In Mauritania and Malawi, for instance, girls with the highest workload on house-
work are more enrolled in school than girls who are less engaged in housework.
 Asia appears to be a continent of extremes. In Syria, girls with the highest workload 
are almost ten times less enrolled compared to girls who are not engaged in housework. 
In vietnam, the differences between girls in the highest and lowest category are smaller; 
hence the average in Asia appears to be highly influenced by the high number of chil-
dren not enrolled in Bangladesh and Syria.
 With regards to family business work in Africa, we see similar patterns. African girls 
are less enrolled in school when they spend more time on family business work; and the 
difference is greater compared to girls engaged in housework. The situation in Soma-
lia is most problematic; the great majority of Somali girls working more than 26 hours 
on family business are less enrolled in school. For Asia, the overall patterns are also 
similar to those on housework, with worrying situations for girls working in both types 
of hidden child labor in Syria and Bangladesh. Note that girls involved in family business 
work in vietnam for more than 20 hours a week are also relatively often not enrolled in 
school.
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 Working many hours is even more problematic for girls involved in commercial work. 
Most girls who work 20 hours or more on commercial work are not enrolled in school. 
These figures suggest that the inflexible nature of commercial work makes this work the 
most difficult type to combine with school. only in Malawi, girls seem to be able to com-
bine work with school as their situation is relatively good compared to other countries.
Unpaid work outside the household appears to be less problematic than working in 
commercial child labor. however, it must be noted that girls with the highest workload 
are often not enrolled in school. Whether this is a causal relationship is difficult to prove; 
it could very well be that these girls work because they are idle and have nothing else to 
do. 
housework family business 
Work
paid work Unpaid work
0–5 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+
Côte D’ivoire 36.1 63.6 34.3 63.4 41.3 70.6 * 41.3 66.7 *
Gambia 33.9 19.2 * 26.7 27.8 * 31.7 N/A 31.8 N/A
Ghana 21.5 28.9 19.3 39.5 21.9 N/A 21.8 N/A
Guinea Bissau 39.3 38.1 35.8 37.8 36.4 N/A 36.4 N/A
Sierra leone 23.8 46.8 17.1 49.2 26.3 N/A 26.2 34.0 *
Togo 25.3 50.7 24.8 59.7 28.1 N/A 27.8 N/A
Mauritania 23.3 20.5 20.6 23.0 * 22.8 N/A 22.8 N/A
Burundi 22.0 39.3 22.2 N/A 22.0 75.0 * 22.0 N/A
CAR 43.7 46.2 40.3 48.0 43.9 63.6 * 44.2 32.8
Malawi 10.2 8.9 8.5 12.4 8.2 14.7 * 8.2 10.9 *
Somalia 60.8 49.6 43.0 65.8 48.6 63.3 * 48.7 62.1 *
Yemen 26.9 43.8 28.6 43.4 29.7 N/A 29.7 N/A
African Average 27.3 35.1 22.5 48.9 26.6 42.4 26.7 35.8
Syria 4.7 46.9 6.2 36.4 * 6.3 70.4 * 6.3 N/A
Thailand 1.3 N/A 1.4 N/A 1.1 N/A 1.1 N/A
vietnam 5.3 13.9 4.6 42.5 6.0 63.2 * 6.0 N/A
Bangladesh 21.1 48.7 19.9 47.8 * 19.3 83.4 19.3 61.3 *
Asian Average 10.0 43.1 12.8 41.9 12.3 80.9 12.3 50.0
Total Average 19.0 36.4 17.2 48.4 19.8 64.1 19.9 38.3
* These averages are based on 20+ hours a week, because there were less than 25 cases in the 26+ 
category.
N/A= <10 cases to base an average on.
table 8.1 Percentages girls not in school by country and work hours
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8.2.2 the relationship betWeen Child labor and non-enrollMent for 
boys
The average school non-enrollment for boys is with 22.0 percent in Africa and with 16.7 
percent in Africa lower than for girls. however, the intra-country differences are similar 
to those for girls. The overall averages for African boys suggest that a higher involve-
ment in housework might not hinder school enrollment. In some countries, such as Cote 
D’Ivoire, Gambia and Malawi, non-enrollment decreases as boys work more hours. on 
the other hand, there are also countries, such as Sierra leone and Yemen where hard 
working boys are less engaged in school. In most Asian countries too, school enrollment 
of boys is also negatively associated with a high involvement in housework. 
 An assumption throughout this thesis is that certain parents in developing countries 
might consider work experience on family business work more valuable than formal 
housework family business 
Work 
paid work Unpaid work
0–5 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+
Côte D’ivoire 29.2 43.9 22.0 51.3 29.9 54.8 * 29.9 35.1 *
Gambia 29.3 14.1 * 25.0 22.6 27.8 N/A 27.8 N/A
Ghana 25.2 27.1 18.9 38.8 23.8 40.7 * 24.0 N/A
Guinea Bissau 34.7 32.5 33.7 35.8 33.9 N/A 34.0 N/A
Sierra leone 21.0 43.6 13.6 39.7 22.0 N/A 21.9 N/A
Togo 20.2 34.6 16.6 61.6 20.3 46.7 * 20.1 55.6 *
Mauritania 19.6 21.9 17.8 25.5 20.1 53.3 * 20.1 N/A
Burundi 21.3 32.3 21.0 27.3 * 20.2 76.7 * 20.2 N/A
CAR 32.1 31.0 29.3 38.9 30.3 44.4 * 30.5 28.8 *
Malawi 11.0 9.4 9.8 13.4 8.8 20.3 * 8.8 N/A
Somalia 33.4 43.5 24.2 55.0 32.4 N/A 32.4 50.0 *
Yemen 16.1 28.9 16.8 14.4 * 16.2 42.9 * 16.2 N/A
African Average 23.1 28.2 15.4 59.9 21.8 44.4 21.8 31.2
Syria 5.6 21.3 * 5.3 31.9 * 4.7 73.6 * 4.7 N/A
Thailand 1.2 N/A 1.2 N/A 1.1 N/A 1.1 N/A
vietnam 4.1 6.0 * 3.3 10.7 * 3.6 N/A 3.6 N/A
Bangladesh 29.4 52.7 27.0 73.0 24.6 92.6 * 24.6 86.7
Asian Average 16.5 40.2 18.9 40.8 14.5 91.3 14.5 81.7
Total Average 19.6 29.3 17.0 44.3 18.2 79.9 18.3 52.1
* These averages are based on 20+ hours a week, because there were less than 25 cases in the 26+ 
category.
N/A= <10 cases to base an average on.
table 8.2 Percentages boys not in school by country and work hours
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schooling. Boys with a high family business workload generally are less enrolled in 
school, indicating that this might be indeed the case for the boys in this study. The only 
exceptions are Gambia and Yemen; in these countries, boys who work many hours ap-
pear to be able to combine work hours with schooling. 
 Similar to girls, school enrollment of boys also seems to be more negatively influ-
enced by commercial work compared to the other types of child labor. This is especially 
true for boys working more than 26 hours in Asia: In Syria, approximately three quarter 
of these boys are not enrolled in school and in Bangladesh this is, with more than 90 
percent of the hardworking boys not enrolled in school, even more. For children in this 
age group, this is really a worrisome situation.
 Regarding the relationship between unpaid work and school enrollment, we see that 
boys can combine it more often with school in Africa than in Asia. It must be noted that 
there are not many boys who are engaged in unpaid labor for more than 26 hours, which 
in itself means that this work might be not very detrimental.
housework family business 
Work
paid work Unpaid work
0–5 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+
Côte D’ivoire 2.6 1.5 2.7 1.5 2.4 1.2 2.4 1.5 *
Gambia 3.0 3.9 3.3 3.4 3.1 N/A 3.1 3.1 *
Ghana 1.0 0.5 1.1 0.2 0.9 0.0 * 1.0 0.3 *
Guinea Bissau 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 N/A 2.7 2.9 *
Sierra leone 3.7 2.4 4.0 2.4 3.6 N/A 3.6 2.9 *
Togo 3.6 2.3 3.6 1.9 3.4 2.3 * 3.4 2.9 *
Burundi 3.7 2.7 3.7 1.3 3.7 0.8 * 3.7 N/A
CAR 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.3 1.8 * 2.3 2.6 *
Malawi 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.3 4.1 4.1
African Average 3.1 3.0 3.4 2.2 3.2 2.3 3.2 2.9
Syria 4.4 2.4 4.3 2.7 4.3 1.2 * 4.3 N/A
Thailand 4.6 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.6 3.0 * 4.6 4.3 *
vietnam 4.4 3.6 4.4 2.1 4.3 0.9 * 4.3 N/A
Bangladesh 3.7 2.2 3.7 1.9 3.8 0.9 * 3.8 1.8 *
Asian Average 4.2 2.4 4.1 2.4 4.1 0.8 4.1 2.3
Total Average 3.7 2.9 3.8 2.2 3.7 1.4 3.7 2.8
* These averages are based on 20+ hours a week, because there were less than 25 cases in the 26+ 
category.
N/A= <10 cases to base an average on.
table 8.3 Average days in school for girls by work hours and country
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8.2.3 the relationship betWeen Child labor and average days in 
sChool for girls
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 present the relationship with work hours and the average time in-
volvement in school for children with the lowest compared to the highest workload. For 
children who are not enrolled in school, this variable is recoded into zero days in school. 
officially enrolled children sometimes did not go to school in the previous week for 
various reasons (illness, school holiday, or work). In this study, this group accounts for 
approximately 4 percent of the children. 
 Table 8.3 shows that there are many differences in the average time involvement in 
school for girls. Girls in Asia spend around one day more in school per week than Afri-
can girls. In Asia, the average time involvement of children who are (hardly) not engaged 
in child labor, can, with 4 days a week, be compared to school weeks in many western 
countries. Although the average engagement in Africa is lower, one country really stands 
out. In Ghana, girls only spend one day (or less) in school. This low average cannot be 
entirely attributed to low school enrollment figures. In Guinea Bissau, for instance, many 
table 8.4 Average days in school for boys by work hours and country
housework family business 
Work
paid work Unpaid work
0–5 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+ 0 26+
Côte D’ivoire 2.9 2.4 3.2 2.0 2.9 2.1 2.9 2.9
Gambia 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.3 N/A 3.3 3.2 *
Ghana 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.5 * 0.9 0.0
Guinea Bissau 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.3 * 2.8 N/A
Sierra leone 3.8 2.6 4.2 2.9 3.8 N/A 3.8 3.1 *
Togo 3.7 2.9 3.9 1.7 3.8 2.2 * 3.8 1.8 *
Burundi 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.0 3.7 1.2 * 3.7 N/A
CAR 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.9 2.7 * 2.9 2.6 *
Malawi 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.0 3.1 4.0 4.1
African Average 3.2 3.2 3. 2.3 3.4 2.2 3.4 2.8
Syria 4.4 2.5 4.4 2.9 4.4 1.2 4.4 1.8 *
Thailand 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.0 4.6 3.0 * 4.6 N/A
vietnam 4.4 3.7 4.4 3.9 4.4 2.0 * 4.4 N/A
Bangladesh 3.3 2.0 3.4 1.1 3.5 0.3 3.5 0.6
Asian Average 3.9 2.5 3.9 1.7 4.0 0.4 4.0 0.8
Total Average 3.6 3.1 3.8 2.2 3.7 0.7 3.7 1.9
* These averages are based on 20+ hours a week, because there were less than 25 cases in the 26+ 
category.
N/A= <10 cases to base an average on.
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girls are not enrolled in school, but the average days spent in school are comparable to 
many other African countries.
 In both continents, the difference in the engagement between non-working girls 
and the hardest working group is around one day as well. There are a few exceptions 
to this finding. First, being involved in housework in Africa does not seem to influence 
the time involvement in school to a large extent. Second, the difference between the 
group with the lowest and the highest workload is larger for commercial work. For ex-
ample, Asian girls engaged in commercial work for more than 26 hours a week are in 
school for one day a week only compared to 4 days for nonworking girls. Interestingly, 
the involvement in unpaid work does not seem to influence the time spent in school 
in Africa, but for Asian girls this difference is much larger. In Africa, girls are probably 
more able to combine school with unpaid labor.
8.2.4 the relationship betWeen Child labor and average days in 
sChool for boys
The results of Table 8.4 reinforce some of the earlier findings. The figures in this table 
show that African boys are able to combine housework with school. In Asia, especially in 
Syria and Bangladesh, the difference for children with the lowest and the highest work-
load is more substantial.
 In some countries in Africa, such as Gambia and Guinea Bissau, there is no clear 
negative relationship between a high workload on family business work and the time 
spent in school. on the other hand, in countries such as Sierra leone and Togo, hard-
working boys are less able to combine work with school. In most countries in Asia, these 
differences are smaller. however, the situation in Bangladesh deserves special atten-
tion.
 It will not come as a surprise that commercial work by boys is also related to a lower 
average time involvement in school. The largest differences are found in Asia. Especially 
in Syria and Bangladesh, boys who spend much time on commercial work are not able 
to spend much of their remaining time in school. This indicates that, although the aver-
age involvement in commercial child labor is not very high (compare Chapter 5), they do 
seem to suffer most.
 Interestingly, the involvement in unpaid work seems to influence Asian boys more 
than African boys. Unfortunately the nature of the data does not allow us to tell what 
they are doing. It could be that these boys work as apprentices. In this way, these boys 
are officially enrolled but spend relatively fewer days in school. however, it must be 
noted that the number on which this average is based is relatively small.
 To conclude, there appears to be a negative relationship between work hours and 
school enrollment. This association is weakest for housework and strongest for com-
mercial work: both girls and boys often seem to be unable to combine school with 
commercial labor. This does not mean that other types of work should be neglected. 
For every kind of work, we see that children working many hours spend fewer days in 
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school. The only exception seems to be housework in Africa, but we should not disregard 
the fact that in many African countries, many girls with a high workload on housework 
are not even enrolled in school at all.
NoTES
1 If there are less than 25 cases in each cell (not-enrolled and enrolled) I compared 
the lowest category with children working 20 hours or more. If there are less than 10 
cases in this category, there is no average shown.
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9.1 introdUCtion
Child labor is still a wide-spread phenomenon in developing countries; many children 
under the age of 14 spend much time on work which may possibly hamper their health 
and education. Child labor has many faces: children may be involved in visible kinds of 
child labor in factories or sweatshops, but also be engaged in more ‘invisible’ kinds of 
child labor in their own family sphere or community. To account for the different faces of 
child labor, I have tried to find answers to questions about the engagement of children in 
developing countries in commercial work, housework, family business work and unpaid 
work outside the household; all activities that can be grouped under the broad umbrella 
of child labor. 
In this thesis, I thus distinguished four types of child labor: 
 – Commercial work: is paid (either in cash or kind) work for someone who is not a 
member of the household in which the child lives. 
 – housework: is work done within the household and consists of chores such as 
shopping, collecting firewood, cleaning, fetching water, or caring for children. 
 – family business work: is work done for members of the household, but house-
work is excluded. It includes ‘any other family work’, for example on the farm or 
in a business or selling goods in the street.
 – Unpaid work outside the household: This category encompasses all unpaid 
work for someone who is not a member of the household in which the child 
lives.
Parents base the decision to let their children engage in child labor on characteristics 
of their children, their household and the context they live in. The driving factors behind 
the different forms of child labor may partly overlap, but there are also many differ-
ences. For example, children living in households without access to running water might 
be responsible for water fetching and therefore spend a substantial amount of time on 
housework. however, access to running water cannot explain why children are engaged 
in work for pay outside their household. In order to address this variation and to explain 
the engagement in the four types of child labor, I have developed a universal model in 
which the driving factors of child labor are grouped into to three conditions. This model 
can be adjusted according to the research question and kind of child labor studied.
 Besides researching the factors influencing the decision of parents to let their chil-
dren engage in child labor, I also wanted to account for the gender differences in (child) 
labor engagement found in many developing countries. Given the fact that there are 
many differences between rural and urban areas and Asia and Africa, I also looked into 
the differences between these two areas and continents.
 In the analyses in this thesis I included characteristics of the children and of the 
household in which they live (like age, sex, occupation and education of the parents, 
wealth, and household composition) as well as characteristics of the context (like edu-
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cational facilities, labor market structure, level of development, culture, etc.). Context 
factors may not only directly influence child labor, but also moderate the effect of house-
hold characteristics. These interaction effects are empirically studied by analyzing the 
differences between rural and urban areas. To account for the differences between Asia 
and Africa, I performed separate analyses for these continents.
 To determine the factors that influence children’s engagement in child labor, I used 
data for 18 countries from the Demographic and health Surveys (DhS) and data for 16 
countries from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). I used the DhS data for 
the analyses on the engagement in commercial work. For the empirical analysis on the 
hours spent on the different types of child labor, I used data from MICS, collected under 
the supervision of UNICEF. The district context information (e.g. culture, development, 
labor market structure, etc.) was created by aggregating variables from these surveys to 
the sub-national level. The household and context data of the countries in this study are 
part of the Database Developing World (DDW, www.datdevworld.org).
9.2 researCh QUestions
The research questions I tried to get an answer to are:
1 how high is the incidence of the different forms of child labor in developing 
countries? how many hours do working children spend on commercial work, 
housework, family business work and unpaid work for others outside their 
household?
2 A: What is the effect of characteristics of the household in which a child lives on 
the engagement in child labor?  
B: What is the effect of context characteristics on the engagement in child labor? 
3 To what extent do effects of household and context characteristics on the en-
gagement in child labor differ between boys and girls in developing countries?
4 To what extent do effects of household and context characteristics on the en-
gagement in child labor differ between rural and urban areas?
5 To what extent do effects of household and context characteristics on the en-
gagement in child labor differ between Asia and Africa?
9.3 resUlts
9.3.1 researCh QUestion 1: the size of the probleM
That child labor may be problematic can probably best be illustrated by the high engage-
ment of children in the four types of work. In Chapter 3, I showed that in some African 
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countries, almost 50 percent of the children are engaged in commercial work. In latin 
America countries and India, these levels are lower, but even in these countries, many 
boys and girls under the age of 14 are engaged in some kind of economic activity. This 
is, however, only part of the story; not only is it important whether children work, but it 
matters very much how much time children are involved in the different types of labor. 
To make the picture more complete, I focused on time involvement in the rest of the 
thesis. Using data of a sample of 4 Asian and 12 African countries from the Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), I could give a description of the hours children spend 
on commercial, household and family business work and unpaid work for others. These 
results are summarized in Chapter 4.
 I showed in section 4.2 that the average involvement in commercial child labor for 
African and Asian children is less than 10 percent. Compared to the averages in Chap-
ter 3, this number is relatively low, but the children that are involved in it tend to do so 
for many hours per week. For example, in Somalia and Bangladesh, the average hours 
worked by children in commercial child labor is around 40 hours; equivalent to an adult 
work week in many developed countries. 
 In section 4.3, the descriptive statistics reveal that 22 percent of the African girls are 
engaged in housework for more than 16 hours per week. That is a considerable work-
load. I also showed that boys tend to work more hours on family business work than 
girls. on the other hand, the total hours girls spend on work within the family (house-
work and family business work) combined is with 12 hours per week 2 hours more than 
the average engagement (10 hr.) for boys; hence girls work more on these ‘hidden’ 
forms of child labor.
 lastly, in section 4.4, I showed that, especially in Africa, many children work without 
pay for others outside their household. Around 10 percent of African boys and girls are 
engaged in this kind of work. The average involvement according to gender and urbani-
zation in unpaid work ranges from 5 to 25 hours per week. A weekly workload of 5 hours 
is probably not problematic, but we must keep in mind that these children may also per-
form other activities in a week so that these extra hours might be the straw that breaks 
the camel’s back. 
9.3.2 researCh QUestion 2: effeCts of resoUrCe, strUCtUral and 
CUltUral hoUsehold and Context faCtors
The effects of the resource, structural and cultural household and context factors are 
summarized in Table 9.1 (commercial) and 9.2 (all types of unpaid work) respectively. 
RESoURCE FACToRS AT ThE hoUSEholD lEvEl
In general, the results of this thesis confirm that children living in families with more 
access to resources are less engaged in child labor. The effect of parental education 
does not always point into the same direction. For example, we see that children with 
higher educated parents are less engaged in commercial child labor. on the other 
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hand, children with fathers with higher educational levels work more in the household 
and African children with better educated mothers are more engaged in unpaid work. 
The unexpected effect of father’s education might be explained by the fact that father’s 
occupation is missing in the MICS- data. Unfortunately, I do not know whether fathers 
with a (relatively) good education are involved in a job outside the household which may 
generate a higher demand for housework. 
 The effect of wealth is in line with most child labor research and confirms that 
wealthier children are less engaged in child labor. The only exceptions to this finding are 
the effects of wealth on paid work in urban areas in Chapter 3 and the nonlinear effect of 
wealth on unpaid work in Africa in Chapter 6. The nonlinear effect of wealth for unpaid 
work in Chapter 6 indicates that up to a certain point, children from wealthier house-
holds work more. After that point, I found the expected decline in work hours. This find-
ing might reflect that poorer households are excluded from the mutually interdependent 
help system with their neighbors because they do not own a farm or business.
Access to basic services, such as the availability of electricity or tap water, leads to more 
efficiency and reduce the time involvement of children on housework. on the other hand, 
assets such as the presence of livestock or land for agricultural production go hand in 
hand with an increase in work hours. A closely related household factor is parental ag-
ricultural occupation, as indicated by the proportion of households owning both agricul-
tural land and livestock. In Chapter 7, I showed that this is an important factor to explain 
the involvement in unpaid labor in Africa.
RESoURCE FACToRS AT ThE CoNTEXT lEvEl
Regarding resource factors at the context level, the district level of development only 
has an effect on the engagement in child labor in rural areas. however, the district level 
of education, which is also placed under structural factors, is found to be highly influ-
ential. This result indicates that, when surrounded by educated adults, parents see that 
education contributes to human capital formation and better labor market opportunities 
and experience that it is within reach for their children.
STRUCTURAl FACToRS AT ThE hoUSEholD lEvEl
Structural factors at the household level affect child labor in several ways. As children 
grow older, they are physically more able to do more and they spend more time on com-
mercial work, housework, family business work and unpaid work for others.
 other structural characteristics influence the way resources and tasks are distrib-
uted among family members. In households with a missing parent, for example, children 
seem to take over the role of their father or mother and are more engaged in child labor. 
An exception is the structure of living in an extended family; more adult household 
members give children the opportunity to get better access to resources and allow them 
to spend less time on child labor. Interestingly, children with more brothers or sisters 
mostly are more engaged in child labor. This might reflect two phenomena. First, the 
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table 9.1 overview of the results found in this thesis for commercial work
Chapter 3
Commercial
work
Chapter 5
Commercial
work hours
Chapter 5
Commercial
work hours
asia africa
girls boys girls boys girls boys
resource factors
household level
occupation father +/- -
Mother employed + +
Education father - - - - - -
Education mother -1 -1 - - - -
household wealth +1/-2 +1/-2 - - - -
Context level
District development index -2
structural factors
household level
Age + + -/+ -/+ + +
Mother missing + + + +
Father missing + + + + +
Extended family without grandparents - -
Extended family with grandparents - -
Biological child
Birth order child -/+ -/+ -
Number of sisters + + + +
Number of brothers + + +
Number of young children in the 
household
-
Context level
living in rural area + + - -
Mean years of male education
Mean years of adult education -
labour market structure (% unskilled 
manual jobs)
+2 +2
Cultural factors
household level
Traditionality (mother 1st child < 18)
Empowerment (age diff. parents)
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presence of more children might be a reason for households to start a family businesses 
or farm. Second, it might reflect a culture with high fertility and high involvement in low-
skilled manual labor.
STRUCTURAl FACToRS AT ThE CoNTEXT lEvEl
Regarding structural factors at the context level, it is urbanization which has the most 
pronounced effect. Children living in rural areas are more engaged in commercial work, 
housework and family business work. These results imply that the demand for child 
labor is higher in rural areas and that it may consist mainly of agricultural activities. 
Although the results of Chapter 3 indicate that the likelihood increases that children are 
engaged in commercial child labor in rural areas, children in urban areas engaged in 
commercial work have longer work hours (Chapter 5). In Asia, the involvement in unpaid 
labor is mostly an urban phenomenon. 
 In Chapter 3, I showed that a higher proportion of unskilled laborers in a district is 
related to more involvement in commercial child labor. This finding supports the as-
sumption that child labor often is low-skilled manual work. It is difficult to say whether 
commercial child labor is a substitution of adult labor; it could very well mean that a 
higher demand for unskilled labor means that adults and children work side by side in 
the same industries.
 It is often argued that a lack of school facilities may cause a higher child labor sup-
ply. In my research, school facilities are reflected by the educational level of the com-
munity. In many of the analyses, I found that children in a higher educated district are 
less engaged in child labor. These results suggest that improving educational facilities, 
indeed, may reduce child labor engagement.
CUlTURAl FACToRS AT ThE hoUSEholD lEvEl
Cultural factors at the household level, such as whether the mother married young 
table 9.1 Continued
Context level
Traditionality (Mean age difference 
between spouses)
- + - -
Patriarchy (% hh with grandparents 
father’s side)
+1 +1
¹ effect is only significant in urban areas
² effect is only significant in rural areas
Note: A grey cell indicates that the factor was included in the analysis
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table 9.2 overview of the results found in this thesis for unpaid work
Chapter 6
housework
asia
Chapter 6
housework
Chapter 6
family business 
work
asia
Chapter 6
family business 
work
africa
Chapter 7
Unpaid Work
asia
Chapter 7
Unpaid Work
africa
  girls boys girls boys girls boys girls boys girls boys girls boys
resource factors      
household level  
Education father +/- +/- + + _ + + - -
Education mother - - - - - - - + +
household wealth - - - - - - - - +/- +/-
household has own land + + + +
household has cattle + + + +
household has tap water - - - - -  
household has electricity - - - - - - -
household has land and livestock + +
Context level
District development index
National GDP per capita
structural factors
household level
Age + + +/- +/- -/+ + +/- +/- + + +
Mother missing +
Father missing + + + +
Extended family without grandparents - - + -
Extended family with grandparents - -
Biological child
Birth order child - - - - - - - -/+ -/+
Number of sisters + + + + +
Number of brothers + + + + + + +
Number of young children in the household +
Context level
living in rural area + + + + + + -
Mean years of adult education - - - - - - -
Cultural factors
Context level
Traditionality (Mean age difference between spouses) - - +
Patriarchy (% hh with grandparents father’s side) + - - - -
Note: A grey cell indicates that the factor was included in the analysis
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table 9.2 overview of the results found in this thesis for unpaid work
Chapter 6
housework
asia
Chapter 6
housework
Chapter 6
family business 
work
asia
Chapter 6
family business 
work
africa
Chapter 7
Unpaid Work
asia
Chapter 7
Unpaid Work
africa
  girls boys girls boys girls boys girls boys girls boys girls boys
resource factors      
household level  
Education father +/- +/- + + _ + + - -
Education mother - - - - - - - + +
household wealth - - - - - - - - +/- +/-
household has own land + + + +
household has cattle + + + +
household has tap water - - - - -  
household has electricity - - - - - - -
household has land and livestock + +
Context level
District development index
National GDP per capita
structural factors
household level
Age + + +/- +/- -/+ + +/- +/- + + +
Mother missing +
Father missing + + + +
Extended family without grandparents - - + -
Extended family with grandparents - -
Biological child
Birth order child - - - - - - - -/+ -/+
Number of sisters + + + + +
Number of brothers + + + + + + +
Number of young children in the household +
Context level
living in rural area + + + + + + -
Mean years of adult education - - - - - - -
Cultural factors
Context level
Traditionality (Mean age difference between spouses) - - +
Patriarchy (% hh with grandparents father’s side) + - - - -
Note: A grey cell indicates that the factor was included in the analysis
156
and the age difference between parents, do not have any effect on the engagement in 
commercial child labor. Moreover, concepts such as empowerment are also captured 
through the educational level and labor market participation of women. These factors 
have been found to influence child labor in many of the analyses in this study. Women’s 
education decreases the likelihood and number of hours spent on child labor. In my 
opinion, women’s educational level is the best household indicator for the position of 
women and empowerment. Mother’s employment differently affects child labor: I found 
that children with working mothers sometimes are more engaged in child labor. This 
might indicate that children go along their mothers to the workplace. In the analyses in 
Chapter 5 to 7, I have not controlled for cultural values at the household level.
CUlTURAl FACToRS AT ThE CoNTEXT lEvEl
The cultural context, and especially patriarchy, plays an important role in explain-
ing child labor. Children living in patriarchal districts are more often engaged in child 
labor. This could reflect a patriarchal culture in which children are expected to learn 
by doing as a preparation for their future professions. In addition, patriarchy is in 
Asia associated with more housework for boys. In Africa, both girls and boys living in 
patriarchal areas are less involved in housework and family business work. This might 
reflect the different prevailing patriarchal kinship systems in Africa and Asia. In Africa, 
women living in patriarchal environments have more autonomy than in Asia (kandi-
yoty, 1988), which enables them to improve the welfare and living situations of their 
children.
9.3.3 researCh QUestion 3: differenCes in the baCkgroUnd 
CharaCteristiCs betWeen girls and boys
Regarding the differences between girls and boys, I showed that boys spend relatively 
more hours on commercial work outside the household and girls tend to spend more 
time on housework. With respect to family business work and unpaid work outside the 
household, gender differences are smaller. Boys are somewhat more engaged in family 
business work and in unpaid work outside their household; but especially in Africa, girls 
are about equally engaged in these kinds of work. In Asia, the role of women and girls is 
clearly more centered in the domestic sphere.
 When effects of background characteristics differ between boys and girls, it is mostly 
the strength of the effect that differs. Table 9.1 and 9.2 show that the effects of resource 
factors are mostly the same for boys and girls. however, some effects are only signifi-
cant for either boys or girls. For example, the availability of tap water and electricity 
decreases the involvement of boys in family business work and unpaid work in Asia, indi-
cating that these types of work are gender-specific.
 Turning to the structural factors, I found only a small number of differences in the 
background characteristics between girls and boys. however, there are a few factors 
that are significant only for either girls or boys. For example, in extended families with-
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out grandparents, boys are less involved in family business work, probably indicating a 
preference for male adult workers in family business work.
 The cultural factors patriarchy and traditionality seem to explain some of the gender 
differences in child labor engagement. Boys, for instance, spend more hours on com-
mercial work in traditional areas. on the other hand, Asian girls living in more traditio-
nal areas are less engaged in family business work. These results reinforce the notions 
that the place of Asian women is more in the household and boys in more traditional 
areas are expected to take over the family business.
9.3.4 researCh QUestion 4: differenCes in the baCkgroUnd 
CharaCteristiCs betWeen rUral and Urban areas
For the chance to be engaged in commercial child labor, I tested whether coefficients 
are significantly different between rural and urban areas. For the analyses on hours 
spent on paid and unpaid labor I presented average effects, and interaction effects are 
added to the model when they are significantly higher or lower in rural areas. In sum-
mary Table 9.1, I added footnotes to indicate whether an effect only is significant for 
urban or rural areas (Chapter 3) and I will summarize the differences between rural and 
urban areas in for hours spent on commercial work (Chapter 5) and unpaid child labor 
(Chapter 7) in different sections.
DIFFERENCES IN ThE BACkGRoUND ChARACTERISTICS FoR ThE 
ENGAGEMENT IN CoMMERCIAl WoRk BET WEEN RURAl AND URBAN 
AREAS 
With respect to the engagement in commercial work, I showed that there are fascinating 
differences in the effects of mother’s education and household wealth between rural and 
urban areas. In urban areas, children with higher educated mothers are less engaged 
in commercial child labor, but the likelihood of being engaged in commercial child labor 
is higher for children with a working mother in rural areas. These results indicate that 
children living in rural areas cannot profit from their mother’s resources and perhaps 
work side by side their mothers at the workplace.
 A second contradictory effect is the effect of wealth. Children living in wealthier 
families are less involved in commercial child labor in rural areas, but more involved in 
commercial child labor in urban areas. This must mean that demand factors in urban 
areas pulls these relatively richer children into the labor market. It must be noted that 
this effect has been found not to be robust (see the robustness test in Appendix A) and 
that the demand for child labor in urban and rural areas is probably country-specific.
 Regarding the effects of context factors on the engagement in commercial child 
labor, there are many differences between rural and urban areas. These differences 
suggest that the demand for commercial child labor affects different groups differently. 
Moreover, the results suggest that the role of patriarchy may be context-specific. For 
example, the labor market structure, measured by the proportion of unskilled male 
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laborers, only affects the labor engagement of children in rural areas. In urban areas, a 
higher demand for unskilled laborers (mostly) has no effect on commercial child labor. 
The context-specific nature of patriarchy is reflected through the significant increase 
in child labor in urban patriarchal areas. Finally, the only group that is affected by the 
district level of development is (rural) girls: a group we might least expect. Whatever 
the reason (successful policies, lower demand for girl child laborers) for this unex-
pected effect may be; it tells us that zooming in on specific groups and regions is most 
important.
DIFFERENCES IN ThE BACkGRoUND ChARACTERISTICS FoR hoURS SPENT 
oN CoMMERCIAl WoRk BET WEEN RURAl AND URBAN AREAS
With respect to differences in the background characteristics between rural and urban 
areas, I found more significant interactions with urbanization in Asia than in Africa. For 
instance, the child labor decreasing effects of parental education are less pronounced in 
rural areas in Asia. This implies that higher educated parents in urban areas are more 
able to free their children from child labor.
 on the other hand, we see that missing a father is less problematic in rural areas. In 
my view, this could mean that children in these families receive more community help. 
Interestingly, the child labor increasing effect of living in a household without the mother 
is reinforced in rural areas, which indicates that single fathers might be more willing to 
let their children engage in commercial work than single mothers. lastly, the differ-
ences in the engagement between boys and girls in traditional Asia are even stronger in 
rural areas.
 In Africa, there are only two significant interaction effects with urbanization. In rural 
areas, older children have more responsibilities than children of the same age in urban 
areas. Children living in wealthier families work fewer hours in commercial child labor, 
but this effect is smaller in rural areas, supporting the situational dominance hypothesis 
which argues that when there are fewer possibilities, the situation dominates.
DIFFERENCES IN ThE BACkGRoUND ChARACTERISTICS FoR hoURS SPENT 
oN UNPAID WoRk BET WEEN RURAl AND URBAN AREAS
In Chapter 7, I argued that unpaid children’s work may have a different nature in Asia 
and Africa. These differences are also reflected in the interaction effects with the back-
ground characteristics between rural and urban areas. For example, in rural Asia; boys 
work more hours when their household has access to electricity; indicating that access 
to electricity could lead to more productive small businesses. Note that improving the 
access to basic services could result in this unintended side-effect.
 The agricultural character of unpaid work in Africa is reinforced by the many sig-
nificant interaction effects with living in a rural area in Africa. I showed that children 
in rural areas in Africa with access to running water are less engaged in unpaid work 
for others, probably consisting of water fetching and tasks related to irrigation. lastly, 
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children living in rural households without their father in Africa are more involved in 
unpaid labor. Single parent families might receive community help in return to the 
unpaid help of their children.
SITUATIoNAl DoMINANCE vS. DoMINANCE oF RESoURCES? 
According to the situational dominance hypothesis, in areas with fewer possibilities, 
resources matter less. This would mean that in rural areas, effects of resource factors 
would be smaller. The other scenario would be that parents with a higher socio-eco-
nomic background will find ways to educate their children and free them of child labor 
even if they live under harder circumstances in rural areas. According to this hypothesis, 
we would expect a larger child labor reducing effect of parental education and wealth in 
rural areas. 
 The results of this thesis do not point into the direction of either one of these hy-
potheses. Sometimes, the situation seems to dominate, and sometimes the effect of the 
resources. however, this seems to be caused by the fact that it is not really clear what 
‘possibilities’ and ‘harder circumstances’ mean. Consequently, if one interprets a pos-
sibility as a chance to go to school, then there generally are fewer possibilities in rural 
areas. on the other hand, a ‘possibility’ could also be translated as a way to earn money 
to contribute to the family income. In that sense, there might be more possibilities in 
rural areas. hence, simply stating that a situation is more positive or more negative is a 
too simplified model of reality; and further theorizing on child labor should take that into 
account.
9.3.5 researCh QUestion 5: differenCes in the baCkgroUnd 
CharaCteristiCs betWeen asia and afriCa
Regarding the differences in the background characteristics between Asia and Africa, 
the most important result that catches the eye in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 is that, except for 
unpaid (both within the household and for others) work, many background character-
istics do affect child labor in Asia but they do not in Africa. This is most pronounced 
for hours spent on commercial work. In Africa, the engagement in commercial work is 
primarily influenced by socio-economic factors1.These results indicate that wealth is 
the most important driving factor, and that structural and cultural factors only become 
influential in more developed regions, as is the case in Asia.
 With respect to housework and family business work, Asia and Africa differ most in 
the direction of the effects of patriarchy. They tell us, that although the statistical instru-
ment is the same, it measures two different kinship systems. These results reinforce 
earlier findings from ethnographic research (kandiyoti, 1988) that African women have 
more autonomy in patriarchal communities.
 From the findings in Chapter 7, I conclude that in Africa unpaid work probably mostly 
is done at neighboring family farms and businesses. If families help each other, they 
also can ask for help in return when they need the help in harsher times. In Africa, 
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children living in the poorest families, who lack the resources for setting up a farm or 
business, are less engaged in unpaid labor than somewhat richer children. As a result, 
their children cannot profit from these social safety nets and are at risk to stay poor in 
adult life.
9.4 poliCy reCoMMendations
In Chapter 8, I showed that there is a negative association between children’s work and 
school enrollment. In light of these facts and initiatives such as the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals program, child labor has been on the agenda of many governments and 
organizations. So what can policy makers do reduce child labor and get these children 
into school?
 Based on the literature on child labor, I would say that one can divide child labor 
policy into two kinds: (1) policy aimed at reaching children and caretakers in order 
to decrease the child labor supply; (2) policy designed to lower the demand for child 
labor through laws aimed at changing firm policies or international trade agreements. 
Another distinction can be made in stimulative and restrictive policy; or in other words 
positive and negative inceptions. Similar to the child labor model in this thesis, poli-
cies are not restricted to one level, but there may be policies at the local, national and 
international level. Figure 9.1 presents an overview of policies aimed at reducing child 
labor. This overview is by far not complete but it is meant to illustrate the different types 
of policies and their target groups.
 Figure 9.1 clearly shows that there a two sides of the coin. A policy might be good 
in reducing the labor supply, but if there is still a large demand for child labor, children 
might be still pulled into the labor market. The fact that effective law enforcement is 
mentioned twice at the local level does not mean that is it is most important; however, it 
does illustrate that an abolitionist approach and bans miss their purpose without effec-
tive law enforcement at the local level (orkin, 2010; Fors, 2012). 
 I am not offering a simple solution to a complex problem. To account for the different 
faces of child labor, policy makers should take into account that there might be differ-
ent solutions for different parts of the world. Besides that, they should take into account 
that a policy might have counter-intuitive (Basu, 2004) or unintentional effects and that 
situation-specific knowledge about the local context is very important. 
 having said that; research such as my thesis can help policy makers decide on to 
what to concentrate first. A good way to start would be to focus on the robust results. 
The consistent outcomes of my research can be summarized as follows:
 – Wealth reduces child labor
 – higher education of the parents reduces child labor
 – Access to basic services reduces child labor
 – older children work more
 – Children with a missing parent work more
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 – Children with more brothers and sisters work more
 – Children living in extended family are less involved in many kinds of work
 – Better educational infrastructure reduces children’s involvement in many kinds 
of work 
Any child labor policy should focus on the main reasons of child labor, but in order to be 
fully successful, it must take the exceptions into account. For example, raising income 
and wealth by investing in education might be a good way to start. Moreover, higher fe-
male education is also associated with lower fertility rates, which may also reduce child 
labor. Furthermore, a higher educational level may lead to a higher level of develop-
ment, better educational infrastructures and more access to basic services. More access 
to basic services reduces time spent on housework and family business work. however, 
the results on unpaid work in Chapter 7 show that this could lead to an unintended 
side- effect. In rural areas in Asia, access to basic services is associated with a higher 
engagement in unpaid work by boys. This might be apprenticeship work, which may be 
beneficial to their career, but if this work is not monitored well, these boys are at risk to 
be exploited.
IN
TE
R
N
ATIO
N
A
L
Effective law 
enforcement
Basic facilitiesLO
C
A
L
N
ATIO
N
A
L
Development aid
ILO-conventions
Effective law
enforcement
Conditional cash 
transfers
Compulsory
edcucation
Minum adult
Wages
Fair trade policies
Boycott
Anti Child labor
legislation
Subsidies
demand supply
figure 9.1 overview of policies designed to reduce child labor
Note: The light grey boxes above refer to positive inceptions; and the darker grey boxes refer to 
negative inceptions.
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 The most consistent result at the context level is that of the district’s educational 
level; if found to be significant, it always reduces child labor engagement. I therefore 
consider investing in the educational infrastructure to be one of the most powerful 
means to eradicate child labor. however, one should not neglect culture. Addressing the 
differences in cultural patterns such as patriarchy and traditionality is one of the chal-
lenges of child labor policy. Interestingly, the results in this thesis suggest that tradition-
ality and patriarchal structures, to some extent, may reduce child labor engagement. 
Within the household economy of patriarchal families, co-residing family members often 
seem to lighten the workload of children. At the context level, we see similar phenom-
ena. Because children living in a household with one of their parents missing often are 
found to be more engaged in child labor, extended family households might be more 
able to cope with the many uncertainties of daily life. A shift to a more modern society 
with modern family types could therefore mean a (temporary) increase in child labor. 
As many authors stress the role of credit constraints and uncertainties (Cigno, 2011; 
Fors, 2012; Edmonds & Pavcnik, 2005); local support to nuclear or single parent families 
might be one of the top priorities of governments and donor organizations. 
 The results in this thesis may not be very encouraging, but there are examples of 
successful policy, such as the conditional cash transfer system (Bolsa Escola) in Brazil. 
The developments in Brazil show that an integrative approach to child labor could help 
to develop several policy measures to raise educational attainment, reduce child labor 
and to improve living standards and the access to basic services. Together this may lead 
to a situation in which both the child labor demand and the supply is at a minimum, 
which could really end the exploitative use of children’s hands (UCW, 2011).
9.5 disCUssion
This thesis has made several theoretical and empirical contributions to the child labor 
literature. A first empirical contribution is the overview of the incidence of child labor 
in developing countries. As I could use data with very specific information on the time 
involvement of children in 16 countries in Asia and Africa, I was able to make an over-
view of the time children spend on all the forms of child labor. These data allowed me to 
make the first accurate portrayal of the extent of hidden child labor (namely housework 
and family business work) within households. In addition, it also sheds more light on 
unpaid work done by children as apprentices or neighboring help.
 An important theoretical contribution is the new theoretical framework on child 
labor. This model distinguishes three levels (household, district and nation) and three 
groups of explanatory variables: resources, structure and culture. Each of the three 
groups refers to another strand of the literature; economics, sociology and anthropol-
ogy. The model was subsequently tested using multilevel analyses on four forms of child 
labor: commercial work, housework, family business work and unpaid work for others. 
The multilevel approach allowed me to simultaneously investigate effects of household 
and context factors. In addition, I could test whether the effects of background effects 
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were different under the different circumstances in rural and urban areas and in Asia 
and Africa. As these analyses not only shed more light into the factors influencing all 
types of child labor, but also revealed many differences, the analyses can be consid-
ered as the second very important empirical contribution to the child labor literature. It 
makes the many hours of work worth it.
 Although my research has reached most of it aims, I am still aware of its limita-
tions and shortcomings. I would like to mention a few and give suggestions for further 
research. As I explained earlier, I have been able to show significant and robust rela-
tionships for different child labor outcomes. Critics may say that, using income as an 
independent variable and child labor as an outcome variable, reverse causality and 
endogeniety problems may arise. however, I use a wealth index which is aggregated for 
several household assets as a proxy for the household’s economic situation and income. 
This has the advantage that, since the acquisition of goods such as a television and a 
house made of firm material goes further back in time, the classical endogeneity prob-
lem is less likely to occur. Besides, as I found robust relationships between wealth and 
other resource factors, the findings in this thesis are in itself interesting for the scientific 
community and policy makers.
 In addition to that, I use household survey data from two sources: DhS and MICS. 
Both sources have their advantages and drawbacks. A major disadvantage of the MICS 
for scientific research is that these surveys do not include information about parental 
occupation. Since parental occupation often is one of the key identifiers of children’s 
school enrollment or labor market engagement (both for present and future jobs) in 
stratification research, I would like to have been able to control for this factor. The value 
of this variable in explaining child labor decisions probably is best illustrated by the 
results of Chapter 3. In this chapter, I used DhS-data in which parental occupation is 
available and I showed that children with fathers who work in an upper non-farm profes-
sion are less engaged in commercial child labor. I believe that if parental occupation 
were available in the MICS-data, much of the unexpected results of fathers’ education 
would disappear. Further, although I have shown which factors are of importance in de-
termining unpaid child labor, I could only guess whether children worked as apprentices 
or helped at neighboring farms. hence, more detailed questions on the nature of unpaid 
work for others outside the household would lead to a better understanding of the these 
unpaid activities. To overcome these data constraints, I would advise organizations 
such as MICS and DhS to add a couple of questions about parental occupation and the 
nature of children’s unpaid work outside the household in their survey questionnaires. It 
must be noted, however, that both MICS and DhS have made tremendous progress by 
harmonizing the child labor modules in the most recent years and I would like to com-
pliment both organizations on this.
 This thesis contains two analyses on the engagement in commercial work. Three 
countries (Sierra leone, Malawi and Bangladesh) are included in both analyses. For 
these countries, the incidence in commercial child labor differs between these two data 
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sources. For Malawi and Bangladesh, the average engagement is, with a 3 to 5 percent 
difference, only somewhat higher than the average in MICS. The difference for Sierra 
leone is, with approximately 20 percent, more substantial. As the survey from DhS is 
from 2008 and the MICS from 2005, this difference might be explained by the different 
time points. Because both sources are respectable representative household surveys, 
it remains still difficult to say whether one of the two sources suffers from a selection 
bias. however, because the MICS child labor modules contain detailed questions on the 
number of hours children work; I chose to use this data source for the bulk of my analy-
ses.
 I have high quality data for the household characteristics, but when it comes to the 
characteristics of the context, there is room for improvement. I have aggregated proxy 
variables for the indicators of the resource, structural and cultural variables. At the 
district level, information is hard to find for, among others, the actual demand for child 
labor. one suggestion for future research would be identifying and collecting data about 
labor intensive industries, such as diamond and gold mining, and crops, such as cotton 
and cacao, all known for their widespread involvement of children. 
 Because I use household surveys, this thesis could not include the worst forms of 
child labor, such as child prostitution, bonded child labor, and child soldiers. Moreover, 
children living in the streets or orphanages are generally not included in household 
surveys either. When it comes to the poorest of the poorest, household surveys are not a 
good means to study child labor.
 Most of the variation in child labor can be explained by household factors, but as I 
have shown in this thesis, parents are also influenced by their surroundings. To account 
for country differences, I sometimes included national GDP per capita as a control fac-
tor. It may be worthwhile to look at the influence of international agreements, trade or 
globalization. Following Clark (2011) who has found a child labor increasing effect of 
foreign direct investment and a child labor decreasing effect for the number of non-gov-
ernmental institutions in a country, it would be interesting to see if these macro-effects 
are still there when controlled for the household and district characteristics.
 one of the limitations of this work lies in the interpretation of unexpected effects. 
In the case of this thesis, particularly the effects of patriarchy often are contradictory 
and sometimes counterintuitive. I explain these by mentioning the literature on differ-
ent kind of kinship patterns. however, to really understand what is going on, we need 
stories from up-close. Especially for the relatively unexplored category ‘unpaid labor 
for others’ this might be very important. Despite the fact that I have unraveled many of 
the determining factors of unpaid labor, we still do not know if this work is neighboring 
help, apprenticeships or other unpaid work. however, this is probably a crucial detail 
to determine the consequences of the involvement in unpaid labor. on the other hand, 
results from large scale comparative research – such as my study – may also inspire 
anthropologists or development practitioners to study whether these patterns are also 
found in specific regions or countries. Moreover, it might also be worthwhile to further 
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explore the relationship with patriarchy with other outcomes, such as children’s health. 
 Finally, I hope that the findings in this thesis inspire other researchers interested in 
child labor to focus more on all forms of unpaid labor, such as housework, family busi-
ness work and unpaid work for others. During my visit to Turkey in the first part of 2012, 
I spoke with several child labor experts, which make me realize that, although unpaid 
work can have a symbolic value or lead to valuable work experience later in life; espe-
cially girls, who are relatively most engaged in unpaid child labor, are most vulnerable to 
miss out on the chance to go to school and to get a better future than their parents.
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban
boys
rural
girls
rural
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.018 **
Education mother (years -0.030 ** 0.015
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm -0.115
upper non-farm -0.370 ** -0.242 ** 0.205 * -0.289 **
Mother employed 0.326 ** 0.327 **  0.373 **   0.110 *
Wealth 0.115 **  -0.067 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl  0.196
Age 0.122 ** 0.173 **
Father missing 0.119 **  0.016
Mother missing  0.094 **
Extended family without grandparents  -0.026
Extended family with grandparents  0.001
Biological child  -0.064
Birth order child  -0.081 **
Birth order quadratic   0.004 *
Number of sisters  0.034 *
Number of brothers   0.053 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18   0.003
age difference partners   0.001
Context factors
living in rural area 0.100 **
District level development -0.230  -0.019  -0.397 *  -0.187
Mean years of male education   0.261  -0.130
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs1  0.042  0.076 0.203 *  0.322 **
Mean age difference between spouses  -0.121 -0.379 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
 0.357 **  0.035
N 239,120 117,177 121,943 97,923 141,197 48,078 49,845 69, 099 72, 098
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
table a.1 Coefficients of multilevel logistic regression models for children age 8–13 with working 
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban
boys
rural
girls
rural
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.018 **
Education mother (years -0.030 ** 0.015
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm -0.115
upper non-farm -0.370 ** -0.242 ** 0.205 * -0.289 **
Mother employed 0.326 ** 0.327 **  0.373 **   0.110 *
Wealth 0.115 **  -0.067 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl  0.196
Age 0.122 ** 0.173 **
Father missing 0.119 **  0.016
Mother missing  0.094 **
Extended family without grandparents  -0.026
Extended family with grandparents  0.001
Biological child  -0.064
Birth order child  -0.081 **
Birth order quadratic   0.004 *
Number of sisters  0.034 *
Number of brothers   0.053 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18   0.003
age difference partners   0.001
Context factors
living in rural area 0.100 **
District level development -0.230  -0.019  -0.397 *  -0.187
Mean years of male education   0.261  -0.130
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs1  0.042  0.076 0.203 *  0.322 **
Mean age difference between spouses  -0.121 -0.379 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
 0.357 **  0.035
N 239,120 117,177 121,943 97,923 141,197 48,078 49,845 69, 099 72, 098
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
outside the household as dependent variable 
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban 
boys
rural 
girls
rural 
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.011 **
Education mother (years -0.041 ** -0.016 **
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm -0.056
upper non-farm -0.438 ** -0.222 ** 0.192 * -0.330 **
Mother employed 0.381 ** 0.380 **  0.400 **   0.089 *
Wealth -0.074 ** -0.059 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl   0.438 **
Age 0.115 ** 0.186 **
Father missing 0.085 **  0.033
Mother missing 0.086 **
Extended family without grandparents  -0.006
Extended family with grandparents  0.015
Biological child  -0.087 *
Birth order child  -0.086 **
Birth order quadratic   0.005 *
Number of sisters  0.026 *
Number of brothers   0.044 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18   0.010
Age difference partners   0.000
Context factors
living in rural area 0.145 **
District level development -0.302 *  -0.088  -0.416 *  -0.201
Mean years of male education   0.172  -0.143
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs 0.135  0.155 0.181 * 0.312 **
Mean age difference between spouses  -0.192 -0.443 **
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
 0.331 **   0.007
N 223,010 109,489 113,521 92,000 131,010 45,175 46,825 64,314 66,696
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
table a.2 Coefficients of multilevel logistic regression models for children age 8–13 with working 
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban 
boys
rural 
girls
rural 
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.011 **
Education mother (years -0.041 ** -0.016 **
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm -0.056
upper non-farm -0.438 ** -0.222 ** 0.192 * -0.330 **
Mother employed 0.381 ** 0.380 **  0.400 **   0.089 *
Wealth -0.074 ** -0.059 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl   0.438 **
Age 0.115 ** 0.186 **
Father missing 0.085 **  0.033
Mother missing 0.086 **
Extended family without grandparents  -0.006
Extended family with grandparents  0.015
Biological child  -0.087 *
Birth order child  -0.086 **
Birth order quadratic   0.005 *
Number of sisters  0.026 *
Number of brothers   0.044 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18   0.010
Age difference partners   0.000
Context factors
living in rural area 0.145 **
District level development -0.302 *  -0.088  -0.416 *  -0.201
Mean years of male education   0.172  -0.143
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs 0.135  0.155 0.181 * 0.312 **
Mean age difference between spouses  -0.192 -0.443 **
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
 0.331 **   0.007
N 223,010 109,489 113,521 92,000 131,010 45,175 46,825 64,314 66,696
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
outside the household as dependent variable, without Benin
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban 
boys
rural 
girls
rural 
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.018 **
Education mother (years -0.032 ** 0.015 **
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm   -0.121 **
upper non-farm -0.384 ** -0.258 **  0.211 * -0.303 **
Mother employed 0.329 ** 0.328 **   0.387 **     0.116 **
Wealth -0.117 ** -0.070 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl   0.199 *
Age 0.127 ** 0.180 **
Father missing 0.114 **   0.019
Mother missing 0.099 **
Extended family without grandparents  -0.031
Extended family with grandparents  0.001
Biological child   -0.073 **
Birth order child -0.083 **
Birth order quadratic    0.004 *
Number of sisters   0.034 *
Number of brothers    0.054 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18    0.006
Age difference partners    0.001
Context factors
living in rural area 0.111 **
District level development  -0.266 *   -0.045  -0.424 *    -0.202
Mean years of male education    0.205   -0.188
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs  0.118 0.154 0.278 ** 0.398 **
Mean age difference between spouses   -0.055  -0.321 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
  0.402 **   0.065
N 238,538 116,883 121,655 97,809 140,729 48,020 49,789 68,863 71,866
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
table a.3 Coefficients of multilevel logistic regression models for children age 8–13 with working 
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban 
boys
rural 
girls
rural 
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.018 **
Education mother (years -0.032 ** 0.015 **
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm   -0.121 **
upper non-farm -0.384 ** -0.258 **  0.211 * -0.303 **
Mother employed 0.329 ** 0.328 **   0.387 **     0.116 **
Wealth -0.117 ** -0.070 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl   0.199 *
Age 0.127 ** 0.180 **
Father missing 0.114 **   0.019
Mother missing 0.099 **
Extended family without grandparents  -0.031
Extended family with grandparents  0.001
Biological child   -0.073 **
Birth order child -0.083 **
Birth order quadratic    0.004 *
Number of sisters   0.034 *
Number of brothers    0.054 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18    0.006
Age difference partners    0.001
Context factors
living in rural area 0.111 **
District level development  -0.266 *   -0.045  -0.424 *    -0.202
Mean years of male education    0.205   -0.188
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs  0.118 0.154 0.278 ** 0.398 **
Mean age difference between spouses   -0.055  -0.321 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
  0.402 **   0.065
N 238,538 116,883 121,655 97,809 140,729 48,020 49,789 68,863 71,866
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
outside the household as dependent variable, without Uganda
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban 
boys
rural 
girls
rural 
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.029 **
Education mother (years -0.049 ** -0.039 **
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm    -0.223 **
upper non-farm  -0.139 -0.378 ** 0.310 * -0.317 **
Mother employed   0.303 ** 0.294 **  0.442 **     0.117 **
Wealth -0.134 ** -0.076 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl   0.089
Age 0.122 **   0.183 **
Father missing 0.159 **   -0.008
Mother missing 0.107 **
Extended family without grandparents   -0.044 *
Extended family with grandparents   0.029
Biological child    -0.076 **
Birth order child  -0.061 **
Birth order quadratic     0.003 *
Number of sisters    0.034 *
Number of brothers    0.050 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18     0.022
Age difference partners     0.000
Context factors
living in rural area 0.067 **
District level development -0.529 **  -0.210  -0.684 **    -0.364 **
Mean years of male education       0.331 **   -0.096
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs 0.176 *   0.124 0.291 ** 0.349 **
Mean age difference between spouses   -0.090   -0.245 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
   0.238 **   0.074
N 165,856 81,712 84,144 68,922 96,934 34,221 34,701 47,491 49,443
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
table a.4 Coefficients of multilevel logistic regression models for children age 8–13 with working 
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all girls boys Urban rural Urban 
girls
Urban 
boys
rural 
girls
rural 
boys
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
household factors
Socio-economic factors
Education father (years) -0.029 **
Education mother (years -0.049 ** -0.039 **
occupation father
farm Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
lower non-farm    -0.223 **
upper non-farm  -0.139 -0.378 ** 0.310 * -0.317 **
Mother employed   0.303 ** 0.294 **  0.442 **     0.117 **
Wealth -0.134 ** -0.076 **
Demographic factors
Sex = girl   0.089
Age 0.122 **   0.183 **
Father missing 0.159 **   -0.008
Mother missing 0.107 **
Extended family without grandparents   -0.044 *
Extended family with grandparents   0.029
Biological child    -0.076 **
Birth order child  -0.061 **
Birth order quadratic     0.003 *
Number of sisters    0.034 *
Number of brothers    0.050 **
Mother got 1st child under age 18     0.022
Age difference partners     0.000
Context factors
living in rural area 0.067 **
District level development -0.529 **  -0.210  -0.684 **    -0.364 **
Mean years of male education       0.331 **   -0.096
Proportion men unskilled manual jobs 0.176 *   0.124 0.291 ** 0.349 **
Mean age difference between spouses   -0.090   -0.245 *
Proportion hh with grandparents from father’s 
side
   0.238 **   0.074
N 165,856 81,712 84,144 68,922 96,934 34,221 34,701 47,491 49,443
* P<0.05  ** P<0.01
outside the household as dependent variable, without India
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 saMenvatting (sUMMary in dUtCh) 
kinderarbeid kent vele gezichten. We denken al snel aan kinderen die voetballen naaien 
in sweatshops. Maar in de realiteit houden kinderen zich bezig met veel andere soorten 
werk. Zo werken ze ook vaak in het familiebedrijf of boerderij, in het huishouden of voor 
buren en andere leden van de gemeenschap.
 kinderarbeid is van alle tijden. Tijdens de industriële revolutie werkten kinderen 
vaak lange dagen onder vaak gevaarlijke en soms fatale omstandigheden. In die tijd 
ontstonden de eerste wetten tegen kinderarbeid. ook kwam er meer aandacht voor on-
derwijs, wat in de loop van de tijd in veel landen verplicht werd gesteld. In veel landen is 
er daarom nog nauwelijks sprake van kinderarbeid, maar toch is het probleem nog lang 
niet uitgeband. Met name in ontwikkelingslanden zijn er nog veel jonge kinderen aan 
het werk. ontwikkelingsorganisaties, internationale instanties en nationale regeringen 
proberen met afspraken, hulp en wetten hier wel wat aan te doen, maar het probleem is 
hardnekkig. ondanks al die inspanningen, schatte de International labor organisation 
(Ilo) dat er in 2010 wereldwijd 215 miljoen kinderen waren betrokken bij kinderarbeid. 
 Waarom is dit probleem zo hardnekkig? Een regering kan wel beloven, bijvoorbeeld 
door middel van het tekenen van een verdrag, zich in te spannen om kinderarbeid te 
voorkomen, maar als het niet de middelen heeft om wetten te maken en uit te voeren, is 
dit een wassen neus.
 Armoede is een veelgenoemde oorzaak van kinderarbeid. En inderdaad, het zijn 
vaak de arme kinderen in arme landen die werken. het kan echter niet alle verschillen 
verklaren. Recentelijk rapporteerde de Ilo dat kinderarbeid is gedaald. Dit valt tegelijk 
met de wereldwijde financiële crisis. Als armoede de belangrijkste oorzaak is, zouden 
we in dat geval niet een toename in het aanbod van kinderarbeid moeten verwachten? 
Aan de andere kant leidt minder internationale handel wellicht ook tot minder vraag 
naar kinderarbeiders.
DE BIJDRAGE vAN DIT PRoEFSChRIFT
In dit proefschrift wil ik recht doen aan de realiteit van werkende kinderen in ontwik-
kelingslanden. In veel eerdere studies wordt voornamelijk gekeken naar betaald werk 
(voor geld of in natura), maar ik kijk ook naar soorten onbetaald werk, zoals huishoude-
lijk werk, werk voor het familiebedrijf, burenhulp en stages. voor al deze soorten werk 
bekijk ik in welke mate kinderen hierin betrokken zijn en waarom ze hierin werken. het 
zwaartepunt van de analyses ligt op landen in Afrika en Azië.
 omdat niet alleen de kenmerken van het kind en het gezin, maar ook de directe 
omgeving waarin het kind opgroeit bepaalt of het kind al dan niet werkt, neem ik beide 
niveaus in de analyse mee. veel van de eerdere onderzoeken naar kinderarbeid richten 
zich op één land of regio. Door kinderen uit meerdere landen tegelijk mee te nemen in 
de analyse is het mogelijk om te bepalen welke factoren op de beide niveaus van invloed 
zijn en in welke mate. 
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 om tot een set toetsbare hypothesen te komen breng ik de bestaande literatuur uit 
verschillende disciplines samen in een nieuw model. Dat model kan toegepast worden 
op alle analyseniveaus en soorten kinderarbeid. Door de verschillende vormen van kin-
derarbeid op deze systematische manier uiteen te zetten en door empirische informatie 
te geven, kan dit proefschrift een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan het bestaande onder-
zoek naar kinderarbeid. 
oNDERZoEkSvRAGEN
Met mijn eerste onderzoeksvraag wil ik in kaart brengen hoe omvangrijk het kinderar-
beidprobleem is. De eerste vraag luidt daarom als volgt:
1. hoeveel komt het voor dat kinderen werken in de verschillende vormen van 
kinderarbeid? hoeveel uren werken kinderen gemiddeld betaald, in het huishou-
den, het familiebedrijf en onbetaald buiten het huishouden?
het tweede doel van mijn proefschrift is het ontwikkelen van een nieuw theoretisch ka-
der. om dit doel te verwezenlijken moeten we eerst weten hoe factoren op het niveau van 
het huishouden kinderarbeid beïnvloeden. De ouders van deze kinderen zullen daarnaast 
ook kijken naar de omgeving. Als er geen vraag is naar kinderarbeid, zullen ze niet gaan 
werken. Daarnaast worden ouders beïnvloed door culturele patronen, bijvoorbeeld de rol 
van vrouwen in de economie. Mijn tweede vraag is daarom opgedeeld in twee delen:
2. A: Wat is het effect van de kenmerken van het huishouden waarin het kind leeft 
op de deelname aan kinderarbeid.
2.  B. Wat is het effect van contextkenmerken op de deelname aan kinderarbeid? 
ouders hebben verschillende toekomstbeelden van hun zonen en dochters. van jon-
gens wordt vaker verwacht het familiebedrijf of boerderij over te nemen en van meisjes 
huisvrouw te worden. om ze voor te bereiden op hun toekomstige rol, zullen kinderen op 
jonge leeftijd vaak sekse-specifieke werkzaamheden uitvoeren. Jongens zijn ook vaker 
bezig met zwaardere taken en leren vaardigheden die ze later goed kunnen gebruiken. 
Meisjes worden vaker verwacht te helpen in het huishouden en bij de zorg voor hun 
broertjes en zusjes. Deze verschillen worden ook weerspiegeld in betaald werk. Meisjes 
mogen soms alleen maar binnenshuis werken. Als ze al buitenshuis werken is het vaak 
in verschillende sectoren en taken. Jongens zijn bijvoorbeeld vaker werkzaam in de vis-
serij en meisjes meer in de textielindustrie. om in te gaan op deze verschillen luidt de 
derde vraag als volgt:
3. In welke mate verschillen de effecten van huishoud- en contextfactoren tussen 
jongens en meisjes? 
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huishoudfactoren hebben niet alleen een direct effect op kinderarbeid, maar zijn ook 
afhankelijk van de context. het vierde doel van dit proefschrift is begrijpen hoe de ef-
fecten van kenmerken van het huishouden beïnvloed worden door de context waarin het 
kind leeft. omdat er veel verschillen zijn in de ontwikkeling, infrastructuur en cultuur 
van rurale en urbane gebieden, zal ik me vooral richten op de verschillen tussen deze 
gebieden. De vierde onderzoeksvraag leest daarom als volgt:
4. In welke mate verschillen de de effecten van huishoud- en contextfactoren tus-
sen rurale en urbane gebieden? 
Ik ga er niet zomaar vanuit dat de factoren die bepalen of een kind werkt hetzelfde zijn 
voor alle delen van de wereld. omdat eerder onderzoek suggereert dat er veel verschil-
len zijn in de oorzaken, omvang en soorten kinderarbeid in Afrika en Azië, zal ik ver-
schillende analyses doen voor deze twee delen van de wereld in het tweede deel van dit 
boek. De vijfde en laatste onderzoeksvraag luidt daarom als volgt:
5. In welke mate verschillen de de effecten van huishoud- en contextfactoren tus-
sen Afrika en Azië?
DE DATA
kwantitatieve onderzoeken zoals deze worden mogelijk gemaakt door de beschikbaar-
heid van data. vroege landenvergelijkende studies werden mogelijk gemaakt door lA-
BoRSTA van de Ilo. helaas zat onbetaald werk in het huishouden niet in deze statistie-
ken waardoor deze eerdere studies het kinderarbeidprobleem onderschatten. Sinds de 
jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw zijn er meer en meer data beschikbaar gekomen voor 
ontwikkelingslanden die grootschalig landenvergelijkend onderzoek mogelijk maken.
 In deze studie maak ik gebruik van data van de Demographic and health Surveys 
(DhS) and UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Surveys (MICS). omdat de MICS erg gedetail-
leerde vragen stellen over de bezigheden en tijdsbesteding, zijn de MICS de meest 
nuttige bron om kinderarbeid te bestuderen. ook zijn deze vragen hetzelfde voor elk 
bestudeerd land. het grootste nadeel van de MICS is dat ze, in tegenstelling tot de DhS, 
geen informatie over het beroep van de ouders bevatten.
 om het theoretische model aan een eerste test te onderwerpen gebruik ik data van 
de DhS voor 18 landen. In het tweede deel van mijn proefschrift gebruik ik de gedetail-
leerde data van MICS. Daarin bepaal ik voor 16 landen in Azië en Afrika welke factoren 
ervoor zorgen dat een kind zich bezighoudt met de verschillende soorten kinderarbeid.
INDElING vAN hET PRoEFSChRIFT
Mijn proefschrift is als volgt ingedeeld. In hoofdstuk 2 geef ik een beschrijving van 
de data en methoden. het theoretisch model word beschreven in hoofdstuk 3. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt het model ook onderworpen aan een eerste empirische test die focust 
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op de deelname van kinderen aan betaald werk. Dit doe ik door middel van multilevel 
analyse op data voor 120 kinderen die leven in 221 districten in 18 ontwikkelingslanden 
in latijns-Amerika, Afrika en India. 
 Deel 2 (hoofdstuk 4 tot 7) richt zich op kinderarbeid in Azië en Afrika. In hoofdstuk 4 
gebruik ik data voor ongeveer 178.000 kinderen in 16 landen om een overzicht te geven 
van de deelname aan betaald werk, huishoudelijk werk, werken in het familiebedrijf of 
boerderij en onbetaald werk buiten het huishouden. Deze data zijn afkomstig van MICS. 
In hoofdstuk 5 tot en met 7 gebruik ik het theoretisch model om de verschillen te ver-
klaren in gewerkte uren in deze vormen van kinderarbeid. hoofdstuk 5 gaat over betaald 
werk. In hoofdstuk 6 verklaar ik de drijvende krachten achter de deelname aan huishou-
delijk werk en werken in het familiebedrijf of boerderij. hoofdstuk 7 gaat over onbetaald 
werk buiten het huishouden.
 In deel 3 van dit proefschrift reflecteer ik op mijn bevindingen. Ik beschrijf de relatie 
tussen kinderarbeid en schooldeelname in hoofdstuk 8. In hoofdstuk 9 geef ik mijn 
conclusies en beantwoord ik de vijf onderzoeksvragen. vervolgens geef ik aanbevelingen 
voor beleidsmakers en vervolgonderzoek.
hET MoDEl 
In hoofdstuk 3 breng ik theorieën vanuit verschillende disciplines samen in 1 model (ge-
baseerd op Spierings, Smits & verloo, 2010). De verschillende factoren zijn gegroepeerd 
in drie verschillende soorten factoren: (1) (hulp)bronnen, (2) cultuur, en (3) structurele 
factoren. Deze verschillende soorten factoren kunnen van invloed zijn op verschillende 
analyseniveaus, namelijk op het niveau van het kind en gezin en van de omgeving waarin 
het kind opgroeit. Factoren op een hoger niveau kunnen interacteren met factoren op een 
lager niveau.
(hulp)bronnen zijn: De middelen waarmee een huishouden zijn leden kan voorzien in 
eten, beschutting, opleiding en ontwikkeling. Contextlevelbronnen zijn bijvoorbeeld het 
ontwikkelings- en opleidingsniveau van de gemeenschap. Ze zorgen ervoor dat ouders 
hun kinderen naar school kunnen sturen en verhogen het begrip dat onderwijs helpt bij 
het vergaren van menselijk kapitaal. 
structuur verwijst naar de familiestructuur, zoals een extended family, aantal broertjes 
en zusjes en naar eigenschappen van de context, zoals schoolvoorzieningen en eigen-
schappen van de arbeidsmarkt.
Cultuur omvat opvattingen over kinderen, socialisatie en de rol van vrouwen in de sa-
menleving. Zo meet ik bijvoorbeeld traditionele opvattingen op het huishoudniveau met 
het leeftijdsverschil in partners. op het niveau van de context, beargumenteer ik dat pa-
triarchaat leidt tot verschillen in de mate waarin kinderen deelnemen aan kinderarbeid.
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RESUlTATEN
De resultaten in dit proefschrift laten zien dat kinderen zich bezig houden met ver-
schillende soorten werk. Samenvattend kunnen we zeggen dat kinderen voornamelijk 
onbetaald werk voor het eigen huishouden verrichten. Daarnaast zijn meisjes vaker 
betrokken bij huishoudelijk werk en jongens werken meer voor het familiebedrijf of de 
boerderij. Aan de andere kant lijkt het zo te zijn dat áls kinderen zich bezig houden met 
betaald werk, ze gemiddeld lange dagen maken.
 (hulp)bronnen zijn van de huishoudkenmerken een belangrijke verklarende factor. 
Met name welvaart en een hogere opleiding van de ouders verminderen de deelname 
aan kinderarbeid. Daarnaast zorgt de beschikbaarheid van basisvoorzieningen zoals 
elektriciteit en water ervoor dat kinderen minder in het huishouden of voor het fami-
liebedrijf hoeven te werken. van de structurele factoren is het voornamelijk de gezins-
structuur die ervoor zorgt dat taken binnen het gezin verdeeld worden. kinderen die 
leven in een extended family met opa’s en oma’s of neven en nichten werken vaak 
minder. Daarnaast werken kinderen meer naarmate ze meer broers en zussen hebben. 
De gemeten culturele factoren op het huishoudniveau hebben geen effect.
 het ontwikkelingsniveau van het district is een hulpbron op contextniveau dat 
kinderarbeid op verschillende manieren beïnvloedt. het vermindert de deelname aan 
kinderarbeid in rurale gebieden. Daarnaast werken kinderen minder als ze in gebieden 
leven met betere schoolvoorzieningen. Dit noem ik zowel een hulpbronnen- als struc-
tureel effect. hoewel cultuur geen effect heeft op het gezinsniveau, is het effect van het 
patriarchaat aanzienlijk. het effect is wel verschillend voor kinderen in Afrika en Azië, 
wat duidt op verschillende vormen van het patriarchaat. In Afrika hebben vrouwen meer 
autonomie en zeggenschap over de welvaart van hun kinderen.
 Deze laatste bevinding illustreert het belang van het onderscheiden van verschil-
lende gebieden en het bestuderen van interactie-effecten tussen rurale en urbane 
gebieden. De interactie-analyses laten zien dat de effecten niet altijd hetzelfde zijn in 
alle contexten. Beleidsmakers moeten zich hier met name richten op de onbedoelde 
effecten. Bijvoorbeeld: de beschikbaarheid van basisvoorzieningen vermindert de tijd 
dat kinderen besteden aan huishoudelijk werk en werk voor het familiebedrijf. Aan de 
andere kant laat ik zien dat in Azië, de beschikbaarheid van basisvoorzieningen kan lei-
den tot meer bedrijvigheid en onbetaald werk. Dit kunnen stages zijn die goed zijn voor 
de loopbaan van het kind. Is hier echter geen goed toezicht op, bestaat de kans dat deze 
kinderen uitgebuit worden.
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